

HOWARD UNIVERSITY

**Leadership in African Public Policy:  
A Comparative Study of the Effects of African  
Political Thought on Monetary, Trade, and Aid Policy  
in The Gambia and Senegal**

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Department of African Studies and Research

by

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## DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my grandfather and namesake Suleyman Garaba Konte—the Chief of Sarre Naggeh... and to the peoples of Kontekunda... and to the Soninkara and Njiejeyen communities of Senegambia; but more broadly to the African diaspora near and far ...and to the ever-surmounting knowledge of mankind.

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## ABSTRACT

This study uses a mixed methods approach to analyze the relationship between, and convergence of, African political thought; multilateral and international policy; and the comparative socio-economic conditions of The Gambia and Senegal between the year 2009 and 2016. The research juxtaposes qualitative aspects of African political thought dimensions as crafted by hardliners like Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Patrice Lumumba, Robert Mugabe, and the late Muammar Gaddafi of Libya against exercised modern political and philosophical trends of neoliberal economic modalities of the current international monetary, trade and aid order, particularly the comparison between a pro-West Senegal and the anti-West Gambia of the recently ousted Yahya Jammeh. The study thus evaluates the correlation between a spectrum of high/low African political thought dimensions against quantitative indicators of trade, aid, and monetary fluctuations to draw conclusions about the relevance and presence of African political thought in modern African polities; and its effect on economic and human development in The Gambia and Senegal.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AEC	African Economic Community
AFDB	African Development Bank
AFPRC	Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council
ACB	African Central Bank
AIB	African Investment Bank
AMF	African Monetary Fund
APTWI	African Political Thought Word Indicator
ARC	Alliance des Radios Communautaires de Sénégal (ARC/ Sénégal)
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
BBC	British Broadcasting Company
CEMAC	Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community
CFTA	Continental Free Trade Area
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DFID	Department for International Development
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ENDA	Environment et Développement du Tiers-Monde
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GATT	General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

IBRD	International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
IFF	Illicit Financial Flows
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IP	Intellectual Property
ITO	International Trade Organization
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LPA	Lagos Plan of Action
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDRI	Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
MFN	Most Favored Nations
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPO	Non-Profit Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAP	Pan African Parliament
PRL	Pouvoir Revolutionnaire Locales (French)
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RER	Real Exchange Rate
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SDRs	Special Drawing Rights
SSA	Sub Saharan Africa
TRIMS	Trade Related Investment Measures
TRIPS	Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights



UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UKAID	UK's Department for International Development (DFID)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

## CHAPTER 1:

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background

In 1944, during the final months of World War II, the United States, Britain and the forty-four Allied nations (the original United Nations members) met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to attend an urgent meeting in an effort to finalize the framework and the rebuilding of a post-World War II global international financial order. Only four African countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa) of the current 54 African nation-states were represented that day, at that meeting (Mason and Asher, 1973). This meeting would be formally called the ‘United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference’ but would be commonly referred to as the Bretton Woods Conference. This conference would give birth to what is known today as the Bretton Woods System of global financial management – i.e. the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. It would also sow the seeds for the creation of The World Trade Organization, the UN, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Food Program (WFP) years later. Hence it was then dubbed “the new deal for a new world (Steil and Hinds, 2009).”

The Bretton Woods system of global financial management was designed in part to liberalize and free up market and financial transactions from national control, manipulation, distortion and/or protection. The goal was to regulate the international financial, monetary, and trade systems such that they would be free from any arbitrary restrictions and/or barriers that might prevent the free flow of goods, finances and services around global markets. Hence, Bretton Woods’s philosophy was built squarely on the tenets of capitalism and the free market principles of Adam Smith –the

idea of a liberal, *laissez-faire* global marketplace where rigorous private competition for goods and services could flourish. This combined with Ricardian principles of free trade and comparative advantage fueled the drive for a shift in global economics. These philosophies that once governed national economies were no longer reserved strictly for local domestic markets; the principles of *laissez-faire* capitalism would now also be the law of global international commerce. Operationally, the system was envisioned to be anchored on four main international governing bodies that would be charged with the formulation and regulation of the global financial system and related policies. These institutions are more commonly known today as the IMF; the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which would later become known as the World Bank; the GATT that would eventually be ratified in 1995 as the WTO; and the grant making factions of the United Nations, more specifically the UNDP and the World Food Program (WFP) (Singer and Reisen, 1995).

At the same time, in 1944, when international superpowers (namely the United Kingdom, France, United States, Russia) were preparing for global economic takeover, African leaders and colonial elites sat in their mansions, villas, compounds and huts consuming international riches and devouring domestic wealth at the cost of the African people and their global heritage<sup>1</sup>. The

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1 According to Mulinge and Lesetedi, the introduction of a monetary tax - namely, the hut and later poll tax was a very significant way by which colonial governments fostered the growth of corruption. Having found no meaningful monetary economies in their newly acquired territories, most colonial governments, and particularly those of British origin, introduced compulsory tax payable only in cash for purposes of meeting the cost of administration and generating cheap African labor necessary for the establishment of productive economic activities. To collect taxes, the colonial governments mostly relied on local African leaders and especially chiefs. Where chiefs did not exist or were uncooperative, new ones were appointed by the colonial powers (Richards 1959; Crowder 1968). Above all, to motivate chiefs to generate as much tax revenue as possible, and do so with zeal, the colonial administrations allowed them to retain a part of it.

mechanism that allowed for such abuse has been historically attributed to the colonial legacy of statehood and Indirect Rule. According to Ake (1996) “It is the [Western] state that brought about these leaders in Africa that have vowed to devour the resources of the continent and render its inhabitants impoverished. It was also the state that led to the incursion of the whites in Africa that led to the issue of underdevelopment in the first instance (Ake, 1996).” Many scholars also contend that indirect rule essentially transformed African leadership into a corrupted enterprise where instead of holding power in trust for the people, rulers held power in trust for the colonial authorities (Ezeanya, 2012). Thus, Africanists argue that through indirect rule, colonial leaders essentially sacrificed African people and their culture, history, resources and ultimately their future, through a process that might be described as a combination of systemic gross-negligence, political-incompetence, purposeful-disengagement, sabotage, geo-political ignorance, lack of initiative and/or an extreme lack of foresight. This lack of participation in the global competition for territory and resources would only solidify Africa’s position in the bottom rung of the global hierarchy of human dignity and freedom.

However, despite such a dreary outlook for African affairs, the tragic failure in leadership would fortunately not be the end of African dignity altogether; although it certainly would be a major setback in what had already been several lifetimes’ worth of negligible progress for that particular cause. But as circumstances had it, there would be a birth of unyielding hope for Africans in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This hope manifested itself in a group of young African leaders, individuals like Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba, Leopold Senghor, Nelson Mandela, Jomo Kenyatta, Sekou Toure, Cheikh Anta Diop, Julius Nyerere, Muammar Gadaffi, Mnamdi Azikiwe, Kenneth Kaunda, Robert Mugabe, Frantz Fanon, Thomas Sankara and many more who fought long and arduous battles for African political, economic and intellectual

independence. Although they essentially fell short in implementing all of their ambitious goals, it is undeniable that these men left a legacy that set the foundation for African progress and development for a twenty-first century economically developed-Africa. The archived documents of pre/post-colonial Africa reveal in great detail the heroic feats of these leaders. I thus contend that these men have established a blueprint for a prosperous future for the African continent, and are indeed the forefathers of African economic and political thought as we know it. Some of their founding principles and commitments are as follows:

1. Pan-Africanism
2. African Political Freedom
3. African Economic Freedom
4. African Intellectual Freedom
5. African Unity and Solidarity
6. Anti-Imperialist and Anti-Colonialism

History has revealed that these men were not only revolutionaries but also the visionaries and protectors of African heritage. For instance, after being held in prison awaiting certain death and torture, Patrice Lumumba wrote a very compelling and a heartfelt letter and plea to his wife. His final message for the African and Congolese people was one of encouragement, fulfillment, and inspiration to stand up against oppression and any imposed conditions of control by external forces. He wrote:

I want my children, whom I leave behind and perhaps will never see again, to be told that the future of the Congo is beautiful and that their country expects them, as it expects every Congolese, to fulfill the sacred task of rebuilding our independence, our

sovereignty; for without justice there is no dignity and without independence there are no free men. History will one day have its say; it will not be the history taught in the United Nations, Washington, Paris or Brussels, however, but the history taught in the countries that have rid themselves of colonialism and its puppets. Africa will write its own history, and both north and the south of the Sahara it will be a history full of glory and dignity (De Witte, “Letter to Pauline Lumumba, 2001).

Kwame Nkrumah, another prodigious Pan-African leader—the original African liberation fighter and Africa’s first president of a decolonized free and independent African nation, Ghana, understood the idea of African freedom most of all. He expounded a similar sentiment in his historic declaration at the 5th Pan-African Congress of Manchester. In it he addresses a fundamental need for solidarity and unity of the African people. The address is broad in scope but the implications are narrow in applicability— Africans need to unite against imperialism and international dominion. An excerpt from the declaration reads as follows:

The 5th Pan African Congress calls on all workers and peasants of the colonies to organize themselves. Colonial workers must be in the frontline in the battle against imperialism. The 5th Pan African Congress calls on all the intellectuals and the professionals of the colonies to take on their responsibilities. The long night is coming to an end. By fighting for union rights, the right to form cooperatives, press freedom, freedom of assembly, freedom to demonstrate or to go on strike, freedom to print and read the literature necessary for the education of the masses, you are simply using the appropriate means to win and maintain your freedom. At present, there is only one road to effective action: organizing the masses. (Declaration of the 5th Pan African Congress “To the Colonial Peoples of the World”, Manchester, 1945)

It has been nearly 75 years since Kwame Nkrumah drafted this declaration, and the long night he refers to seems to be as dark as it has ever been. Africanists have thus purported that in order to heed the voices of African political and economic thought leaders, Africans should revert back to pre-independence African leadership techniques and related political philosophy when dealing with international public organizations that govern policy both globally and locally (Lauer, 2007;

Hoekema, 2013). Others emphasize technocratic policy aspects of international relations as the critical matter, believing that effective engagement of bilateral and multilateral international relations and commerce for African leaders is what ultimately affects their collective histories and interests (Kararach, Besada, & Shaw, 2015). However, it is my contention that African policy makers need to be rooted in both African political thought as well as international public policy conditions. In order to achieve true sovereignty African historical philosophy is but only the initial requisite phase. The second and more critical phase is to be well-versed in international history and global dynamics by acquiring extensive knowledge in multilateral engagement and understanding the corresponding policy implications of their respective actions to the local polity.

As Kiki Edozie and Keith Gottschalk outlined, striving for ownership and operation of Africa's economic future has always had deep historical roots in Pan-Africanism. Kwame Nkrumah's mantra, "Africa must unite," had economics as its strategy and politics as its goal. Already conscious of the way that colonial balkanization and the post-world war II international financial/institutional reform would lead to the neocolonialism of Africa, particularly as most of Africa's new nations were too small to avert economic dependency in a then globalizing economy, Nkrumah advocated African union with specific economic goals. It would be a means for African independent nations to establish independent currency and financial institutions, to break the pattern of economic exploitation established through colonialism, and to reconstruct African economics to achieve higher living standards for all African nations (Edozie and Gottschalk, 2014).

The idea explained above is what links us to current multinational governance and a perceived African dependency to wealthy nations. It is thus widely accepted that Public

International Organizations (PIOs) are some of the most important multilateral international bodies that hold immense power over nations, and can yield particular authority and direction over Least Developed Countries (LDC) nations. These organizations are generally considered to be government bodies at the international level. Their power is mostly concentrated in global consensus building and in weighted voting criterion based largely on military and economic prowess. Therefore, in order for African nations to receive equitable treatment, African leaders should likely understand and engage these institutions in a way that is most advantageous for their own cause.

The IMF, World Bank, WTO and the UN are all PIOs. These particular PIOs are mandated to seek constructive means to broaden international financial transactions, trade and create equal access to global markets while maintaining a regulatory framework that is clear, transparent, inclusive and sustainable. The IMF, on one hand, promotes equal financial treatment worldwide by providing global financial stability through exchange rate stabilization, macroeconomic analysis, and technical assistance to all of its member countries (IMF Annual Report, 11). The World Bank, on the other, promotes equality, sustainability, and poverty reduction by the provision of low interest loans to credit worthy countries for specific reconstruction and development projects. The WTO purportedly works with member nations to increase global economic development by liberating global trade mechanisms around the world. The UNDP and the WFP provide humanitarian and other discretionary aid to nations in-need. However, despite the well-crafted mission statements, much of the Bretton Woods IFIs policies have proven to be counterproductive, limiting and restrictive in regard to development in LDCs in Africa (Crisp & Kelly, 1999). Even though these IFIs s are meant to be a venue for transparency and equality, the mechanisms by which they attempt to achieve their goals are



convoluted and substantially intricate such that the confounding negative effects resulting from their implementation and existence are not plainly obvious. In this regard, these organizations seem to contribute directly, at times, to an international process that increasingly and systematically undermines and shrinks the sovereign policy space for African and LDC nations. This prevents LDC nations from achieving economic independence and sustaining socio-economic growth. However, contrary to popular Africanist sentiments on dependency and underdevelopment of African states, there is sufficient evidence that African poverty is not the fault of any one multinational agency, the United States, Europe or the proverbial “West” for that matter (Van der Veen, 2004). It has also been substantiated that African leaders themselves are ultimately culpable and responsible for the impoverished conditions of the continent today (Mulinge & Lesetedi 2002; Mills, 2010). This is what led former U.S. president Barack Obama and former UN secretary general Kofi Anan claim that the root causes of Africa's problems are a lack of political will and the inability of the continent's leaders to use revenues to benefit the African people (Anyangwe, 2010; Shealaw, 2014).”

The idea that economic unity or continent-wide regionalism, realized through Africans’ self-determined efforts is Africa’s means to achieve economic parity for Africans vis-à-vis a postmodern global economy is at the heart of this caution. Ownership and operation of the African economic agenda is a value that has always been rooted in the Pan-African discourse. Pan-Africanism has long-standing roots in facilitating collective African political renewal, in reversing marginalization and downward trends of socioeconomic decline that are common to Africa, and in interjecting African economies into the mainstream global political economy to foster greater production, trade, and thus development and wealth creation for the continent is the everlasting hope (Edozie and Gottschalk 2014).

Thus, it is against the backdrop of these dynamics of international integration, geo-political exploitation and African leadership dimensions that I undertake this study, analysis and evaluation of dependency.

### **Statement of the Problem**

For the majority of the modern era, Africa as a continent has experienced a multitude of disastrous economic policies and trade relations with Europe, North America and the international community as a whole. From a historical perspective, both the transatlantic slave trade and the European colonization of African states serve as two important markers of the many unfavorable economic and trade relationships that effectively decimated much of its human resources, local economy, polity and governance structures. As a result, African economies have fallen into a consistent state of torpor and stagnation. Many believe that this disruption and decimation of integral pre-colonial endogenous structures in turn dismantled the foundation and any chance of a cohesive post-independence African international trade agenda and internal pan-African economic development program (Easterly, 2013). While this may not be entirely true, the trade relationships of the past have given rise to adversity and complexity for African states, and have also set the precedent for new and future policies with the “West” and most recently China. Given that international trade policy with Africa has always been skewed in favor of wealthier economies, the recent policy trend has continued in that same vein. International trade policy with Africa has therefore continued to be a policy of division, manipulation, coercion, force, intimidation and power. As Walter Rodney stated in his controversial book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, “The whole import-export relationship between Africa and its trading partners is one of unequal exchange and of exploitation (Rodney,

1972).” Although some view this as a very extreme perspective of African international trade relations, there is in fact sufficient evidence to support the claim. However, on the other hand, what is not commonly cited is that African underdevelopment is heavily rooted in African complacency and culpability. In 2005 Idi Udoku briefly touched on the notion in his essay *History and the Challenge of Underdevelopment in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Africa*. He said: “Although African history had been active in highlighting the dependency theory which led to the nationalization of FDI, she has been uncomfortably silent in the face of economic impoverishment of African countries caused by ineptitude on the part of the leadership” (Udoku, 2005). It is thus likely that the combination of poor African leadership and bad IFI policies that have ultimately resulted in the sustained levels of poverty and instability on the continent.

Accordingly, African international trade and monetary policies need to shift away from Eurocentric and globally-focused policies that further enrich advanced economies and hinder African and LDC domestic development. The Bretton Woods model for financial management and the World Trade Organization’s trade forum are generally good for international governance, but, unfortunately, it may be ill suited for the development of individual African states. These international finance institutions have proven to be effective at generating wealth for advanced economies that are equipped with the geographical, financial and human resources to compete on equal ground in the international arena, while yielding poor results for unskilled, geographically-disadvantaged, poor countries. These international policies also generally cause an increase in global domestic productivity by allowing the world as a whole to develop at a faster rate; whilst decreasing domestic productivity in LDC nations. The result is the steady growth of technologically-advanced industrialized nations at the expense of poorer nations, and the extreme polarization of wealth distribution on the planet. In practice, these institutions essentially allow

rich countries to speed up their development by creating an uneven trade and financial relationship with poorer countries. These policies effectively encourage the unfavorable transactional relationships of extractive minerals from African countries; undermine LDC domestic industrial development; and systematically devalue LDC labor and GDP output. African countries and LDCs cannot grow their economies in a trade environment that undermines their success and progress. This is perhaps what prompted William Easterly to state that “sleight of hand [of international economic policy] focuses attention on technical solutions while covering up violations of the rights of real people is the moral tragedy of development today (Easterly, 2013).”

When we examine traditional Africanist macroeconomic structures, we see that modern conditions force countries to be mutually interdependent in order to satisfy the needs of their citizenry; however, it is also clear that interdependence is not incompatible with economic independence. This is because economic independence does not mean isolation or come at a price of self-isolation. National independence, on the other hand, does, however, require the capacity for nations to exercise choice in external relations that are favorable to them. Above all, it requires that a nation’s growth at some point become self-reliant and self-sustaining. Therefore, African countries must engage the global economic machinery in a manner that is not only advantageous for the global community but also promotes Africa’s own local, state and national interests. While it is a nearly insurmountable task for any one African nation to exert meaningful autonomy in the global market, it is possible for Africa to do so as a united entity. In the economic and geopolitical landscape of the modern world and for all international economic intents and purposes, Africa would fare better if it operated as a bloc; if not a single bloc then perhaps two or three regional blocs, but certainly not fifty-four separate, small insignificant and

powerless countries with policies that undermine the overall potential and development of the continent. Africa may not be a country by definition, but the term is merely an academic construct and therefore should not cloud one's judgment or thought. When viewed as a whole it is clear that Africa has the potential to advocate for significant reforms on the global stage.

Walter Rodney (1972) posited an interesting question and answer in his book *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* that continues to be relevant today. Let us ponder its significance and aim to answer the hidden assumptions and conclusions within it. It is as follows:

The question as to who, and what, is responsible for African underdevelopment can be answered at two levels. First, the answer is that the operation of the imperialist system bears major responsibility for African economic retardation by draining African wealth and by making it impossible to develop more rapidly the resources of the continent. Second, one has to deal with those who manipulate the system and those who are either agents or unwitting accomplices of the said system. The capitalists of Western Europe were the ones who actively extended their exploitation from inside Europe to cover the whole of Africa.

In recent times, they were joined, and replaced, by capitalists from the United States; and for many years now even the workers of those metropolitan countries have benefited from the exploitation and underdevelopment of Africa. None of these remarks are intended to remove the ultimate responsibility for development from the shoulders of Africans. Not only are there African accomplices inside the imperialist system, but every African has a responsibility to understand the system and work for its overthrow. (Rodney, 1972)

These questions of responsibility are at the heart of all of Africa's problems. The critical analysis of these questions is of paramount importance, as it will ultimately determine the progress of African people and its economic development for generations. It will be up to Africans and their leaders to establish the necessary conditions for success in this area, this is perhaps why Mbeki had said "A balance between our rights and duties as Africans to protest against an unjust world order and our need to practically engage our development partners with a

partnership that breaks the old relationship between hapless African recipients of aid and benevolent donors must be created” (Edozie and Gottschalk 2014).

According to Ake (1996) and other African scholars, major corruption in African officialdom continues to cause continent-wide degenerative underdevelopment. In which case African countries have become the personal estates of official criminal gangs whose avowed aim is not the development of their countries, but rather the siphoning off of national resources into foreign banks (Ake, 1996). This suggests the two-fold problem of internal and external factors outlined by Nnadozie is at the heart of Africa’s development paradox. Nnadozie has said that “the internal factors fan the ember of the external factors.” (Nnadozie, 2008) Whichever direction the fan blows, it is clear that both are negative factors on African development.

In the case of the Gambia, many have argued that its most recent leadership (i.e. Yahya Jammeh) has been a critical factor in its economic stagnation over the past decade. Noting that during the latter years of Yahya Jammeh’s tenure his erratic leadership style based on Islamist rhetoric and Pan-African ideology significantly misaligned the Gambia’s geopolitical trajectory and dismantled its economy through criminal activity and illicit financial siphoning of its assets, leaving the Gambia far behind its intended progress; and that conversely the relatively similar nation of Senegal prospered under more evenhanded leadership during that timeframe. So again, the question of African leadership, and its role in local, regional and global economics is paramount to the African development problem. This study examines these critical elements of leadership, culpability, and development through the bilateral and multilateral engagement lens with particular focus on a comparison of The Gambia and Senegal over the past 8 years.

## Research Aims and Objectives

Renowned Pan-Africanists such as Walter Rodney, Kwame Nkrumah and Marcus Garvey have widely criticized the West for corrupting, alienating and impoverishing African nations throughout the modern era. Western philosophers and political activists such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Noam Chomsky have also contributed heavily to literature on the unrelenting force of Western imperialism and neocolonialism on third world countries. In recent times, sensationalists like William Engdahl, the author of *Gods of Money*, John Perkins, the author of *The Confessions of an Economic Hit Man* and Michael Parenti who authored *Democracy for the Few*, have further developed the notion of a systemic effort by the West to under-develop, neo-colonize and disrupt African economic progress. Recent African leaders like Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Yahya Jammeh of The Gambia, Omar Al Bashir of Sudan, and the late Libyan leader and self-proclaimed Prince of Africa Muammar Gaddafi all held strong views and hard policy lines on international meddling in African internal affairs for similar reasons. Although some studies have demonstrated direct links to Western institutions and the perpetuation or expansion of poverty in Least Development Countries (LDCs), many ultimately provide inadequate evidence or purport oversimplified generalizations of the notions of underdevelopment and dependency. Thus, this study aims to uncover evidence either for or against the idea of dependency in the 21<sup>st</sup> century globalized world, as it relates to Senegal and The Gambia.

This proposed research study is designed to investigate and uncover the facts surrounding some of the untold histories of African international relations with the West, as well as Africa's own destructive macroeconomic policies and geopolitical suppositions. It aims to unveil potential international conformities and neorealist political adaptations that serve as an

underlying foundation for the continued economic stagnation in African countries. Moreover, this study lends special attention to the economic conditions of the 21st Century African nation-state as it relates to the modern international context (i.e. hyper-globalization, commercialization, free trade, fiscal/monetary control, foreign direct investment, foreign-aid, and the interchange of human capital across international borders). However, this research is not solely about international and multinational relations; instead, it is meant to provoke African introspection, recollection and recognition of African countries' own role in the economic retardation of an entire continent. Thus, this research examines the enduring absence of African leadership and African unity on the modern Pan-African economic thought lens of international monetary, aid and trade policy. Addressing notions of the nationalist struggle phase of the 1960s, in contrast to the nation-building phase of contemporary Africa in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, this research draws on large-scale public and private sector macroeconomic databases in order to evaluate government negotiated outcomes, deal making and profit sharing results. This dissertation also juxtaposes modern African leadership— (i.e. nationalistic), with pre/post-independence African leadership— (i.e. Pan-Africanist) to illustrate contrasts in the development outcome. Finally, this study explores the critical International Finance Institutions (IFI) that govern international systems and African international relations [i.e. World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO)], by examining their respective organizational policy positions in contrast to African political thought dimensions. This research seeks to determine whether said policies are indeed favorable to, or in fact detrimental for, the economic progression and advancement of African economies in the 21st century.

In this regard, the research analyses the policy decisions and negotiated agreements made by past and present African leaders in dealing with the UN, WTO, IMF, World Bank group and



the global community as whole. The research lends specific focus to the policy decisions made by African leaders in conjunction with the adopted policy-positions of the International Finance Institutions (IFIs) as they relate to African internal economics, international development, poverty reduction and global economic equality. In this sense, the research seeks to explore dynamics of international economic relations in an effort to answer the long-lasting and complex questions of dependency, modernity and exploitation. The idea is to re-examine the intricate international dimensions of bilateral and multilateral agreements; trade; monetary policy; and international exchange from a historical and cost dependence perspective.

Specifically, this research focuses on fundamental policy positions that drive African bilateral negotiated agreements, in order to determine how these policies affect African economic progress, regionalization and pan-African development. In so doing, it specifically examines the economic impacts of the WTO and General Agreement of Trade and Tariff (GATT) policies on African countries, notably comparative advantage, Most Favored Nations (MFN) as well as the WTO's most recent policies of Trade-Related International Property Rights (TRIPS) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) from the Uruguay round of negotiations spanning from 1986 to 1994. Regarding the World Bank and IMF, the study explores various lending policies, repayment terms, investments and monetary exchange relationships that serve as the basis for international and global trade flows. By examining these IFI policies, the study aims to develop thorough economic policy positions that are most favorable for African nations and regional blocs vis-a-vis global incremental progression. Furthermore, this study aims to provide insight into the global interconnectivity of nation-states and the role that these countries play in the collective global system—specifically what the continent of Africa's role has been historically, and how regional and pan-African policymaking

relates to those roles. Most importantly the study will examine how African political thought and Pan African leadership ideology affect bilateral and multilateral policy, and how those policies in turn affect human development at the local levels.

## **Research Questions**

This research seeks to answer a few basic research questions regarding the interconnectivity of Pan-African leadership, multilateral policy making, foreign assistance provision, and human development in The Gambia and Senegal.

The research questions for this study are as follows:

1. What are the specific characteristics of the rhetorical content of speeches delivered by modern African leaders (Senegal and The Gambia) at the UNGA conventions between 2009 and 2016; and how do those characteristics compare to 20th century pre-independence leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure?
2. What were the characteristics of key multilateral engagement in terms of signed agreements between Senegal and The Gambia respective to trade, aid and monetary policy? Are there differences in the number or the types of agreements the respective countries are party to?
3. What are the characteristics of U.S. bilateral engagement in terms of signed agreements between Senegal and The Gambia with respective to trade, aid and monetary policy? Are there differences in the number or the types of agreements the respective countries are party to?

4. What are the key characteristics of human development in Senegal and The Gambia and how do they compare to bilateral and multilateral aid dollars received in those years.
5. What are the key characteristics of trade, aid, and monetary data concerning Senegal and The Gambia?

### **Hypothesis**

I hypothesize that between the years of 2009 and 2016 the regime of Yahya Jammeh promoted policies and rhetoric that are generally aligned with indigenous African political thought as outlined by pre-independence leaders of the 1950s and 1960s, specifically to Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Muammar Ghaddafi, and Robert Mugabe. Conversely, Senegalese leadership promoted policies and rhetoric that were comparatively more pro-Western in sentiment than that of The Gambia. Furthermore, I hypothesize that despite inflamed rhetoric, the negotiated multilateral and bilateral agreements The Gambia agreed to generally mirrored those of Senegal during this timeframe. Lastly, I hypothesis that economic progress as measured by human development and net development assistance received is positively correlated to countries that have maintained and adhered to philosophies expounded by African political thought leaders (as represented by the sampling of Senegal and The Gambia).

## Assumptions

This study makes a few very general assumptions with regards to international affairs. First, the study assumes that advanced international market participants as well as public international bodies operate strictly in accordance to national and commercial interest, and that these national interests are always economically advantageous to the originating country or its supporting entities. Second, the study assumes that all member countries have equal rights within the legal and commercial realms of international trade and finance. Third, the study makes the assumption that all matters of war and peace are irrelevant in the international monetary, trade and aid arena. Fourth, the study assumes that African leaders operate under the authority of their governments, and that governments enter into bilateral and multilateral agreements on their own volition, on the basis of geo-political, geo-economic, and ideological grounds.

The study also makes some very specific assumptions regarding African political thought, bilateral policy, and development economics categorically. In this regard, the study assumes that the ideological trends of 20<sup>th</sup> century African presidents, such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Toure of Guinea, effectively captures the major modalities of thought of critical African political leaders of the pre-independence 20<sup>th</sup> century African world. The study also makes the assumption that the presence and prevalence of African Political Thought Word Indicators (APTWIs) in speeches given before the United Nations General Assembly by sitting African presidents is a direct indication of the presence and prevalence of African political thought in the respective nation's policy goals. The study makes the final assumption that the decisions governments make with regards to which bilateral and/or multilateral agreements to

enter into ultimately affect human development, trade, aid, and monetary indicators more broadly.

### **Limitations**

This study could not possibly examine every aspect of development, monetary policy, trade relations and international aid strategies for each individual country in Africa. This study, therefore, focuses on the broad overarching international development themes and a set of multilateral agreements and human development indicators that relate to African national trade, aid, and monetary matters. With regards to the African political thought dimensions, there is no single common African political thought repository, and therefore this study only examines political rhetoric of a select group of pre-independence African leaders as given to international audiences. This study thus attempts to capture the critical policy themes of specific African political thought leaders against the stated policy positions of international financial institutions.

### **Delimitations**

Due to time and financial constraints, this research mainly only examines African political thought as philosophical byproducts of Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, and does not include other key actors in the pre/post-independence African liberation movement, i.e., Nyerere, Mandela, Kenyatta, Azikiwe, Nassir, Mugabe, Garvey, Dubois, Diob, Sankara, Mbeki, Obasanjo, etc.. It also does not examine other forms and influences on African political thought

on modern policy prescriptions, i.e., historical, linguistic, tribal, afro-Islamic, triple heritage conformities, etc.. Also, since the study was to be completed within a specific time frame, it was not feasible to conduct an in-depth examination of all facets of multilateral and international policy, or a comprehensive examination of each individual African country, so a case study and comparative model was utilized in examining the key issues of socio-economic, regional, and globalization elements of multilateralism and its public policy and development implications in Senegal and The Gambia.

With regards to the data collection, this research examines classic indicators such as the GDP growth and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), numbers which are recognizable in the geo-economic space and powerful indicators of economic performance of nation states. Thus, the examination was narrowed to 15 economic and human development indicators to provide a snapshot into key segments of the economy and polity. The study does not conduct in-depth trade, aid, or monetary analysis for specific industries of trade, types of aid, or specific monetary trends. Instead, the study compares broad categories of trade (commercial services export, intellectual property, export concentration index, communication/computer services), Aid (net development assistance, U.S. bilateral aid), and monetary transactions (FDI, repurchase agreements, debt forgiveness, broad money, remittances) to draw conclusions.

### **Significance of the Study**

This research is of considerable economic, political and historical significance to African policy makers and researchers, as there is an ever-widening gap in the formation of a

comprehensive Pan-African socio-political and economic body of literature that serves to answer some of the continent's most precarious and long-lasting problems. The study is a critical instrument in the effort to illuminate, extrapolate and aggregate African socio-economic data in order to display and diagnose the economic and political ailments of the continent's continually failing economic condition. The study is significant in its aim to provide a multidisciplinary and multivariate formula that will establish a framework for policy makers to diagnose and predict how African national, regional and international public policies affect the economic development and social wellbeing of its citizens. Many studies have examined these countervailing factors on African economics, but only in a piecemeal fashion. This study, by contrast, looks at how all these major elements of international finance (trade, market openness, foreign direct investment, international monetary exchange, aid, human capital and governance) collectively affect African economic growth and regional/Pan-African economic convergence. This study is thus poised to be instrumental in developing public policy instruments that can enhance regional integration, sustainable governance, and policy making in Africa. Most importantly, this study reawakens and reexamines the homegrown African economic principles of the past, and the African political philosophy of the independence era, in order to juxtapose those philosophies with modern African public policy practice. By doing so, I hope to highlight trends in African public policy and clear the proverbial path.

## CHAPTER 2:

### REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### Economic History of Africa and the West

There is a very large volume of literature on African development and African economic history that relates to the progression and regression of the current African economic disposition, and its complex economic predicament of stagnation, retardation and in some cases acceleration. The vast majority of these writings generally support the theory of dependency and underdevelopment. According to many Africanists and economists in the field, Africa as a continent has long been subjugated to economic control by the West. These theorists, notables like Walter Rodney, Eric Williams, and Michael Parenti, as well as contemporary scholars such as Fantu Cheru, William Easterly, Wilfred David, Patrick McGowan and Dale Smith conclude that the current world system is unquestionably characterized by gross inequalities in industrial capacities, technological abilities and state power, of which the Western core controls major portions of the economic, political, and cultural life of the Third World. Thus, the consensus is that this dominion of the economy has been a long-lasting relationship that has endured several centuries at this point, most likely originating as far back as the sixteenth century in Western Europe. McGowan and Smith (1978) estimate that this exploitative relationship likely began in 1492 with the Spanish discovery of the Americas and the expulsion of the Moors and Jews from Spain, and continued through 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia that established the classical



state system. This new world structure thus emerged, based upon the principles of capitalist production and state-building, and has continued to this day (McGowan & Smith, 1978).

There is not much that refutes this general historical outline of events in the prominent literature on the subject. Ralph Austen (1994) provides a particularly interesting historical estimation that further supports this very notion that African dependency is rooted in European economic models of exploitation that has linkages to capitalist ideology. He says, “the opening of sea routes between Europe and the South Atlantic affected the economic development of all parts of Africa” and thus concluded that economic dependency resulted out of this opening. He elaborates on that point, displaying how the model took fold in several of the key sectors. “Europeans sought slaves in Africa almost entirely for a single purpose: the working of plantations in the tropical regions of the New World. As with the gold trade this form of enterprise grew out of the late medieval European economy (Austen, 1994).”

Eric Williams also argues that the introduction of triangular trade<sup>2</sup> in the 17<sup>th</sup> century by Britain, France and colonial America was the birth of the global trade system we know of today. He argues that the triangular trade system gave European industries a triple stimulus and an unfair advantage in the world economy—an exploitative incentive, of which set the foundation

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<sup>2</sup> Triangular trade, or triangle trade, is a historical term indicating trade among three ports or regions. Triangular trade usually evolves when a region has export commodities that are not required in the region from which its major imports come. Triangular trade thus provides a method for rectifying trade imbalances between the above regions. The best-known triangular trading system is the transatlantic slave trade, that operated from the late 16th to early 19th centuries, carrying slaves, cash crops, and manufactured goods between West Africa, Caribbean or American colonies and the European colonial powers, with the northern colonies of British North America, especially New England, sometimes taking over the role of Europe.[1] The use of African slaves was fundamental to growing colonial cash crops, which were exported to Europe. European goods, in turn, were used to purchase African slaves, which were then brought on the sea lane west from Africa to the Americas, the so-called middle passage.

for current trade mechanisms. In the system he describes, African slaves were purchased at very low costs in Africa, principally exchanged for manufactured goods at massive profits for Western dealers. African slaves were purchased by providing middle men with cheap manufactured goods in exchange for bound unwilling African people. Essentially slaves were purchased with the very same manufactured goods that both African slave-labor and African raw materials produced in the Anglo/American factories and plantations. And yet this was but just one leg of the profit structure. The creation of the plantations in the Caribbean also generated a new market for more manufactured goods on which British merchants capitalized. By Eric Williams's estimation (1994), "the profits obtained provided one of the main streams of the accumulation of capital in England which financed all of the industrial revolution (Williams, 1994)." In this regard, Eric William's argument generally supports the idea that European and American trade relations served as a major economic destabilizer and ultimately disrupted much of the African internal economic and trade mechanisms that existed prior to the transatlantic trade adaptation.

Between 1783 and 1793, only ten years, a recorded 878 ships out of Liverpool had transported 303,737 West African slaves to North America, making an estimated profit of 17 million pounds sterling (Jackson & Clarke, 2001).

In fact, this thinking is not unique to African scholarship; it has roots in Marxist philosophy as well, which is likely why many African states found comfort in Marxian and socialist policy frameworks in the post-independence era. Karl Marx wrote in the communist manifesto "that the 'elite' [which we can loosely substitute as 'colonizing elite' in this context], wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, and idyllic relations between people and their societies. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his 'natural superiors' and has left remaining no other nexus between man and

man than naked self-interest and callous ‘cash payment.’ It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom – Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation (Marx, 1848).”

Africanists like Yimenu relate this type of capitalistic urgency to what is deemed as globalized dependency and African underdevelopment. Yimenu (1975) has thus stated that “the total neglect of the great mass of African people comes as a result of the choice of quick profit oriented projects whose main beneficiaries are the urban petit bourgeoisie (Yimenu, 1975). Here, he is actually talking about the African urban elite. Walter Rodney (1972) uses that same logic but takes that sentiment a step further by connecting ‘urban elite’ interests with Americo-European trade policy to say that “The whole import-export relationship between Africa and its trading partners is one of unequal exchange and of exploitation (Rodney, 1972).”

William Easterly noted that the calculus and theory of economics itself shifted to favor the top down structures of colonialism and mercantilism. He argued that classical economics took for granted that the behavior of individuals was made on the basis of free and voluntary choices. Noting that the unfree situations of colonialism and indigenous autocracy in most of the colonized world were not adequately addressed by the world economics of the day, thus applying a unitary economics across all societies (Easterly, 2013). He elaborates on this to say that this in turn allowed those making international economic policy in the U.S. and the U.K. to establish ideas of authoritarian development to justify or excuse racist, colonialist, or imperialist policies globally (Easterly, 2013).

Marx, Rodney, Yimenu, Cheru and many of the prominent economic thinkers of the world understood that in both a hyper-capitalized and hyper-globalized world, the need for a constantly expanding market for consumers will inevitably push the elite (the one percent, the bourgeoisie, the colonizers) across the entire span of the earth in pursuit of exploitation and profiteering. As Marx (1848) wrote, “It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere in order to be profitable and maintain supremacy (Marx, 1848).” In the modern context, we can easily see the connection between this statement and the very essence of free trade and open market philosophy and policy. Harry Dexter White, the American chief Architect of the new deal “argued that U.S. economic recovery [of the great depression] demanded trade expansion opportunities for American businesses, and that such expansion in turn required a new model for international monetary stabilization (Steil, 2013).” As it were, dependency theory as a study furthers this supposition, contending that “the condition of underdevelopment is as a result of the incorporation of the Third World economies into the capitalist world system which is dominated by the West and North America (Randall and Theobald 1998).”

Nkrumah elaborates on the subject to say:

Imperialism simply switches tactics. Without a qualm it dispenses with its flags, and even with certain of its more hated expatriate officials. This means, so it claims, that it is “giving” independence to its former subjects, to be followed by “aid” for their development. Under cover of such phrases, however, it devises innumerable ways to accomplish objectives formerly achieved by naked colonialism. It is this sum total of these modern attempts to perpetuate colonialism while at the same time talking about “freedom,” which has come to be known as neo-colonialism. (Nkrumah, 1965)

The threats that, according to Nkrumah, confronted post-independent states in Africa remain relevant as contemporary states are now faced with what seems to be maturing international interests and unrelenting internal crises. Neocolonialism provides an effective

framework for reflecting on the current state of the unification debate and identifying some of the observable trends that now portend to define that discussion (Young, 2015).

Others like Reinhold Niebuhr (1892 – 1971) Theologian, activist, and founder of the Americans for Democratic Action saw all nations as characteristically divisive and exploitative. He is quoted for writing:

Nations are territorial societies, the cohesive power of which is supplied by the sentiment of nationality and the authority of the state.... When development was first conceived, open racism prevented Western actors from seeing a free alternative—that is, an alternative based on individual rights and initiative—as possible in the rest of the world. Colonial and semi-colonial actions by the West were directly violating the rights of the poor in the Rest (Easterly, 2013).

In the 1890s Cecil Rhodes, one of Britain’s most esteemed and strongest promoters of colonialism said: “We must find new lands, from which we can easily obtain raw materials and at the same time exploit the cheap slave labor that is available from the natives of the colonies. The colonies will also provide a dumping ground for the surplus goods produced in our factories (Ellwood, 2003).

Nkrumah further postulates that this type of thinking had not been eradicated with African independence, instead it merely transformed into a different type of exploitation—something he termed “neocolonialism.” In his acclaimed 1965 book with the same title, he called neocolonialism the “worst” form of imperialism. He said that those hegemonic powers that practice it get to exploit poorer nations without any responsibility or consequence and those who suffer from it have no course of redress (Nkrumah, 1964).

Austen explains some of the other dynamics around the growth and ascendance of this type of global dependency in his book *The Economic History of Africa*. In his book, he gives us a picture of how these current systems started and grew through a combination of time, repetition

and reinforcement. His conclusion when it comes to trade, is that exchanges of import for export goods, whether on the coast or in the interior, had normally not been able to be made immediately due to lack of financing, and thus required the advancement of credit by one partner or the other. The advances in almost all these cases he contended, went from Europeans to coastal Africans and from the coastal Africans along the chain of intermediaries leading to ultimate interior suppliers. Thus, the direction of this credit flow reflected the superior access of Europeans to a capital market. This in turn put Europeans on the top of the food chain, and in many ways the relationship continues in the same accord to this day. He also offers that in certain cases it indeed did subject foreign merchants to losses from default or fraud, but he also contends that on the aggregate it allowed a degree of external control over prices, which tended to steadily provide a very high gross profit for Europeans and the African elite that served as their middle men (Austen, 1994).

In the modern context, Fantu Cheru explains it as a form of exploitation whereby rich countries impose “particular policy choices on poor countries, [such that] creditors take away [the] governments’ sovereignty and accountability to their own people and make them answerable to unaccountable, external institutions for their choice of economic policies, level of spending on public services, and other crucial political decisions. This he argues is simply recolonization, and not development. The attempt to impose change from outside actually engenders resistance and gives rise to barriers to change (Cheru, 2010).

However, as Africa’s market integration into the world economy increased, its relative importance to external consumers certainly declined. This trend might have induced individual African producers to withdraw from the export market, but the expansion of Western capacities for penetrating the continent has made it difficult to define African economic roles collectively

without reference to external centers (Austen, 1994). This interconnectivity of exploitation and dependency is a consistent theme within the major scholastic achievements on this topic. In

1923, Marcus Garvey had said:

At the present time the world is not producing enough food to feed all its inhabitants. The strong are fed and the weak starve. That is why there are famines in certain countries, even though those countries produce certain things for human consumption. The strong go there and take the food and send it home just as how Great Britain and France go into Africa, take out the products and ship them away to feed Europeans and leave Africans to starve. The strong will always live at the expense of the weak (Garvey, 1986).

Nkrumah also wrote:

The contradictions between the handful of ruling "civilized" nations and the millions of colonial peoples of the world. In this sense imperialism is the most degrading exploitation and the most inhuman oppression of the millions of peoples living in the colonies. The purpose of this exploitation and oppression is to squeeze out super-profits (Nkrumah, 1964).

### **Unfolding a New World Order**

Increasing globalization of the world economy, particularly relating to trade and investment flows, is accompanied with continuing marginalization of many countries in Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in particular stands out as a region of the world which is being largely by-passed in the rapidly unfolding process of global integration. Many efforts to reverse SSA's marginalization are based on a belief that fuller integration into the global economy, on appropriate terms, could enhance the conditions for more rapid economic growth by providing more favorable and secure market access for the region's exports, and by fostering the expansion and diversification of those exports (Richard Blackhurst, Bill Lyakurwa and Ademola Oyejide, 2000).

This is what has led philosophers like Austen (1994) to conclude that “the root cause of Africa’s economic development has been the asymmetry between the role of the continent in the world and the degree to which that world – or at least its dominant Western sector – has penetrated Africa (Austen, 1994).” Regarding the inception of the IMF and its purpose in global financial affairs and smoothing global financial transaction Steil (2013) wrote:

At, base, the International Monetary Fund would bring about a world congenial to American economic interests. The American export juggernaut would be protected by the commitment of other countries not to erect trade barriers or to engage in competitive devaluation, as they had done in the 1930s, underpinned by the fund’s ability to sanction them for such behavior. Conversely, the U.S. government would have virtually unlimited discretion in its own economic policies, as its dominant currency, backed by control of two-thirds of the world’s monetary gold, would ensure that it never had to borrow from the fund, and its effective veto power, afforded by Whites voting formula, would ensure it could never itself be censured (Steil, 2013).

Yimenu, an Africanist philosopher attempts to juxtapose that very perspective with a more practical and pragmatic viewpoint by explaining the interplay of nations, economies and policies in a globalized context. He says that in Africa there are usually three basic gaps that impede development comparative to other nations. (1) a skills gap—which is simply the lack of skilled personnel in all relevant fields; (2) a financial gap—which is the lack of development and investment capital; and (3) a lack of a proper system of administration and governance. From his perspective, these are factors that are tangible and account for some of Africa’s major development shortfalls. However, he is adamant that these gaps are actually only secondary to other important factors. In fact, he claims that these initial factors (highlighted above) are merely the by-products of the one most important factor, which he claims is the lack of effective leadership and class structure in African countries. From his viewpoint, the developmental



efforts in Africa failed because they were being sabotaged and side tracked by the domestic elite and their imperialist allies (Yimenu, 1975).

Yet another African scholar insinuates the same sort of logic but this time invoking complacency of a higher order saying that:

Even the UN General Assembly has chosen to ignore the specific, rationally organized historic contribution to the creation, maintenance and defense of today's global structure of inequalities by the three most powerful types of global organizations in the contemporary world: the states forming the core of the world economy, the transnational corporations substantively rooted in those states, and the supra-or meta-state organizations of public authority, formal and informal networks of collusion, coordination, governance, agenda- and policy-setting mechanisms and other tools of 'remote-control' at have recently mushroomed around the world (Borocz, 2005).

Even when we revert back to Marxian ideology we find that this is a sentiment that has consistently repeated itself in the development scholarship. Marx (1848) wrote:

Those of us living in the rich west may congratulate ourselves on the achievements of liberal democracy, but there are signs that it could be nothing but a fool's paradise with a non-renewable lease. The truth that presses ever more insistently on us is that in order to cut costs and keep their goods competitive the large corporations of our western economies rely increasingly on low-wage production in the Third World, or on temporary (often illegal) labor imported from outside our borders (Marx, 1848).

In his 2004 book, *The Humanitarian Paradigm*, Wilfred David expounds that “Billions of people, especially in the less developed sector of the world, have come to view development as an unfair ‘rat race’ of giant proportions, a theoretical construct that is uniformly imposed from the capitals of north America and Europe.” He later goes on to say that, “We are all willing or unwilling participants in a materially wealth world system that is prone to generate varying degrees of inequality and human deprivation (David, 2004).”

This school of thought is sometimes refuted by conservative writers such as Roel Van Der Veen who tends to lean toward the perspective that internal state structures and governance are the main drivers of economic progress/or lack thereof, in Africa, and not underlying global financial structures. He has written several articles on the topic anchoring his point mostly on the progression of Asian states such as Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia. He has said that many of these Asian countries have been successful at development despite the continued presence of global ‘underdevelopment’ structures and the so called adverse nature of the global economic system. He continues stating that it is clear that “the structure of the worldwide economy doesn’t have to change in order to give developing countries a chance to grow (Van Der Veen, 2004).”

Currently, former colonies of European imperial expansion in Asia have broken out of the shackles of underdevelopment and have created strong structures in manufacturing, finance and technology. Indeed, the Asian tigers namely, South Korea, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Hong Kong, Taiwan on the one hand, and India, China, and Brazil on the other hand, which were once colonized are now dictating the pace of global economic growth (Van Der Veen, 2004).

Advocates for free trade and global free market mechanisms point to the Asian “Tiger Economies” as proof that classical capitalism would bring wealth and prosperity to millions in the developing world, however, they do not factor that all these countries took heavy State interventions and controls on their economies (Ellwood, 2003). Thus, supporting the notion that a level of national disengagement and disregard of intrusive multilateral or bilateral external policies are imperative for such growth. In this sense, the lack of leadership again is to be blamed for any potential lack of foresight, and/or application of protectionist policy for African growth. Udoka alludes to this very point when he writes:

Although African history had been active in highlighting the dependency theory which led to the nationalization of FDI's, she has been uncomfortably silent in the face of economic impoverishment of African countries caused by ineptitude on the part of the leadership (Udoka, 2005).

Austen (1994) actually builds his argument around the idea that certain critical economic factors never change. He says that the things that have remained the same are mostly only some of the central features of the colonial economies; which is a dominant position for the state; a weak role for indigenous entrepreneurs; a weaker role for organized labor; and a heavy dependence upon external markets and capital sources (Austen, 1994).

Looking to the literature for what is in store for African states and the African continent as a whole, we can see that again the scholars seem to be in agreement. Yimenu says that economic development cannot be achieved by relying on only one type of economic activity. That there is no such thing as an equitable international division of labor in a world divided by dissension and profit-oriented classes and countries. In the world today, the industrially capable nations have the advantages and will continue to receive proportionately more for their labor than those engaged in agriculture and other primary production. Therefore, it is imperative that African countries quickly create an industrial capability within themselves in order to have a better competitive posture (Yimenu, 1975).

Nkrumah had also said,

I can see no security for African states unless African leaders, like ourselves, have realized beyond all doubt that salvation for Africa lies in unity ... for in unity lies strength, and as I see it, African states must unite or sell themselves out to imperialist and colonialist exploiters for a mess of pottage, or disintegrate individually (Nkrumah, 1961).

When we examine today's Africa and its development growth and economic output we can certainly find many countries that are succeeding and certainly many others that are not. According to Steven Radelet (2010) who converted his co-authored white paper with Liberian president Ellen Sirleaf Johnson into a book titled *Emerging Africa*, there are 17 emerging African countries. These are countries that for the past fifteen years can claim to no longer have any signs of destabilizing factors such as conflict, economic stagnation or dictatorships. They are also countries that, according to Radelet (2010), have in the past fifteen years achieved steady economic growth, deepening democracy, stronger leadership, and falling poverty. He identifies another six countries that are showing signs of following in that direction, to ultimately reach a total of twenty-three successful African countries (Radelet, 2010). By this calculation there are another thirty countries in Africa, a majority, that are essentially failing. This means that most of these successful countries will likely have at least one neighbor that is also failing. Unfortunately, the process of catching up has itself recently stalled, according to Collier (2008). Those countries that have only broken clear of the traps during the last decade have faced a new problem: the global market is now far more hostile to new entrants than it was in the 1980s. The countries newly escaped from the traps may have missed the boat, finding themselves in a limbo-like world in which growth is constrained by external factors according to Collier. When Mauritius escaped the traps in the 1980s it rocketed to middle-income levels relatively quickly. However, when neighboring Madagascar finally escaped the traps two decades later, there was no rocket (Collier, 2008).

Yimenu (1975) adds to the point by warning that the accelerating global confrontations and alignments, and especially the economic realignments going on today require that if Africa is to have enough weight to protect the interests of its own people, it has to be able to get together

on the closest terms of cooperation and trust between all the nations (Yimenu, 1975). Even modern European economists underlie the need for unity, cooperation and internal cooperation in order for African states to succeed. Albeit the tone is often a bit more subtle and nuanced but the sentiment is all the same.

The problem of the bottom billion is serious, but it is fixable. It is much less daunting than the dramatic problems that were overcome in the twentieth century: disease, fascism, and communism. But like most serious problems, it is complicated. Change is going to have to come from within the societies of the bottom billion, but our own policies could make these efforts more likely to succeed, and more likely to be undertaken (Collier, 2008).

Cheru (2010) identifies the following mechanisms following policy areas (Debt Structure, Official Development Assistance; Foreign Direct Investment, Global Trade, and Capital Flight) as the mechanisms by which unequal development in Africa is transmitted and sustained. Harry Dexter White justified capital flow bans, during the initial adaptation of the IMF, on the grounds that efforts by the rich to evade “new taxes or burdens of social regulation” had been “one of the chief causes of foreign exchange disturbances (Steil, 2013).” However, the most important of White’s aims —the one that would obsess him in for the majority of the implementation was very deliberately left unstated: To elevate the status of the dollar to that of the world’s sole surrogate for gold, such that cross-border gold movements would no longer have the power to dictate changes in U.S. monetary policy. This would be set entirely at the discretion of American experts, and would be transmitted to the rest of the world by way of fixed exchange rates (Steil, 2013).

Perhaps this is why David (2004) wrote:

The march of modernization in both rich and poor countries has resulted in the subordination of society to the economy instead of the economy being in service to the

society. The economic sphere has become a morally neutral zone in which only legal restraints can temper the pursuit of pecuniary gain (David, 2004).

According to Carroll Quigley, the aim of the Western economists was to create a world system of financial control in private hands able to dominate the political system of each country and the economy of the world as a whole. The system could then be controlled by central banks of the world through multinational agreements regularly updated through private meetings and conferences (French, 2005).

In any event world leaders and multinational institution all come to similar conclusions, as evidence by this joint report from the AU and UNECA.

Poverty remains of serious concern in Africa in absolute and relative terms. The number of people living on less than \$1.25 a day in Africa is estimated to have increased from 290 million in 1990 to 414 million in 2010 (United Nations, 2013). This is because population growth outweighs the number of people rising out of poverty. Moreover, GDP per African was around \$2,000 in 2013, which is around one-fifth of the level worldwide (IMF, 2014). Poverty in Africa is also multidimensional, in the sense of limited access to education, healthcare, housing, potable water and sanitation. This situation puts the loss of more than \$50 billion a year in IFFs in better perspective. (AUC/ECA, 13)

The question of whether that is a uniquely African dilemma is certainly a difficult one to decipher. Udoka (2005) offers this as an explanation.

The same pace of development has been recorded in South East Asia. All the south East Asian countries had come under colonial rule at one point or the other. From Singapore, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, South Korea to Philippines, western imperialism had entrenched itself. But it appears that the dependency theory has been debunked by the ability of these countries to break out of the poverty trap. Their economies have left the Third World category into the second world with strong financial, industrial, infrastructural and technological structures. This is what the world has designated a "miracle." To overcome their development impediments, the Asian Tigers adopted plausible policies and programs and made planning the cardinal strategy of achieving results. The leaderships were transparently accountable to the people and where they obtained foreign loans, such loans were efficiently utilized in providing infrastructure needed for the development of their countries. For instance, Asian tigers invested heavily in education, health, communication and manufacturing. Funds were allocated as loans

and subsidies for the establishment of productive ventures in agriculture, mining and manufacturing. The 'golden age' of Asia had been the 'dark age' of Africa (Udoka, 2005).

In the end all we have are bits and pieces of answers that each by themselves do not answer any relevant point sufficiently. The collective literature however, helps guide us through the nuances and complexities of the ever-evolving African political economy. Whether Africa too can eventually hit a golden age and develop sufficiently to escape the many development traps that have lingered for centuries will be the gauge for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **Theoretical and Conceptual Framework – Development and Africa**

Despite the enthusiasm and effort for development in Africa, there has simply been limited progress. This study examines how theories of African underdevelopment interlock with African cultural and economic perception and the many varying and contradicting realities within itself. This study lends special focus to dependency theoretical outlooks on the African economy. Dependency theory continues to play a vital role in the African economic personality and how Africans perceive the global marketplace both on African soil as well as globally. The matter of dependency and neorealism, in general, warrants dedicated analysis in determining its validity in the modern era. However, to fully comprehend dependency one must also grasp the various forces transecting the African socio-political and economic landscape. Thus, this study looks to the many leading African economic theories for solutions and/or answers to the economic conditions in African states. In this group, we include modernization theory, underdevelopment theory, post-colonialism theory, and governance theory. This study examines

and draws on these theories and related matters of modern day globalization and human development as a critical framework for the current African condition.

It is my contention that many of the theories explaining African development have been wrongfully and prematurely discarded without rigorous and sustained application or testing in practical terms. There is a need to further investigate, develop, and retrieve solutions through these theoretical frames.

### **Modernization Theory**

Modernization Theory is a socio-economic theory which hypothesizes that all societies and countries are basically affixed along an economic spectrum; a spectrum that has the traditional or pre-modern social systems, on one end, and the modern or more advanced social systems, on the other (Eisenstadt, 1974).

In today's international context, underdeveloped countries like Zimbabwe, Guinea, Haiti, Bangladesh, Nicaragua, or Republic of Congo are on one end of the continuum and other more advanced countries such as the United States, Russia, France, Australia, or Canada on the other. All other countries would thus fall somewhere in between these two extremes. The theory suggests that societies essentially move from one end of the spectrum to the other by applying a set of strict social, political and/or economic mechanisms or reforms. For example, an underdeveloped country with limited social and political controls, like Somalia, for instance, would simply need to establish basic state institutions like universities, libraries, parliaments, senates, armies, etc. and that would essentially increase their level of development and consequently move the country up the continuum. If Somalia implemented further reforms, for



example, installing democracy and rule of law, or establishing a stock market or adhering to best practices in good governance, it would move even further along this continuum.

The underlying logic of modernization theory is consistent with Rustow's theory of stages, which assumes that progress tends to be spatially diffused, a process by which more and more countries evolve from a state of backwardness, capitalizing on the experience of those that developed before them. W. W. Rustow was a senior U.S diplomat and presidential advisor (for John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson), as well as professor of Economic History at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). According to Rustow, the spatial distribution of progress, however skewed at any moment in time, is not static but a dynamic occurrence. By proximity and interaction, progress is diffused through space to other countries. Progress, or modernity, by its very nature, is thus apt to strain beyond its locus, overflowing into the adjacent space and transforming it into development. Thus, uneven development is a transitional phenomenon that can be systematically removed by creating certain favorable conditions. (Ake, 1996) In this regard, Rustow identified the following 6 stages of growth:

1. Traditional Society Stage
2. Preconditions for Take-Off Stage
3. Take-Off Stage
4. Drive to Maturity Stage
5. Age of High Mass-Consumption Stage
6. Beyond Consumption Stage

Modernization theory has a profound presence in the case of African development. It has simply been the most dominant frame through which the political, social, economic and academic development has been examined. In this regard, the theory simply stipulates that Africa as region is undeveloped and/or developing in comparison to Europe, the United States and the Eastern Bloc and therefore needs to undergo a systematic and gradual social evolution in order to achieve a ‘modernity.’

It implicitly argues that African countries are in a state of backwardness of which all human societies have been or will be in at some point in time. It argues that since human societies exist on an axis of a development trajectory, of which only a set of Western tools and initiatives can effectively push countries forward, African countries must “Westernize” in order to make it to the subsequent phase of development. However, from an Africanist perspective, this type of modernization theory follows in lockstep with the early European colonizing mindset, that Africa was uncivilized, amoral, corrupt and immature. Therefore, in order to achieve progress, African societies must introduce and adopt Western ideas, institutions and policies, specifically democracy and capitalism, to develop into ‘modern’ acceptable societies (Ake, 1996).

Development was conceived as modernization and this was seen as being synonymous with Europeanization or Americanization. The aim of development was therefore to “catch-up” with the advanced industrial capitalist countries of Europe (w’Obanda,1996).

Many African scholars believe that the modernization model is a false frame through which to view Africa in because it ignores the existence of an authentic African historical frame of reference. In so doing, it discounts the reality that Africa had its own history, a history that was in many ways completely separate and different than the histories of the Western world. By denying African history, the theory cannot account for the vastness of cultures, insights, traditions and knowledge that would be needed to grow and develop Africa. Another significant

oversight of modernization theory was that it neglected to include the dynamics of an extremely exploitative global environment, one largely perpetuated by Western nations, as well as its failure to consider exogenous factor in individual African countries own development.

Excluding exploitative and divisive policies of imperialist Western nations while analyzing theory about African development is simply unrealistic, irresponsible and ill-fitting according to many African scholars. Soyinka-Airewele and Edozie explain this phenomenon in their book

*Reframing Contemporary Africa:*

As is well known, modernization theory permitted the normalization of the well-propagated notions of African backwardness for liberals who felt themselves invested in achieving positive global change and who pushed an agenda that eventually worked in tandem with the economic and strategic goals of international economic institutions., financial agencies, Western governments, and nongovernmental organizations(Soyinka-Airewele and Edozie, 2010).

They go on to say:

The failures of such a culturally misinformed ideological paradigm, with its narrow understanding of historicity, its willful manipulation of African societies, incapacity to understand ongoing discourses around decolonization, and continued dependence on global superpower interest and resource exploitation, during and after the Cold War period, were not surprising. They were evident in the decades of splintering “Western liberal” polices and treatment by International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and world trade prescriptions that entombed African countries in a rising spiral of social, economic and political crisis (Soyinka-Airewele and Edozie, 2010).

Although the notion that modernization theory discounts an authentic African historicity has some validity, it certainly does not rule out the theory’s relevance altogether. Both Western and African scholars alike as well as international policy makers continue to propagate the idea of modernization. It is likely that this theory continues to have major traction in academic and policy circles because it provides a tangible means to African industrialization and development. Modernization theory indeed has many attractive features, despite some of its negative overtones. It provides African policy makers with a concrete step by step outline and policy

framework for the achievement of a more modern Africa. It promises modernization by providing a development template of which policy makers can simply plug in institutions, programs, and initiatives and produce modern industrialized states. Another factor for the continual proliferation of modernization theory is that many African intellectuals view Africa through the same Western lens as Americans and Europeans do. This is certainly not a positive note but it is mostly due to the Western hegemony and dominance on the educational system, and more specifically African pedagogy and intellectual sovereignty.

This notion of 'intellectual sovereignty' was a consistent point of contention for Kwame Nkrumah. In his book *Consciencism* (1964), he warned Africans against the thirst for Eurocentric intellectualism at the cost of their own African intellectual and academic history. He understood quite keenly how the Western educational system was framing and trapping the minds of African students, leaders, politicians, and civil servants into a continued life of intellectual servitude and inferiority. He often pontificated that history could be, and in fact was being manipulated and fabricated by means of a systematic dominance of the psyche. Nkrumah writes:

It is not only the study of philosophy which can become perverted. The study of history too can become warped. The colonized African student, whose roots in his own society are systematically starved of sustenance, is introduced to Greek and Roman history, the cradle history of modern Europe, and he is encouraged to treat this portion of the story of man together with the subsequent history of Europe as the only worthwhile portion. This history is anointed with a universalist flavoring which titillates the palate of certain African intellectuals so agreeably that they become alienated from their own immediate society (Nkrumah, 1964).

However, the dominance of Western forces on the educational system, the economy or development in general is not universally bad for African countries. African countries need to be able to discern the difference and harness the infiltration of Western knowledge and policies for

their own advantage. Modernization does not have to mean “Westernization,” instead it could simply mean “improving.” The act of “improving” can be done in an African centered way; in a manner that utilizes Africa’s unique talents, cultures, values to achieve development goals. Unfortunately, this is precisely where African countries continue to fall short, making development in Africa look less like African development and more like Western hegemony. As a consequence, some African scholars have a bit of a complicated and nuanced relationship with modernization theory as the sole answer to African development.

One complicated perspective comes from Robert Collier, a former director of Development Research at the World Bank. Invoking themes of modernization, he says that all societies used to be poor and that most of those countries are slowly moving out of poverty, inciting the point that countries move across a development continuum. “Poverty is not intrinsically a trap, otherwise we would all still be poor. Think, for a moment, of development as chutes and ladders. In the modern world of globalization there are some fabulous ladders; most societies are using them. But there are also some chutes, and some societies have hit them. The countries at the bottom are an unlucky minority, but they are stuck (Collier, 2008).”

These complications and contradictions regarding the validity of modernization theory were the root cause for the ensuing development of alternate theories on the African experience and its relation to the global community. Thus, the birth of a new paradigm, aptly named as the “oppositional paradigm”. The switch to the oppositional paradigm had academics heavily focused on a counter narrative to the idea of modernizing. This is what essentially helped bring the dependency theories to the fore.

## Post-Colonialism Theory

Post-colonialism is another controversial theory within the oppositional paradigm that builds on the themes established in post modernism. The theory generally supports the notion that much of the colonized world's social, political and economic problems are a direct result of colonial intervention, oppression and exploitation. The theory expands beyond conventional colonial definitions by encapsulating both imperialism and neo-colonialism as a frame to assess development and society in underdeveloped countries. Post-colonialism interprets colonialism contained in modernity, deconstructs cultural hegemonism, and turns Western ideals of modernity into an inquiry about the global relationship between the North and South.

Post-colonialism is one of the most influential trends of thought that transformed third world development economics in the late twentieth century. Edward W. Said, Gayatri C. Spivak, and Homi F. Bhabha are some of its key agents. Post-colonialism has three general foundations: first, the flourish of the national liberation movement after World War II; second, the self-identity of national culture; third, total reflection of modernity. Similar to postmodernism, post-colonialism is an umbrella term for various cultural, political theories and methods of criticism that are relational to the West and the rest of the world. It is not only a cultural strategy of communication between Africa and the West, but also provides the foreground for African countries and other colonized nations to re-identify themselves in the global landscape. It is a strategy of the "periphery" scholars to deconstruct the artery discourse of the West; so post-colonialism is not only theoretical but also practical significance (Heaney, R., & Rowland, C. 2016).

It is thus a theoretical framework that reflected through the lens of self-identification, nationalism, and liberation from colonial hegemony. It is a perspective that allowed for African,

Asian, and South American people to begin to re-examine their world in relation to atrocities and geopolitical formations of their recent past. Essentially, a mode of thinking that was birthed out of the freedom and independence movement of post-World War II era. In which case, it was a backward reflection of the world that shaped their lives, and from that perspective ultimately shapes their future existence as well.

Post-colonialism allowed for the development of further relational theories such as neo-colonialism, dependency theory, and the expansion of critical theory to Africa geopolitics.

### **Dependency Theory**

The dependency theorists, which are quite relevant to this study, suggest that the relationship between the West (colonizers) and the colonized (Africa) could never be equal or fair within the colonizers' terms and conditions—it would only continue to generate rising social, economic and political inequities. This model of thinking emphasizes that the systems within which the 'global' rules and regulations have been framed are not in favor of outsider countries (i.e. LDCs in Africa). The power, economic, political and social structure precludes Africa and other underdeveloped countries. The dependency theory thus purports that the continent of Africa will be in a perpetual state of dependency given the current status quo.

To introduce this idea of dependency, let us examine McGowan and Smith's (1978) insightful definition. They deem dependency to be an asymmetrical structure of control relations wherein one strong entity, such as a state, multinational enterprise, or parent, regularly and predictably, changes or maintains the behavior of another weaker entity, such as another state, an economic sector, or a child. Viewed from the perspective of the stronger entity, such asymmetrical control relationships represent dominance, whereas for the weaker entity they

represent dependency and often exploitation. It is only the capability to dominate the weaker entity that renders exploitation possible. However, that, in of itself, does not represent dependency. It is only when the stronger entity actually uses its capacity to affect the behavior of a weaker entity and only when this process is mainly one way does dependency exist.

(McGowan & Smith, 1978) This distinction demonstrates that intent to exploit is a necessary component of dependency. Further Brian-Vincent Ikejiaku (2008) writes:

Proponents of the dependency theory contend that the debt crisis in Africa could be perceived from the extreme dependence of Africa's economies on international competitive economic conditions over which they had little control. Dependency theory is predicated on the notion that there is a 'centre' of wealthy states and a 'periphery' of poor, underdeveloped states. Resources are extracted from the periphery (developing nations) and flow towards the states at the centre (developed nations) in order to sustain their economic growth and wealth. The major contention here is that the economic development of the developing countries (the Global South) was rendered impossible by the domination of the global economy by the already industrialized capitalist powers ('the Global North', Offiong, 1980). The implication is that poverty; including indebtedness of the countries is the result of the manner of their integration of the world system. The historical incorporation of dependent territories into global division of labour entailed a tendency toward economic stagnation in the colonies and neo colonies (Sandbrook, 1982).

Dos Santos (1970) paints a more vivid picture of this by describing dependency as:

A conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence between two or more economies or between such economies and the world trading system becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can expand through self-impulsion while others, being in dependent position, can only expand as a reflect of the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have positive or negative effects on their immediate development. In either case, the basic situation of dependence causes these countries to be both backward and exploited (Dos Santos, 1970).

Underdevelopment rests on two principal foundations namely, the theory of monopoly capitalism and that of imperialism. (Amin, 1999) The central thesis of these theories is that the intercourse between the rich (center) and the poor (periphery) countries always results in the development of the center at the expense of the periphery (Hettne, B., Inotai, A., & Sunkel, O.



2002). This exploitation is engendered by the transfer of capitalist profits through various channels from the periphery to the center. This practice makes the development of the periphery impossible as excessive profit repatriation creates perpetual state of underdevelopment in the periphery. This process is what Andre Gunder Frank refers to as the "development of underdevelopment (Udoka, 2005).

One of the practical and observable means of dependency is in the official corruption siphoning of money intended for the development in Africa (i.e. illicit financial flows). The act is profitable for individuals and companies in the developed world as well as for the corrupt leaders in African countries who have access to such funds. For one group (industrialized developed country businessmen), it earns them significant profit on the interest earned on investments accruing from Africa's stolen money, in this regard, such international accomplices collect the stolen funds, turn around and loan the stolen money back to Africa at exorbitant rates (Ake, 1996).

### **Governance Theory**

Governance theory is one that has taken center stage in international policy forums and multilateral agencies during the past 25 years. It places much attention on the institutional capacity, subject matter expertise, technical knowhow, and popular social inclusion mechanisms of governing bodies in Africa, and drawing the conclusion that without the aforementioned political apparatus, African governments will continue to be ill-equipped for proper governance and sustainable economic development and social progress. Robert I. Rotberg defines governance as performance.

Governance is performance—the delivery of high quality political goods to citizens by governments of all kinds. In Africa, as everywhere else, those political goods are: security and safety, rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development (Rotberg, 1965).

Although this phenomenon of ‘good governance’ is ubiquitous in the African development literature, there are many differing definitions of what ‘governance’ actually is and how it is to be applied. On a very general level, “governance” seems to refer to the theories and practices involving skilled social coordination and systemic transparent patterns of rule, law and order (Bevir, n.d). However, in the modern world, measuring and observing such patterns can prove to be a rather expansive, oblique set of activities and responsibilities that are not so readily confined. In the modern globalized world, “governance” is no longer an activity that takes place within the confines of international borders, but instead involves a wide range of actors, jurisdictions, agencies, industries, etc. The interplay of these local, regional, transnational and international forces creates an altogether elusive concept of governance, equity, and order. Bevir argues in his book titled *Governance as Theory, Practice and Dilemma*, this increasingly embroiled relationship has resulted in the internationalization of industrial and financial transactions, the rise of regional blocks and the interdependence of jurisdictions resulting in changing formal and informal governance structures (Bevin, n.d). Thus, defining the concept requires a certain application of interpretative license. As the matter relates to Africa, the consensus is that dysfunctional political institutions and governance bear much of the blame for the region’s disappointing economic performance, hindering the successful pursuit of any development strategy (Mkandawire & Soludo 1999; Ndulu & O’Connell 1999; Sandbrook 1986; van de Walle 2001).

## Development Theories

### Measuring Development – GDP, GNP, and Freedoms

There has been a lot of talk in the past decade about how to properly measure development and what exactly should be considered as “development.” The most traditional ways of quantifying development to date has been in the form of financial calculations of economic growth i.e. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP), Gross National Income (GNI) and terms of similar equivalence. These input-output calculations are generally used to benchmark and determine the economic activity and contribution of nations to the global market place.

The Gross Domestic Product measures the value of economic activity within a country. Strictly defined, GDP is the sum of the market values, or prices, of all final goods and services produced in an economy during a period of time. In the IFI context, GDP is the calculated value of the total worth of a country’s production and services, within its boundary, by its nationals and foreigners, calculated over the course of one year. There are, however, three semi-important distinctions within this seemingly simple definition:

1. GDP is a number that expresses the worth of the output of a country *in local currency*.
2. GDP tries to capture all final goods and services as long as they are *produced* within the country, thereby assuring that the final monetary value of everything that is created in a country is represented in the GDP.
3. GDP is calculated for a specific period of time, usually a year or a quarter of a year.

Taken together, these three aspects of GDP calculation provide a standard basis for the comparison of GDP across both time and distinct national economies.

The GNP is similar in that it determines the economic contribution of nations to the global marketplace, however, distinctively, in this case with the GNP, the formula is modified to incorporate all domestic and travelling citizen contributions. That is to specifically include both domestically addressed individuals as well as individuals living abroad and across national borders. The GNP is thus the net income inflow from assets abroad (or net Income Receipts), minus the net payment outflow to foreign assets.

GNI on the other hand, is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (fewer subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad (World Bank). Essentially all these calculations aim to measure the same or similar monetary equation, albeit in different ways. GNI, GNP and GDP are all based on income and monetary value of assets in relation to the global standard currency, the US dollar. Many international development experts and Africanist alike are increasingly finding this type of measurement limiting, in that it does not account for country-specific standards of living, or other more representative determinants of the quality of people's lives i.e. access to health care, life expectancy, security, and personal freedoms. African economists, like Dr. Wilfred David, have called for a fundamental and radical switch in how nations and international finance institutions approach development economics. In fact, Dr. Wilfred David (2004) has argued for a complete paradigm shift from neoclassical, neoliberal "Washington Consensus" approach to development to what he has termed the "Humanitarian Development Paradigm." The humanitarian development paradigm argues for a bottom-up development strategy that chiefly considers the individual and community as the basis for development. That is to say that development is a result of empowering humans, humanity and investing the human agency of societies and creating social

capital that can be leveraged for development versus a focus the notion of monetary capital for development.

Unfortunately, the Humanitarian Development Paradigm, amongst other socialist models, continues to focus heavily on collectivist ideas despite the fact that those policies have proven inferior to the any kind of development. The failed experiment of Marxist-Leninist Communism in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) displayed the superior development potential unleashed by neoliberal market mechanisms. The issue is that if you believe in freedoms, then you intrinsically believe in “individual freedom,” which is not the same as “group freedom.” However, to believe in individual freedom is also to be against “group freedom” and collectivism. This is because collectivism infringes on the rights of individuals thus destroying “individual freedoms.” For example, when the group wants something and has power over the individual, then the freedoms of that individual are threatened. This is what has been deemed as the ‘tyranny of the majority.’ In fact, this was the driving force behind the adoption of neoliberal policies by the “Washington Consensus” in the first place. Marx attacked neoclassical liberal ideas of markets. Now, that is one argument but it is entirely different than the subsequent development of neoliberalist thought. In fact, neoliberalism was all about freedoms; and all against collectivisms (in any form). The pioneers of neoliberalism were folks coming out of 1930s London School of Economic (LSE) Ludwig Van Mises, Frederic Hayek, and Karl Popper, as well as their U.S. counterparts in the Chicago school Milton Friedman, and Simons. These individuals were against ‘New Deal’ economics. They firmly believed that when individuals rights and inextricably linked to group rights that their freedoms were supremely jeopardized. Clearly, they had their biases, but these were individuals that were familiar with being a minority class. Their goal was thus to protect the individual such that he can always be

free (free in the same sense that Amartya Sen discussed) in the group dynamic. The belief is therefore, similar to that of the humanitarian development paradigm in that, neoliberals believe that human nature will ultimately prevail. Their point is that, if goodness, morality, benevolence and the like are truly innately human, then the medium of play should not affect the outcome. Incidentally, this is also what Adam Smith alluded to in his description on the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. It is this ‘other’ quality that makes sure things are happening in an equitable manner.

By and large the experiment has proven correct. The United States receives a lot of criticism, particularly from the dependency and conspiracy theorist of the day. However, if you analyze its systems, although not perfect, it has proven to be mostly efficient, flexible, and has features that are congenial and self-regulating as a sociopolitical system. If you look at freedoms from an evaluation perspective instead of implementation perspective. You may learn that the United States is one of the freest places in the world. Although it is not thought of as a socialist society, it also has one of the biggest entitlement programs in the world—from social security, unemployment, food stamps, housing and electricity subsidies, and most recently universal healthcare and free community college education. The U.S. also boasts one the largest donor communities in the world. All of its mechanisms cannot be fully analyzed here but the system has proven to be effective nonetheless.

This is simply to say that the goal of humanitarian may be correct, but the ideas of collectivism are likely wrong. Grassroots development begins with individuals and individual freedom. Without it tyranny ensues, and collective destruction will continue to plague the continent.

In which case the measurement of development is fundamental and critical to meaningful progress on the African front. The Human Development Index (HDI) has been developed to fit this gap in understanding and quantifying true development at the human level. The HDI is a composite index focusing on three basic dimensions of human development: to lead a long and healthy life, measured by life expectancy at birth; the ability to acquire knowledge, measured by mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling; and the ability to achieve a decent standard of living, measured by gross national income per capita. The HDI has an upper limit of 1.0. To measure human development more comprehensively, the Human Development Report also presents four other composite indices. The Inequality adjusted HDI discounts the HDI according to the extent of inequality. The Gender Development Index compares female and male HDI values. The Gender Inequality Index highlights women's empowerment. And the Multidimensional Poverty Index measures non-income dimensions of poverty. (UNDP, 2015)

This idea is supported by many in the contemporary development scholarship, as noted here by Breuning (2012), who insists that any meaningful focus on poverty alleviation demands a change in the definition of development, and particularly a change the unit of analysis. Quoting Finnemore he goes on to state "Poverty moved from being a condition of states to a condition of people." Which in turn, has influenced policy. Rather than focusing merely reconstructing development assistance on "increasing GNP or, perhaps, GNP per capita," development also came to entail a focus on the "distribution of those gains." Finnemore acknowledges that this norm is often violated in practice, but she nonetheless insists that it provides a yardstick by which to gauge the policies of countries and international organizations involved in the development process (Breuning, 2012).

We should certainly consider the notion of alternative measures of development as there are increasingly more nuanced alternative measures of well-being, particularly in the field of “happiness economics” that have been developed in the twenty first century. In 2006, the New Economics Foundation released its first Happy Planet Index (HPI), an alternative means of measuring fulfillment by country based on experienced well-being, life expectancy, and ecological footprint. In the 2006 HPI study, 31 African countries ranked higher than the United States. The high scores from so many African countries suggest a greater ability to appreciate what one has, including strong social relations built in part by investing in social capital, rather than suffering the “affluenza” of the world’s wealthiest—the anxious condition of having much material wealth but always wanting more (Smythe, 2015).

## **Globalization and Africa**

Globalization is the ever-evolving process of human interaction, adaptation and integration. It is the drive for a cohesive interconnectedness of economics, humanities, cultures, societies and the general human spirit to a place of uniformity for all of mankind. It is the innate human quest to explore, improve, resolve, conquer, destroy, build, and/or enhance his own existence that drives globalization.

At its core, globalization is the measurement of the innate human need and ability to wander, explore, learn, share, transcend and discover the earth, its surroundings, and its many crevices, channels, elements, inhabitants and systems. It is an age-old reality of the movement of human beings across peaks and valleys, deserts and plains, rivers and oceans in the effort to peak an interest; solve a problem; amass wealth; find land; escape prosecution, poverty, famine or any of the other many tragedies of the human experience. However, globalization in most modern



instances does not encompass this broader meaning of the term. Instead, it is often equated with economic globalization or Western neoliberal hegemonization of the global order. This is to say that globalization is strictly about the interconnectedness of economies, supply-chains, value-chains and other economic and monetary mechanisms. This idea of economic globalization is often thought of as a new phenomenon credited to Ted Levitt, former Harvard Business Review editor who coined the term in a 1983 Harvard Business Review article. However, even before the United States declared independence from Britain, German philosopher Van Heder had written widely on the topic of hegemonic economic control of world resources. Globalization in this context is simply an old notion, with even older ideas about its pros and cons.

If we examine the Africanist literature, we can come to see that there is a whole school of thought regarding anti-globalization. Many post-modernism theories have varying themes and intensities of anti-globalization sentiments. The dependency and under development theorists are perhaps the most pronounced of these theorists. Scholars like Walter Rodney and Howard University's Dr. Wilfred David have written quite extensively on how Europe, the proverbial West, and the "Washington Consensus" have effectively exploited, looted and deprived Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and more specifically, African countries out of the development potential of their economies. The dependency contention is that throughout history, Europe and the West have systematically exploited the LDC nations out of natural resources and economic development. These theories have matured and splintered into both multidisciplinary factions and deeply rooted African philosophies. Kwame Nkrumah, one of Africa's most prolific leaders, coined the term and consequently a whole field of study called "neocolonialism." International Affairs scholars and political scientists alike have taken stabs at the idea with expanding notions of realism and neo-realist ideology. The dependency theorist, neocolonialist and neorealist

essentially purport that the economically and militarily powerful nations use new instruments and systems of globalization to control, manipulate and extort riches from poorer, non-industrialized nations. The argument from neocolonialist thought-leaders is that through the international mechanism of global order, the “new world order” i.e. the Bretton Woods institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization and the United Nations) industrialized rich nations exercise their will on the others.

These theories have their root in post-World War II politics. They surfaced at the end of World War II at the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire where the United States, Britain and the 44 allied nations came together to set a global order for financial and economic management for the entire world. It was a big feat with very noble reasons behind it-- to create a common system for trade, exchange and the movement of capital across borders. These new institutions certainly had their merit in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and laid the groundwork for peaceful hegemonic transition from the European center to the United States. However, many neocolonialists argue that although these institutions were set up in good cause, they were ultimately used to manipulate, control and extort riches, minerals and natural resources out of the continent. Many Africanist thus contend that the structural adjustment schemes of the 1980s and 1990s system broke down their internal controls and long-term plans for development. Scholars like Fantu Cheru and George Ayittey have thus claimed that the Bretton Woods institutions infringe on African sovereignty and shrink the policy space of African countries (Ayittey, 2006; Cheru, 2010). Many neocolonialists have also contended regarding the types of aid programs that are sponsored in LDC nations are stripped of both economic and social value by the time they reach recipients in LDC countries. The UN is not exempt from these criticisms. The governing mechanisms set up by the UN Security Council have been under heavy fire since its

inception. Under the current system, only the United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France have a vote in any major policy endeavor the United Nations undertakes. In fact, the governing structures and related weighted voting schemes of all the Bretton Woods institutions have been heavily scrutinized and contested as they skew towards Western national control. The policy positions of many of these institutions have also been criticized. The World Trade Organization(WTO) has seen some of the harshest levels of contestation of the international finance institutions. Anti-globalizers, as identified by Martin Wolf, author of *Why Globalization Works* have severely hindered the WTO in implementing many of their policies. In fact, for much of the 21st century, the WTO has found it quite difficult to even hold any high-profile meetings and often resorts to conducting such meetings in remote unpopulated areas where agitation will be less likely i.e. the Doha round (Wolf, 2005).

However, the question of whether globalization is good or bad is not the right question to ask. The reality of the matter is that globalization is real and it is an integral part of our everyday life. As long as there has been a globe there has been globalization. Therefore, the question should not be whether it is good or bad. Instead, the question should focus on “the how?” Specifically, “how do we harness its potential for good?” This is the question many Africanists have not effectively answered yet. If they have attempted to answer it, they certainly have not arrived at any meaningful answer to the question.

Today, globalization has profoundly affected Africans, but it has also affected the biggest economies of the world just the same. Thomas Friedman, author of the *World is Flat* and Podraig Carmody author of *Globalization and African* discuss some effects that modern day globalization has had on the global marketplace, US markets and the African economy (Carmody, 2010; Freidman, 2006). China was a central point of interest for both authors. They

both see the growth of China's economy and its middle class as a major globalization indicator. This increased economic activity and shift in social demographics has changed economies and social organization in countries thousands of miles away. Friedman considers the rise of China as a threat to the United States economy and political stability of the American working class. He sees globalization as a dynamic force-- something that is ever-changing and ever-evolving. Therefore, countries and individual actors alike should be constantly evaluating and assessing its conditions, vulnerabilities and advantages in the global space. Contrarily, Carmody (2010) perceives China's involvement in Africa and its resources as an 'opportunity' for Africa (Carmody, 2010). Through these conflicting opinions, we begin to see how the idea of globalization is not something that is easily quantifiable as 'good' or 'bad' but instead as a net neutral. If we look at globalization from this perspective, we can begin to find ways to use both the technology and the exchange as a means to better the lives of all global residents. With globalization comes the transfer of information, goods, services, people, materials and ideas. As mentioned above, instead of trying to determine whether this is inherently good or bad, we should find ways to maximize its benefit. The world has already seen this occur in some ways. For instance, globalization in the field of humanitarian assistance has seen some clear benefits. In early the 2000s, the international community collectively raised support, funds and tangible action for the Darfur region in Sudan largely due to the free flow of communication and information (a byproduct of globalization). Similarly, the relief efforts surrounding the Japan Tsunami in 2004 and Haiti Earthquake in 2010 broke records in both the amount of funding (both exceeding \$1.5 billion) and the speed by which the funds were raised. In this regard, the global order worked in favor of humanity, however there are other instances where the same globalizing forces and instruments yield negative and at time devastating effects. For example,

warring factions in Syria, Nigeria, and Iraq use the internet and other globalized media forces to train, recruit and terrorize the global society. Market crashes in the United States, Greece, or Singapore have devastating effects on the economies of Nicaragua, Togo or France. On the other hand, economic booms in China can mean prosperity for a family in Angola or Senegal.

In the African context, Africans must simply analyze the flow of information, goods and services and determine sectors to penetrate in order to foster development. Despite the internet and other globalizing technologies, Africa continues to be in a similar position it has been in for most of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. For much of this time, Africa has been playing “catch up” – capitalizing on low employment rates, cheap labor, natural resources, strategic locations, and the majority of the world’s arable land. As previously mentioned, globalization is not a new phenomenon. Thus, when you examine the equation of successful development outcomes (if there were any), you would note that the equation itself does not change. In my opinion, the rate by which globalization occurs is all that has changed to date. At this point if African countries do not take steps towards significantly improving the governance portion of the development equation then it will inevitably hinder African economic growth. African governments must deal with the international finance institutions (IMF, World Bank, UN, etc.) from a “national interest” perspective, and not take any aid and other projects that have minimal value to the society at large. They must exercise sound judgment in national policy development and program implementation in order to maximize outputs.

Globalization has not effectuated substantive changes in public policy and international institutions however it has sped up the pace of private sector development. In which case, African governments need to make significant steps towards fostering a landscape to allow their private citizens and companies to succeed. This will likely prove challenging as the

technological, educational, and physical infrastructure necessary to harness the internet (one of the greatest modern development tools) is largely lacking in Africa. The freedom to move about both locally and internationally is also significantly diminished in Africa, which clearly provides citizens from other parts of the world an advantage. Thus, the same questions of market openness, comparative advantage and autarky arise on a micro level. The equation doesn't change. Africans must solve the development equation first before they can effectively harness the 21<sup>st</sup> century lightning round of globalization.

### **Conclusion of Theory**

Modernization theory and the various dependency, governance, and development theories mentioned above are all valid perspectives on which to examine Africa. They all provide insights into the many dimensions of global development economics and the interdependence of global histories and civilizations. However, these theories cannot independently answer all the questions about African underdevelopment on their own. Instead these theories need to be used to complement one another to provide a more comprehensive and multifarious outlook on African development. Although some may conclude that modernization theory and dependency theories are out of vogue, I believe they continued to be critical pieces in the puzzle of African economic development and will continue to play a role in explaining and predicting African development matters in the future. And although elements of modernization theory are not attractive or heartening, they may indeed hold value, and hold key answers to African development generally. To examine something is not to pick and choose answers that are simply favorable to one's outlook. Instead the idea of accumulating data that is complete, comprehensive, and accurate is the ultimate aim. In this sense perspectives certainly matter,

even if it is not your own. Thus, ideas and theories cannot be written off in wholesale because they do not comply to contemporary norms or interests.

The Theory of History, Knowledge and Adaptation is perhaps all that Africans can rely on to advance African economies. That is to say a theory based on documented knowledge, experimentation, history and the adaptation to results and changes in the world landscape. African nations must base their policies on local, national and global realities, not sound bites, conjecture and ideology. This means examining development from positions foreign, domestic and multilateral angles. This means examining histories, relationships, and statistical outcomes of the many influencers of trade, aid and internal economics. It is only with such introspection of cause and effect can African countries lift themselves out of poverty.

### **Research Methodology**

This study uses both qualitative and quantitative measures to analyze the relationship and convergence between African political thought, multilateral and international policy, and the socio-economic conditions of The Gambia in comparison to neighboring Senegal between the years of 2009 through 2016.

The study uses United Nations General Assembly archived speech content to effectively codify and create new data measures with respect to African political thought content in speeches given by selected pioneering African heads of states of the 20<sup>th</sup> century before the UNGA convention. Speech content is evaluated and codified using pre-identified African Political Thought Word Indicators (APTWIs), such as Africa, Pan-African, African Union, Colonialism, Race, Anti-imperialism, African Economic Freedom, African political Freedom, African Unity,

etc. Further, the study arranges these APTWIs under key categories of African political thought as identified by the legacy on Nkrumah and Toure. These broad categories are 1) Political/Economic unification of Africa; 2) Political/Economic Freedoms and matters of sovereignty; 3) Hegemonic exploitation, subjugation, and/or imperialism; and 4) Matters of Race, Justice, and Inequality. This data is presented along with development data concerning Senegal and The Gambia for a specified time (2009-2016) to demonstrate correlations between African political ideology and key development metrics. Further, the study examines trade, aid, monetary, and development data utilizing primary economic data from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and the UN. The quantitative framework is complemented by additional non-governmental data sources and databases such as [publishwhatyoupay.org](http://publishwhatyoupay.org), [foreignassistance.gov](http://foreignassistance.gov), and [investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org](http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org). This study specifically utilizes the IMF's time series data for GDP growth, inflation, unemployment, payments balances, exports, imports, external debt, capital flows, the World Bank's *Open Data Catalog* and the World Trade Organization's *International Trade and Market Access Database* for more worldwide data on aid, investment, trade in merchandise figures, tariff accounts as well as non-tariff Measures and Services Regimes. The study draws on this data and applies quantitative analytical methods and financial modeling techniques to calculate and deduce statistically relevant findings and financial conclusions based on these African economic indicators.

Using the Human Development index, this research study also analyzes the human development indicators for an eight-year time period. These indicators (as outlined below) serve as individual data points for the overall analysis on the validity of underdevelopment theory and the dependency argument in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The plotting of these specific data



points allows the reader to visualize and quantify African economic development and progress in order to assess the significance and/or relevance of IFI individual policy positions and international resource extraction deals.

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a key source of data concerning development outcomes. The HDI is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions.

The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, the education dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita. The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing GNI. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using geometric mean.

### Human Development Indicators

1. Population Demographics:
  - a. Population
2. Education:
  - a. Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and older) Education index; Expected Years of Schooling; Mean years of schooling (of adults); Primary school dropout rate (% of primary school cohort).
3. Environmental Sustainability:

- a. Carbon dioxide emissions per capita; Natural resource depletion (% of GNI); Population living on degraded land (%); Primary energy supply, fossil fuels (% of total)
4. Gender Inequality:
- a. Adolescent birth rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19); Estimated GNI per capita (2011 PPP\$), female; Estimated gross national income per capita, male (2011 PPP\$); Expected years of schooling, females; Expected years of schooling, males; Gender Development Index (GDI); Gender Inequality Index (GII), value; Human Development Index (HDI), female; Human development index (HDI), male; Labor force participation rate, female (% ages 15 and older); Labor force participation rate, male (% ages 15 and older); Life expectancy at birth, female; Life expectancy at birth, male; Maternal mortality ratio (deaths per 100,000 live births); Mean years of schooling (females aged 25 years and above); Mean years of schooling, males; Population with at least some secondary education, female (% ages 25 and older); Population with at least some secondary education, male (% ages 25 and older); Share of seats in parliament (% held by women)
5. Health:
- a. Adult mortality rate, female (per 1,000 people); Adult mortality rate, male (per 1,000 people); HIV prevalence, adult (% ages 15-49); Health index; Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births); Infants lacking immunization, DTP (% of one-year-olds); Infants lacking immunization, measles (% of one-year-olds); Life expectancy at birth; Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)
6. Human Security:

- a. Homicide rate (per 100,000 people); Old age pension recipients (% of statutory pension age population); Prison population (per 100,000 people); Violence against women ever experienced (%)
7. Income Composition and Resources
    - a. External debt stock (% of GNI); Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2011 PPP \$); Gross domestic product (GDP), total (2011 PPP \$ billions); Gross national income (GNI) per capita (2011 PPP\$); Income index; External debt stock (% of GNI); Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita; Gross domestic product (GDP), total (PPP \$ billions); Gross national income (GNI) per capita.
  8. Inequality
    - a. Inequality in education (%); Inequality in income (%); Inequality in life expectancy (%); Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) value; Inequality-adjusted education index; Inequality-adjusted income index; Inequality-adjusted life expectancy index; Overall loss in HDI due to inequality (%)
  9. Mobility and Communication
    - a. Internet users (% of population); Mobile phone subscriptions
  10. Poverty
    - a. Multidimensional poverty index (MPI), (revised); Population in multidimensional poverty, headcount (%); Population in multidimensional poverty, headcount (thousands); Population in multidimensional poverty, intensity of deprivation (%); Population in severe multidimensional poverty (%); Population near multidimensional poverty (%):Working poor at PPP of \$2 a day
  11. Trade and Financial Flows

- a. Trade and financial flows; Exports and imports (% of GDP); Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP); Net official development assistance received (% of GNI); Remittances, inflows (% of GDP)

## 12. Work, Employment, and Vulnerability

- a. Child labor (% ages 5-14); Domestic workers, female (% of total employment); Domestic workers, male (% of total employment); Employment to population ratio (% ages 15 and older); Labor force participation rate (% ages 15 and older); Mandatory paid maternity leave (days); Total unemployment rate (% of labor force); Vulnerable employment (% of total employment); Youth not in school or employment (% ages 15-24)

The third component of the study is a comprehensive compilation and aggregation of publicly sourced country data on multilateral and bilateral agreements with IFI institutions and the United States. The collective policy and transactional data compilation for The Gambia and Senegal is subsequently analyzed to underscore trends in international trade flows to and from poor LDC nations to their richer, industrialized counterparts.

This information is then to be utilized in conjunction with regional and trade agreement data as well as compiled scores from UNGA speech in an effort to construct a narrative relating to notions of underdevelopment, African political thought, and culpability. The data provides insight into the underlying relationship and convergence between African political thought, multilateral and international policy, and the socio-economic conditions of The Gambia in comparison to neighboring Senegal between the years of 2009 through 2016.

This research ultimately follows an inductive process. It therefore evaluates and analyzes the relevant data points and their significance in an effort to draw conclusions and develop a broad theoretical determination on the question of international trade, monetary exchange, and aid effectiveness.

### **Research Objectives**

There are five objectives to the study. The first is to compile and aggregate key international multilateral policy positions as well as selected bilateral agreements that affect The Gambia and Senegal. The second objective is to analyze public international and multilateral data on key indicators related to factors of trade, aid, market openness, currency exchange, integration, and other indicators. The third objective is to extrapolate the pre-independence African political and economic policy objectives of modern day African political thought into succinct policy positions. The fourth objective is to draw connections between the policy themes of African political thought leaders and international trade, aid and monetary policy, and economic outputs. The fifth and final objective is to link development trends to trends in political rhetoric and delivered remarks at UNGA.

## CHAPTER 3:

### INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND LOCALIZED POLICY PERSCRPTIONS

The idea of underdevelopment is heavily hinged on the notion that the various multilateral organizations (i.e. World Bank, WTO, IMF, UN) play an undermining role in the development agenda for African nations. However, many that purport this notion rarely outline any of the specific mechanisms or policies by which these institutions employ to undercut development in African states. In this chapter I will outline some of the key historical and relevant inflection points in the establishment of WTO, as well as, key underlying policies and instruments used to regulate trade in the current era. The goal is to breakdown key policy positions promoted and embodied by the WTO and demonstrated any inherent biases and conformities that could potentially answer key questions of underdevelopment. This dissection of policy (in this Chapter), combined with the review and analysis of key trade data components in the results section (Chapter 8) will allow for the critical understanding of key elements at play and they intricate dynamics under multilateral regulation; and how those regulations in turn affect the trade environment in Africa and around the world.

Mostly notably, I will discuss issues of WTO inception, comparative advantage, most favored nations (MFN), trade related investment measures (TRIMS), and trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS), as these components are the underlying philosophies that govern the WTO and serve to have the most impact on African economies.

## The World Trade Organization (WTO)

The WTO is intended to be an international organization consisting of 159-member countries centrally focused on increasing international trade and global commercial interconnectivity. It envisions itself as an impartial forum for discussion, negotiation, integration, dispute-resolution and the formulation of trade agreements that ultimately liberate the world economy and increase development throughout the global community. It operates under the five basic principles of the WTO multilateral trading system-- trade without discrimination; national treatment; free trade; predictability; fair competition; and development and economic reform. The WTO argues that free trade is commercial common sense and that WTO policies are statistically correlated to high economic growth. “The system’s overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possibly – so long as there are no undesirable side-effects” (WTO, 2014). Its core objectives are to administer trade agreements; act as a forum for trade negotiations; settle trade disputes; review national trade policies; assist developing countries in trade policy issues, through technical assistance and training programs; and cooperate with other international organizations (WTO, 2014).

The WTO Secretariat is at the heart of the WTO system. Along with the Secretariat and legal agreements, the WTO system is also comprised of the interactions among WTO member states, who conduct much of its day-to-day business, the appellate body and a host of international agencies and non-government organizations (NGOs). The agreement establishing the WTO outlines its specific functions, both formalizing some of those previously served by the GATT Secretariat and also extending beyond them. In practice, the range of functions served by

the WTO system as a whole now include trade negotiations, implementation monitoring, capacity building, outreach, and dispute resolution (WTO Public Forum, 2007).

At the conclusion of World War II, 23 countries, led primarily by the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, negotiated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The goal was to create an agreement that would ensure postwar stability and avoid a repeat of the mistakes of the recent past, including the Smoot-Hawley tariffs and retaliatory responses, which had been a contributor to the devastating economic climate that culminated in the death and destruction of the Second World War. In 1947, GATT created a new basic template of rules and exceptions to regulate international trade between members (referred to as contracting parties) and locked in initial tariffs.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) makes up one third of the current international finance governing structure. Although it was not officially part of the Bretton Woods creation, it is often considered to be the most important and critical component to the overall functionality of the international financial system. In 1948, the United States was an economically overwhelming global power. When it came to market access, the only issue of consequence was the access to the U.S. market. The stability of rules essentially depended simply on the desire for stability on the part of the United States. Market skills were highly concentrated in U.S. firms. However, today things are different. The U.S. government and policy-makers are discovering the limits of policy implementation due to the actions of its trading partners. The importance of market access now is increasingly critical for U.S. firms if they are to be successful (Czinkota, 1982).



It was not until 1994 that the global community led by the U.S came together and agreed to the formation of the first international trade institution, the World Trade Organization. This new institution would essentially replace the loosely structured General Agreements in Trade and Tariffs (GATT). However, since its inception, the WTO has been heavily criticized for being a biased “old-boys” network aimed at advancing rich industrialized countries at the expense of the least developed nations of the world.

The WTO continues the tradition of rich world domination. Rubens Ricupero, current Secretary-General of the UN conference on Trade and Development UNCTAD is frank in his assessment of the multilateral trading system. It is a matter of ‘concrete evidence’ he says that global trade rules are ‘highly imbalanced and biased against developing countries (Ellwood, 2003).

The Doha Round is the latest round of international trade negotiations. Its aim was to reform the international trading system through the introduction of lower trade barriers and revised trade rules that adversely effected LDC nations. The Doha process covers about 20 areas of trade with its fundamental objective being to improve the trading prospects and related matter in developing countries. This round was officially launched as the Doha Development Agenda at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. The Doha Ministerial Declaration provided the mandate for the negotiations, including on agriculture, services and an intellectual property topic, which began earlier (WTO, 2014). Although the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations begun in November 2001 it has just entered its 16th year. The Doha round was deemed the development round as a result of perceived uneven agreement from the Uruguay round that excessively favored the developed world over the developing and least developed nations. The negotiations have been thus far characterized by persistent differences among countries in the developed world and those of the developing.

Major issues, such as agriculture, industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers, services, intellectual property rights, and dispute settlements have been a particular sticking point. (Congressional Research Service, 2018). The Congressional Research Service also highlights three development issues that they consider most noteworthy out of this round of negotiations. The first pertains to compulsory licensing of medicines and patent protection. The second is regarding the establishment of a comprehensive systematic review of provisions that give special and differential treatment to developing countries. The third addresses problems that developing countries face in implementing current trade obligations (Congressional Research Service, 2018), I propose to add a fourth noteworthy issue-- the inability for many LDCs to equitably participate, contribute, and negotiate in the various international trade forums. For the small and poorer countries, Michalopoulos (1999) argues that it may not necessarily be an optimal use of their scarce resources to seek individual representation in the context of the WTO process (Richard Blackhurst, Bill Lyakurwa and Ademola Oyejide, 2000).

The simultaneous negotiation with several international bodies include issues that certain negotiating countries are reluctant to address by default—many of which are necessary conditions for the successful development/continuation of other beneficial processes for those countries. This situation can put LDCs and developing countries at a disadvantage. The developing countries will likely be anxious to improve their economies through international trade so they are equally likely to conceded on trade deals that affect the short-term gain. According Peter Drahos, renowned author and authority on global regulation has said.

Now as we speak [October 26, 2016], the Doha Round has yet to conclude and many people over the last few years have said that the Doha Round is dead. So the one round that was meant to serve the interests of developing countries hasn't really produced the goods. And so one can see again why many people are critical of the trade regime from a development point of view. The Uruguay Round of agreements delivered a set of results

that favored rich countries and the round that was meant to serve poor countries is lingering on not delivering anything at all. (Peter Drahos, 2016).

Many in the developing world have since come to realize that the adoption of a world trade organization to help manage and govern international trade relations may be ideal in theory, but the control and manipulation of its policies, practices and outcomes is an entirely different thing. As I stated above, The WTO claims “its policies sharpen competition, motivate innovation and breed success for all its members; and that the system’s overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possibly – so long as there are no undesirable side-effects.” (WTO) However, when it comes to the WTO’s functionality and policy, two key questions continually come to the surface. First of which is, from both a statistical and empirical framework, who has and will benefit from this “motivation”, “innovation” and “competition?” and secondly, what are these so called “undesirable side-effects?”

To examine these questions more in-depth, let us first take a look at the WTOs guiding principles. I will begin by first examining the WTO policy of comparative advantage and some of the relevant literature on the subject.

### **Comparative Advantage**

The term comparative advantage was first introduced in England in the early 19th century by economists of the classical school, which dates from the publication of Adam Smith’s *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Maneschi, 1998). The term has since been used as the primary yard stick for evaluating international terms of trade.

It was Adam Smith that was able to quickly demonstrate a basic mathematical certainty of an “absolute advantage” in trade; that is to say, that if two nations traded the surpluses of two separate goods that each country was respectively better at producing, both countries would ultimately benefit from the trade. This is fairly simple logic. i.e. if one country (A) produces 100 bushels of corn in 10hrs and 100 bushels of maize in 15hrs while another country (B) produces 100 bushels of corn in 15hrs and 100 bushels of maize in 10hrs, then in this case each country would have an interest in specialization in the commodity they are most efficient at producing and trading for the other. Ricardo expanded on this scenario to say that even when an absolute advantage doesn’t exist between two nations as is in the case above, there are still advantages to international trade for each respective country. He coined his scenario as a “comparative advantage.” Under his theory, countries are said to always have an opportunity cost of the production of goods and should therefore always seek to maximize their returns by maximizing their collective productivity. Thus, the value in international trade is only linked to availability of production-specialization in the most efficiently produced goods and services of a given country.

This philosophy is what the WTO bases its international trade policy and liberal free-market system on; the notion, as they put it, where “comparative advantage is arguably the single most powerful insight into economics. That it is one of the most widely accepted principles among economists and also the most misunderstood among non-economists.” (WTO, 2014)

On the other hand, this can be perceived as an exercise in soft power at play in this type of interaction between states and multilateral institutions, where the aim may be to mask greed and exploitation under a veil of complex mathematics and classical economic theories. The inference being that there is an interest in slowing LDC contribution to market philosophies,

therefore LDCs and African countries should merely abide by the rules but should not shape them. The contention is that once LDC nations fully understand that comparative advantage refers to the benefit or advantage of an economy to be able to produce a commodity at a lesser opportunity cost than another country; and they know that the opportunity cost is merely the benefit foregone for undertaking the activity. They will quickly be able to deduce that comparative advantage is only constant in certain sectors i.e. products relating to specific geographies, climates, natural endowments, etc. However, when we talk about human capital, manufactured goods and intellectual property, which make up a major portion of world trade, comparative advantage is no longer at play. Policy makers will therefore approach very cautiously when sanctioning and ratifying WTO Agreements. The creation of comparative advantages are caused by the innate human ability to learn, improve, and innovate. When advanced nations and PIOs write African nations out of major sectors of the global market by claiming comparative advantage they are simply belittling Africans and labeling them as incapable and un-human. It is true that there is much that African countries will continually need to import, but there are also too many imports into the African marketplace that simply serve to undermine its development.

The relationship between Africa and the industrialized nations is not based on such basis of mutual advantages. True they can produce things which we cannot. And we can produce some things which they cannot. But, they can do without our produce and we cannot, presently, do without most of theirs. Therefore there is no equity in our trade. It is therefore necessary to create industrial capability as well as production within Africa. Acceptance of this objective will necessitate the acceptance of certain technical and economic imperatives (Yimenu, 1975).

In strictly economic terms, a comparative advantage may indeed always exist between two nations but in real world terms the opportunity cost of training LDC people to manufacture new technology is always greater than the opportunity cost of producing strictly primary

commodity goods. The problem here, is that the marketing of the WTO suggests the opposite. Again, this goes back to the issue of understanding comparative advantage.

Regarding classical comparative advantage, Ricardo's only claim was to show that there are inherent 'advantages' and certain gains in international trade on labor terms. However, his model does not account for the many real-world instances that determine international trade relationships and international terms of trade. In the Ricardian model of trade, labor is the only factor of production; meaning that no other factor affects the production of any good or service thus ruling out productivity factors such as capital, wages, incentives, technology, supply, demand, etc. The Ricardian model also stipulates that the supply of labor is fixed and perfectly mobile within country borders and perfectly immobile beyond those borders. This mode of thinking is certainly out of date and outside of today's globalized, multinational, conglomerate-based international marketplace. Lastly, the Ricardian model assumes that there are neither natural nor artificial barriers to international trade; barriers such as tax levies, tariffs or even transportation costs (which are not a part of his calculation). In such a model, the global market structure is one of "perfect competition." Assuming that, 1. All firms sell the identical products. 2. All firms are price takers, and do not control the market price of their product. 3. All firms have a small market share. 4. Buyers have complete information about the products on the market. 5. The market is free for participants to enter and exit. (Bhagwati, Panagariy, and Srinivasa, 2004) The current global market place could not be further from the controlled hypothetical environment depicted by Ricardo when he coined the term "comparative advantage." Ricardo simply postulated the existence of a trade equilibrium but never explained how the terms of trade, and hence the division of gains of trade between two countries is actually determined (Maneschi, 1998).

These types of restrictions on the evaluation of modern trade create a series of misconceptions, assumptions and rationalizations that are difficult to justify empirically, and therefore becomes an inadequate basis for the blanket adoption of the WTO policy framework. Although comparative advantage exists in the international trade context, the concept is so misunderstood to the point that its relevance is severely minimized. Secondly the terms of comparative advantage simply do not relate to the current international trade environment.

Although the Ricardian model accounts for many trade dynamics, as explained above, its applicability is not at all intuitive. One such issue in the Ricardian scope is the matter of global heterogeneous efficiency of production versus national-economy productivity. In the Ricardian model there is a subtle yet clear implication of a global system of production. However, in real terms, collective gains are simply not mutually beneficial across country borders. So even if trade between two nations increase and both nations grew more efficient at producing their respective products, how much bread would country B need to produce in order to buy a single car from country A? This also doesn't take into account subsidies, tariffs and the interplay between domestic and international markets and currency exchange rates. The simple problem in these "real world" scenarios is that efficiency in the global system is not beneficial for all countries involved. This is because the idea of comparative advantage mostly works between economies that have marginal differences in their capacity or for economies that are similar in size and productive means. This is why when small African nations trade with mega-economies, the comparative advantage only benefits the country that already has an absolute advantage in high-priced goods or has some other advantage in other lucrative sectors of the market. This is the advantage of modern industrialized nations in the current world economy. They consequently grow at rapid rates while non-industrial countries lag behind. According to Burchill (1996);

Events in the developing world provide us with some reasons why attempts made in redressing the situation through the encouragement of increased foreign borrowing have contributed to the current debt crisis by increasing the resource gap even further. These powerful transnational bodies which embody free trade liberalism as their governing ideology however impose free market strictures on developing societies. Since they are the primary organizations which formalise and institutionalise market relationships between states; they lock peripheral states into agreements which force them to lower their protective barriers (GATT and NAFTA for instance), thereby preventing developing nations from developing trade profiles which diverge from the model dictated by their supposed 'comparative advantage' (Burchill et al, 1996).

The IMF and the World Bank for example, make the provision of finance (or more accurately 'debt') to developing societies conditional on their unilateral acceptance of free market rules for their economies, the conditionality of the so called - structural adjustment programme 'SAP' (ibid)" (Ikejiaku, 2008).

The crux of the problem is that the term "comparative advantage" is a bit of a misnomer.

When one thinks of comparative advantage, they make the assumption that the "advantage" being referred to is in the production advantages between the two opposing countries of which trade is occurring. However, that is precisely what it does not mean. Instead the term refers to the advantage a country has within the production capabilities of two goods within its own borders. That is to say, a country has a comparative advantage between the goods it produces, not the country with which it trades. The trade relationship is secondary and always depends on global price indexes of those products. This is why it is said that no country can develop a comparative advantage in all goods. This is because "comparative advantage is a concept of the relative costs of doing things, so some things have to be comparatively more or less advantageous" and thus every country naturally has a comparative advantage is something (OECD, 2011). It is this particular point that is precisely at the heart of modern international trade and comparative advantage disequilibrium in the world.

Governments, corporations and private actors have come to realize that it is much more profitable to control important bits of knowledge and higher order processes over raw materials



and products. This changes the value chain for all goods and services in today's marketplace. If a country is stuck producing copper or cotton, then the purchasing power of its exports will fall (or at least stagnate), and so will its ability to import, invest, and grow. Producers of primary commodities will become relatively poorer over time (Valesco, 2009).

More recently, analysts from a more diverse community of scholars have also provided their insights on the subject of comparative advantage, trade and Least Developed Countries.

According to the UN Economic Commission on Africa, in the *2014 Economic Report on Africa*, they have said:

The question of whether developing countries should industrialize [and trade] along their current comparative advantages or defy these static comparative advantages and shift resources to new high-tech industries at an early stage of development has long been debated. Lin (2012) argued that governments should first align their industrial policies with their resource base and level of development and subsequently invest in new industries as they accumulate human and physical capital. In contrast, Chang (2012) argued that in view of the high cost of moving capital from relatively low to high tech industries, industrial policy should encourage investment in high-productivity industries at an early stage of development (UNECA, 2011).

The Economic Report on Africa 2013 (ECA and AUC, 2013) argued, however, that these strategies are not mutually exclusive, and that commodity-based industrialization can be a stepping stone to diversifying over the long-term and building competitive advantages in resource-rich countries. Further, any policy mix of the two requires direct state interventions; hence more recently the debate has shifted to focusing on institutions and mechanisms that ensure the “effectiveness” of such actions.

With these types of analyses international policy frameworks are debunked—they allow us to unearth the many years and layers of soft power manipulation that have plagued African states since the early adoptions of the Bretton Woods financial framework. Once again this is a

place where the ideals and principles of the international finance institutions simply do not result in their desired righteous outcomes of equality and justice. Given this reality, countries should operate within their sovereign policy space to determine which areas of the market they wish to engage and which sectors of the economies should be penetrated by the international marketplace. Fantu Cheru has noted that both China and India exercised this type of policy control in order to grow their respective economies.

The experience of China and India—along with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—shows that countries do not have to adopt liberal trade and capital polices in order to benefit from enhanced trade, to grow faster, and to develop an industrial structure to produce and increasing proportion of national consumption. These countries actually grew faster under protective barriers, and only later did they begin to liberalize. In other words, developing countries require policy space to exercise institutional innovations that depart from the old discredited orthodoxies of the WTO, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Blind adherence to market integration is a prescription for disaster (Cheru, 2010).

Through these examples we can see that the concept of comparative advantage does not entirely exist everywhere within the global marketplace. Thus, international governance cannot be a one-size fits all model. All countries must have enough policy space to exercise their sovereign power to make the necessary policy decisions that are best suited for their own internal growth and development. Fantu Cheru discusses the implications of the lack of policy space as it relates to the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs of the 1980s.

The ‘adjustment decade’ saw dethroning the state as the driver of development. By imposing particular policy choices on poor countries, creditors take away governments ‘sovereignty and accountability to their own people and make them answerable to unaccountable, external institutions for their choice of economic policies, level of spending on public services, and other crucial political decisions. This is re-colonization, not development. The attempt to impose change from outside actually engenders resistance and gives rise to barriers to change (Cheru, 2010).

The WTO would be better off basing its model of trade on a more concrete and practical economic theory of international trade, like the Hecksler-Ohlin- (Samuelson) theorem, which

states that a country abundant in the endowment of one factor will export the commodity that uses that factor intensively. Thus, this theory places heavy emphasis on the natural endowments of nations; capital accessibility; labor productivity; technology; interest rates and wage factors (all of which are negligible or irrelevant in the Ricardian model). However even when we acknowledge this type of framework it doesn't quite answer all the international trade complexities.

William Easterly noted quite keenly that “technocratic illusion is that poverty results from a shortage of expertise, whereas poverty is really about a shortage of rights. The emphasis on the problem of expertise makes the problem of rights worse. The technical problems of the poor (and the absence of technical solutions for those problems) are a symptom of poverty, not a cause of poverty (Easterly, 2013).” With regard to trade, the Hecksler-Ohlin model, although much more reliable as a practical trade model, has itself been proven to have numerous loopholes. The most notorious of which is commonly known as the Lontief paradox. Lontief's 1953 study essentially proved the opposite effect in trade relationships than that of which the Hecksler-Ohlin model predicted, essentially disproving the notion that capital-intensive countries export capital-intensive goods. In this case, the empirical study proved American exports were being produced with much more labor-intensive techniques than competing import goods from labor intensive countries (Leamer, 1995).

Another matter to consider is diversification and global market fluctuations. Even in the case where one's comparative advantage can yield results in the global market. It has proven unwise to build an entire economy on this principle, as this can result in the over-specialisation in one product. Overspecialization can threaten national economies when global market prices

fall e.g. in two years Ethiopia lost almost US\$300 million, half its annual export revenues, due to the fall in world coffee prices.

In any event, the Hecksler-Ohlin model is certainly favorable to the comparative advantage model simply because it is forthright in the implication that national endowment and external factors play a major role in determining which trade relationships are favorable and which ones are not. The problem with promoting Ricardo's idea of comparative advantage as working slogan for the WTO, is that it suggests that all nations will benefit from trade in all instances—which is in fact counter to historical and empirical evidence on the subject. It is well noted, in fact, that most of these revered mathematical economic theories are notoriously unreliable and impractical in the evaluation of actual and historical national practices; albeit highly complex, very sophisticated and elegant arithmetically. In which case, African and LDC nations need not become enamored in haughty intellectualism and soft power determinism at the expense of basic economic and common sense. In fact, Thomas Piketty, the economics professor at the Paris School of Economics and renowned author of the New York Times bestselling book *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* put it like this:

To put it bluntly, the discipline of economics has yet to get over its childish passion for mathematics and for purely theoretical and often highly ideological speculation, at the expense of historical research and collaboration with the other social sciences. Economists are all too often preoccupied with petty mathematical problems of interest only to themselves. This obsession with mathematics is an easy way of acquiring the appearance of scientificity without having to answer the far more complex questions posed by the world we live in (Piketty, 32).

## Most Favored Nations (MFN)

Another favored policy of the World Trade Organization is the policy of “Most Favored Nation.” According to the WTO this is how the policy works:

Each member treats all the other members equally as ‘most-favored’ trading partners. If a country improves the benefits that it gives to one trading partner, it has to give the same ‘best’ treatment to all the other WTO members so that they all remain ‘most-favored’. Most-favored nation (MFN) status did not always mean equal treatment. The first bilateral MFN treaties set up exclusive clubs among a country’s ‘most-favored’ trading partners. Under GATT and now the WTO, the MFN club is no longer exclusive. The MFN principle ensures that each country treats its over-140 fellow members equally. But there are some exceptions ... (WTO, 2014).

From an international law perspective, the “Most Favored Nation” policy essentially establishes the sovereign equality of states with respect to commerce and trading (Britannica, 2014). This means that all 153 nations have equal access and rights to LDC domestic markets. I should note that all 153 countries likely do not have the means, access, expertise or production standards to compete in all sectors of every country—so in many regards, they simply do not compete at all. However, we can be fairly certain that there are a select few nations that indeed do have the ability to penetrate any desirable market. This list of countries certainly does not include the Guatemala’s, Gambia’s, Nepal’s, Mozambique’s, Paraguay’s, Liberia’s and Nicaragua’s of the world. This policy is therefore at a minimum disingenuous and from a more critical perspective, emphatically incorrect.

There are several other issues with the WTO’s “Most Favored Nations (MFN)” policy. First, the historical relevance of the policy and the name itself is one that warrants heavy scrutiny and will surely reveal hidden schema behind its intent and origin. Second, the idea of an “exceptions to the rule” clearly implies impartial treatment for some, and preferential treatment

for others. We will need to examine whether African nations fall into the latter category. Lastly, we will also examine the WTO's enforcement mechanisms and the country-specific technical expertise needed to monitor world trade in order to conform with MFN policies. I believe these aspects of MFN perpetuate the imbalance in the international trade system that is disadvantageous for poor, non-industrialized LDCs.

Through the MFN clause, the WTO also promotes the policy of "National Treatment." This policy stipulates that imported goods, services, trademarks and patents should be treated equally as their local counterparts in domestic markets. Although on the surface this may seem like a leveling mechanism, but in actuality can be quite detrimental to the growth of LDC industries. It is also quite opposite to the approach that the current industrialized nations adopted to grow their respective economies and industrial capacity. (Tandon, 1999)

This brings us to another point of heated contention among many scholars and policymakers, the notion of nationalism. Many supporters of globalization, economic liberalization and the current international financial system argue that third world countries should simply not exercise any rights of sovereignty on local markets (Goodison, 2007). That African nations are somehow backwards or regressive in their ideology by adopting protectionist economic policies. The very same economic policies the current world powers used to industrialize and develop. Again, hiding behind the principles of universality, justice, and equality. Meanwhile every major power operates on a policy of "national interest" first and notions of equality second (Steil and Hinds, 2013; Lemert, 244).

In the case of African countries and LDCs exercising their economic sovereignty, it is certainly not about the "tranquility of yesteryear," as unfortunately Africa and LDCs have not

had the privilege of economic tranquility –mostly due to the interfering of Western powers. Secondly, should LDCs seriously consider not protecting their own national interests? It seems extremely duplicitous that all other nations, particularly the richest, most industrialized and most powerful countries all adopt very strong nationalistic trade, monetary and economic policies, yet these same countries advocate for less nationalism among third world countries.

According to economist Ha-Joon Chang, all successful developed countries used infant industry protection, among other measures, during their catching-up periods. In other words, they did not open their industries and markets to those of more developed countries, as African nations have been expected to do. Since the 1980s, the result of opening markets in many African countries has been devastating to local industry. For example, due to importing used-clothing from the United States, Zambia went from running several dozen textile factories in 1991 to only eight by 2002 (Smythe, 2015). Reducing government expenditures on health care and education meant that access to both is more class-based than it was before in many countries (Smyth and Frontani, 2015).

The ten largest merchandise traders constitute nearly 60 per cent of world trade and about half of world trade in intermediate goods. Many of these global value or production chains are organized by a multinational enterprise. For US multinationals, one-third of their exchanges take place within the multinational (WTO, 2014).

## Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)

Trade Related Investment Measures also known as TRIMs is one of the newest policy positions adopted by WTO. This policy is filed under Annex IA of the Marrakesh Agreement that emanated out of the last session of WTO negotiations commonly referred to as the Uruguay round. The agreement mostly addresses matters relating to investment measures that violate the “Most-Favored-Nations” clause—Article III, as addressed previously. The agreement also places prohibiting measures on quantitative restrictions on imports and exports within the WTO framework. This policy agreement has been deemed to essentially provide further protections to foreign companies, particularly multinational mega-conglomerates who invest millions in extractive employments in the third world and other foreign nations. The quantitative restrictions clause is in fact often thought to be a general target on textiles and on agricultural trade products. Both of which are heavily traded in African countries and other LDC nations. According to the WTO the TRIMs agreement does the following:

The agreement recognizes that certain investment measures restrict and distort trade. It provides that no contracting party shall apply any TRIM inconsistent with Articles III (national treatment) and XI (prohibition of quantitative restrictions) of the GATT. To this end, an illustrative list of TRIMs agreed to be inconsistent with these articles is appended to the agreement. The list includes measures which require particular levels of local procurement by an enterprise (“local content requirements”) or which restrict the volume or value of imports such an enterprise can purchase or use to an amount related to the level of products it exports (“trade balancing requirements”).

The agreement requires mandatory notification of all non-conforming TRIMs and their elimination within two years for developed countries, within five years for developing countries and within seven years for least-developed countries. It establishes a Committee on TRIMs which will, among other things, monitor the implementation of these commitments. The agreement also provides for consideration, at a later date, of whether it should be complemented with provisions on investment and competition policy more broadly (WTO, 2016).



The first issue to address regarding the adoption of TRIMs is the complicated nature of the rule. The outline above doesn't provide a very succinct or clear determination of the ruling thus complicating additional mechanisms of trade that otherwise should not be. Many of the trade, aid, monetary multilateral prescriptions inevitably tie the hands of LDCs with such complicated and convoluted rule making that is tied in very specialized Jargon. The WTO however does attempt to explain the rule further through various different fora. Accordingly, the WTO further explains the nature of TRIMS as not affecting foreign direct investment directly. Stating that since agreement is based on existing GATT disciplines on trade in goods, it therefore does not regulate foreign investment. However, this is again yet another confusing notion, as the products/goods being traded in such instances are often produced through foreign investment mechanisms, hence the invocation of MFN. They insist on the distinction that disciplines of the TRIMs Agreement focus directly on investment measures that infringe GATT Articles III and XI. That is investment measures that discriminate between imported and exported products and/or create import or export restrictions on those products. The WTO offers the example of a local content requirement imposed in a non-discriminatory manner on domestic and foreign enterprises as inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement because it involves discriminatory treatment of imported products in favor of domestic products. The fact that there is no discrimination between domestic and foreign investors in the imposition of the requirement is irrelevant under the TRIMs Agreement. The distinction is well taken; however the end result is usually wholesale restrictions against the trade strategies that benefit LDC nations and allow them to catch up to the rest of developed and developing world. TRIMS generally speaking, has very minor implementation implications for developed nations, as these nations are heavily

integrated in global supply chains and have very little locally produced ingredients or additives that are not already cost prohibitive for its use as a TRIM.

The second issue worth addressing is the mechanism by which these rules were made and agreed upon. That is the negotiating platform of the Uruguay round, and others for that matter, particularly that of the development round held in Doha. With regards to the complications within the mechanisms of negotiation, there has been a wide debate and much contention about what many, including Yash Tandon, Richard Blackhurst, Bill Lyakurwa and Ademola Oyejide have deemed an unequal and unfair representation of African and LDC countries in the WTO negotiations. They argue that much of inequity is due to the lack of technical and institutional capacity as well as a consistent lack of regional coordination by Sub-Saharan African States. Some of these complications are outlined by Blackhurst, Lyakurwa and Oyejide (2000).

Effective participation in the WTO is typically channeled through three mechanisms (Blackhurst, 2000). A country's resident delegation in Geneva serves as the arrowhead for the country's pursuit of its national interests in the WTO. Because the WTO is 'member-driven,' there are a large number of delegate meetings – averaging about 46 meetings a week in Geneva in 1996, not counting informal consultations (Blackhurst, 2000). This places a considerable premium on a country's capacity to maintain in Geneva a skilled, versatile and relatively large delegation which can engage in the daily meetings and consultations that drive the WTO process. Key staff in home capitals with analytical and policy-making skills provide direct operational support and guidance to the resident Geneva delegation. Finally, there are the professionals with the technical, legal, political and legislative skills, distributed among various institutions in the capital, who contribute to effective participation in the WTO process by implementing the country's commitments.” (Richard Blackhurst, Bill Lyakurwa and Ademola Oyejide, 2000)

Thirdly it is necessary to examine the exploitative nature of such agreements to Least Developed Countries. Particularly because as a result of the adoption of TRIMs many African countries will continue to face ever-growing restrictions in areas in which they have a competitive advantage, i.e. agriculture, labor, textiles and apparel. There is thus an increasing need for provisions of "tariff escalation" to be revised as well to allow for greater access of African products into industrial nations. Tariff escalation involves charging low tariffs on raw materials imported from commodity producing extractive materials, and placing higher tariffs on imports of partially processed goods and even higher tariffs on fully processed products. Core exports from developing countries such as metals, textiles, cereals, leather, sugar, fish, tobacco, rubber and wood products are often targeted. Duties on these products can peak higher than 100 per cent over base duties.

Lastly it is critical that economist and public policy makers scrutinize the legitimacy of multinational corporation's rights to national treatment in local markets on direct investment grounds, generally. The wholesale expansion, progression and liberalization of world trade to facilitate investment across international frontiers so as to increase the global economic growth cannot be the center objective trade matters. Ideas of equity, balance, and wealth distribution are necessary components to the conversation. As the 2012 WTO report aptly noted:

This new way of trading makes it more complex to attribute the value added by countries participating in global supply chains. This is further complicated by ownership considerations, trade within firms and intellectual property issues (WTO, 2012, statistics report).

In attempt to link lost ideologies of African economic stewardship to modern policy prescriptions, Nkrumah notably welcomed both private and public foreign direct investment in Ghana and Africa as a whole. However, this was only on strict terms of economic inclusion,

technological advancement and training. The end result was always about increasing the African public and industrial institutional knowledge, ability and production output. It was not at all for the advancement of global trade and/or international connectivity (Nkrumah, 1965).

### **Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)**

Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is one of the newest policy positions adopted the WTO. The TRIPS agreement was negotiated and signed during the Uruguay Round between the years 1986 and 1994. It was the first time that intellectual property rights were introduced in the multilateral trading forum (WTO, 2014). In fact, Intellectual property matters were not traditionally considered an element of trade, or even a matter of trade regulation. Traditionally the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a separate non-trade related entity coordinated matters of Intellectual Property (IP) globally. The World Intellectual Property Organization was in turn widely considered to be a more appropriate and effective means of balancing IP interests of mega conglomerates and developing nations without placing onerous and intrusive requirement on these nations. Many argue that because the prominence of LDCs and developing nations in the WIPO, the developed nations engaged in a forum shifting techniques in order to push blanket IP agreements to the global community.

Under the rules of TRIPs, the rights of authors of literary and artistic works (such as books and other writings, musical compositions, paintings, sculpture, computer programs and films) are protected by copyright, for a minimum period of 50 years after the death of the author. Also protected through copyright and related (sometimes referred to as “neighboring”) rights are the rights of performers (e.g. actors, singers and musicians), producers of phonograms (sound

recordings) and broadcasting organizations. The main quoted social purpose of protection of copyright and related rights is to encourage and reward creative work (WTO, 2014). However, it is of no surprise that Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and environment issues have been two critical points of divergence between the developing and developed members of WTO in recent years. This is likely because on both accords, each case invariably closes the doors on developing nations; the very doors used by modern industrialized economies and developing nations to advance rapidly a century ago. That is to say, in the case of the environment, developing nations are being asked to forego fossil fuels, carbon, coal, and other dirty fuels in favor of clean energy, that of which is often difficult to source and harder to regulate. In the same vein, rich nations insist that developing nations and LDCs, meet stringent labor and safety standards at host country factories and workplaces. On the one hand, certainly environmental protection, labor and safety standards are all very critical for global harmony and human development generally, but on the other, it certainly throws the developing world off the charted course of industrialization and economic prosperity outlined by these very developed countries. In this sense, many have contended that the standards of practice and modes of success seem to shift right as nations are in the position to benefit from years, if not decades, of investment towards that goal. In this instance, perhaps both positions are valid enough to warrant serious concessions on the spectrum. Thus, there needs to be more give and less take in the process of leveling the field for developing nations. In the case of TRIPs, developing nations are facing similar obstacles in adhering to strict privacy and copyright laws across international borders. At present, over 90% of the world's patents are in the control of developed countries. However, most developing countries cannot afford patents and rely mainly on unauthorized copying of the TRIPs in their production (Maskus, 2012). To mark these in a blanket

requirement, essentially creates what John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos have called the monopoly privilege and knowledge/information feudalism.

Accordingly, Drahos has stated that Intellectual property rights have always been important to development. And that history supports the notion that countries have always sought to learn, copy, and imitate the technology of other countries in order to advance. He gives the example of India & Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s who were at the forefront of trying to obtain technologies, and of trying to develop through investing in technology. Noting that they saw intellectual property rights as a distinct impediment to their success in development. India was therefore only willing to recognize patents on processes and not on final products. The idea behind that was to try and encourage their pharmaceutical industries to compete for better processes to find or to get at cheaper drugs.

Although it is clear that ideas and knowledge are an increasingly important to business, commerce, and human interaction generally. And that most of the value of some of our most precious worldly products, i.e. new medicines, information technology, and the like products lies in the amount of invention, innovation, research, design and testing involved. Films, music, art, books, software and on-line services are bought and sold because of the information and creativity they contain, and not usually because of the plastic, metal or paper used to make them. Nations have traditionally copied the works of other nations to develop their own industries and produce product for both internal and external trade partners. Innovators are usually far better at making products they have the initial designs for, technical knowhow, and historical research and development data for, then when they have to build it all from scratch. And when it comes to least developed nations, they are simply not a substantial threat to mega conglomerates and other industrialized countries. Least Developed Nations are merely markets

for mega industries; markets that can inevitably feed the bottom line. One of the issues that's probably not fully appreciated about intellectual property rights is that they are a form of private tax. Essentially a patent owner or a copyright owner can basically require a producer say in a developing country, to pay a licensing fee before they can use the relevant bit of intellectual property whether that is copying a book, making use of a film or making use of the patent. Essentially intellectual property rights are a form of private taxation on innovation which is why they should be minimized, particularly in third party external markets. When you globalize intellectual property rights you essentially put in the hands of the owners of intellectual property rights a global private form of taxing power. That's a considerably big form of privatized power.

Having made that point, it is certainly understandable that consumers retain the benefit of the marketplace. This is to say, that the marketplace should remain open and accessible to products and services on basis of free enterprise and competition. This certainly holds true to the capitalist model generally, of which is the foundation for the current trade system. When consumers are both protected and informed, the invisible hand of the market can regulate inequities fairly seamlessly. In this regard blanket copyright infringement should not be tolerated as it will invariably distort the market. For instance, using the place name of a product when the product was made elsewhere or when it does not have the necessary characteristics of that product will certainly mislead consumers i.e. terms that hold inherent meaning ("Champagne", "Tequila" or "Roquefort"). This in turn can lead to a degradation of potency and grade. The TRIPS Agreement's prohibition of this is thus helpful to both importer/exporters and any would-be manufacturer.

This is perhaps why Latin American governments are persevering with integration, as they steadily cut tariffs and sign regional agreements in spite of global recession or other

impeding mechanism. The Latin American policy on expansion is not simply born out of the conviction that open economies have fared better than those that have remained closed. Nor on the notion that liberalization of trade and investment is here to stay by popular demand. Instead it is on the basis of constituent and consumer needs that the policy is born. Latin American politicians keen on provided their constituents with the imported consumer goods have become accustomed to, the much-improved phone service provided by privatized (and often foreign-owned) telecom companies. So popularly elected Latin American presidents attend World Trade Organization meetings calling for more globalization, not less. They line up for a free trade agreement with the United States as they dodge protesters by U.S. and European college students who claim to be acting on behalf of the world's poor. Those Latin American politicians are not naive: They understand that globalization needs safeguards and regulations if it is to benefit the poor. Their position is pragmatic (Velasco, 2009).

Again, this is based on the idea that capital can move wherever it liked and obtain the most favorable circumstances that it could. Now a key problem with that is that a lot of regulation has to be removed along the way in order for that to happen. Unfortunately, the WTO frees up regulations in some instances and tighten them in other instances, creating an elasticity in trade regulation that ultimately drives the disparity in development. TRIPS has thus been looked at as simply a process of eliminating competitors in the global marketplace. Drahos gives the example of the Indian generic industry that was able to manufacture high quality products that people all around the world benefited from. But due to TRIPS U.S Pharmaceutical companies imposed product patents on Indian pharmaceutical manufacturers, raising prices on consumers, and eliminating competition worldwide.



Peter Drahos a Professor in the RegNet School of Regulation and Global Governance at the Australian National University and Chair in Intellectual Property at Queen Mary, University of London has stated:

During the TRIPS negotiations in the 1980s the HIV AIDs epidemic was really growing at an alarming rate and of course this was true during the 1990s. Now when we look at the history of the TRIPS negotiations, what we see is that no African country was part of the inner circle of the TRIPS negotiations. And so ultimately when that agreement was signed it in a sense was a death warrant for many people in Africa. The implications of product patents, the implications for access to anti-retroviral were profound. And thats a terrible, terrible tragedy when one thinks about the effect of a trade agreement on hundreds of millions of people. And it also shows how important it is now for developing countries to have the technical expertise to understand the consequences of these agreements. Because for many countries in Africa intellectual property rights were not on the top of their priorities. Their expertise lay in other industries. They were interested in a good outcome on agriculture. And so the wool was really pulled over their eyes. And the countries that really participated in this inner circle do not have a lot to be proud of (Drahos, 2016).

In any event, as Drahos implies, knowledge and its very application is perhaps the most key ingredient for the economic development of a nation. To place a crippling tax on the knowledge needed to lift masses of people out of poverty should not be the global standard. Picketty renown economist and author of the bestselling book *Capital* wrote:

Knowledge and skill diffusion is the key to overall productivity growth as well as the reduction of inequality both within and between countries. We see this at present in the advances made by a number of previously poor countries, led by China. These emergent economies are now in the process of catching up with the advanced ones. By adopting the modes of production of the rich countries and acquiring skills comparable to those found elsewhere, the less developed countries have leapt forward in productivity and increased their national incomes. The technological convergence process may be abetted by open borders for trade, but it is fundamentally t a process of diffusion and sharing of knowledge—the public good par excellence –rather than a market mechanism (Picketty, 2015).

An excerpt from a talk on *Understanding IP* by Peter Drahos displays the magnitude of intellectual property rights as information feudalism of the modern era.

Think for a moment about the history of mathematics. The rules of arithmetic were created, invented, discovered many, many centuries ago in ancient civilizations in Persia, in Greece, in Egypt and later in the Great Islamic Empires. Europe was something of a late-comer, actually, to mathematics. Many Europeans of course benefit from these profound discoveries in mathematics. Imagine if Europe had to pay licensing fees to these earlier societies. How would that have affected Europe's development?

Think of the rules of addition, or the rules of division. These are things that you learned as a child – multiplication tables. They're driven by algorithms. The rule of arithmetic – lying behind them – are algorithms. So think of an algorithm of addition, for example,  $X + 0 = X$ . Every day we use that rule. We do mental calculations in our head. Everyday trillions of calculations are performed by computers using the algorithm of addition. An intellectual property owner could lay claim to an algorithm. So the social consequences of creating a private property right in something as important as the algorithms for addition are very, very profound (Drahos, 2016).

It is against this backdrop and these potential economic carve-outs by industrial nations that Africans question their sovereignty, prosperity and development. The question of how these provisions of the trade and development actually intersect and effect the future of their states is paramount. The threatening notions of information feudalism is of increasing concern as nations increase their industrial capacities and become increasingly reliant on international trade and globalization.

## CHAPTER 4:

### INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNAL MACHINATIONS

In this chapter, I will give a brief overview of the history and development of the International Monetary Fund, as well as its policy implications on the African economy past, present, and future. Moreover, I will address the intricacies of the IMF's role in establishing the price of money, trade balance, and local money market distortions. More broadly, I will discuss money markets and financial systems, and how those systems affect African development and international relations. The analysis in this chapter is aimed to help demonstrated the specific roles the IMF plays in global money markets and international trade transactions; the specific policies it promotes; and its history and engagement with African and least developed countries of the world. The goal is draw out key points of contention from African nations and juxtapose those with the implementing and monitoring mechanism at the IMF and the broader financial community in effort to conclude on the relevance of underdevelopment themes within the system. The information in this chapter will serve as a baseline for the analysis of critical monetary data presented in the results section (Chapter 8).

#### **The International Monetary Fund**

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), also known as the Fund, was conceived at a UN conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, United States, in July 1944. The 44 countries at that conference sought to build a framework for economic cooperation to avoid a repetition of

the competitive devaluations that had contributed to the Great Depression of the 1930s. The IMF's primary purpose is thus to ensure the stability of the international monetary system—the system of exchange rates and international payments that enables countries (and their citizens) to transact with each other. (IMF, 2016). The fund is charged with 5 essential tasks. First the Fund aims to provide monetary, regulatory and policy surveillance for the global market place. That is to say they review and monitor member country policy frameworks and regulatory structures in effort to promote economic stability and reduce vulnerabilities to domestic and global economic and financial crises. In so doing it provides regular assessments of global prospects in its *World Economic Outlook*, of financial markets in its *Global Financial Stability Report*, and of public finance developments in its *Fiscal Monitor*, and publishes a series of regional economic outlook pieces. Secondly the Fund provides financial assistance to member countries in effort to counteract monetary transactional imbalances within the international trade structure, i.e. balance of payments, foreign exchange reserves and trade deficits. Thirdly the Fund provides technical assistance and financial capacity building to member nations in the areas of tax policy and administration, expenditure management, monetary and exchange rate policy, banking and financial system supervision and regulation, legislative frameworks, and statistics. Lastly the Fund provides Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to member countries; the SDRs are essentially supplemental funds to the official reserves of member countries. The current total allocations amount to about \$286 billion. IMF members can also voluntarily exchange these SDRs for currencies among themselves. Currently the IMF Membership stands at 189 countries out of 195 recognized countries in the world. The executive Board consists of 24 Directors each representing a single country or groups of countries a staff of approximately 2,700 from 148 different countries with total quotas equaling US\$668 billion (as of 9/13/16).

From a historical perspective, The fund was meant to operate under detailed and complex rules that would allow member governments to buy from it, other members' currencies, provided such demand was limited, adequately collateralized by gold and other currencies, and needed strictly to meet legitimate, trade-related balance-of-payments difficulties—that is , not just to add to their stock of gold and stronger currencies. In return for these privileges, the member governments would pledge to abandon, within one year after joining the fund, all restrictions on foreign exchange transactions with other member countries; not to alter exchange rates without the fund's consent; not to engage in discriminatory bilateral clearing or exchange rate arrangement with other members; and gradually but continually to reduce import tariffs and other trade barriers (Steil, 2013).

In the development context, the IMF is seemingly poised to be the necessary advisory and transactional interface needed to equitably level the field for the least developed nations. From a more cynical view, some have viewed the IMF relationship with member states as exclusive and/or privileged to best suit rich nations, providing increase international market and banking tools that provide advantages to select nations. In any event, many LDC's in particular those in Africa did not benefit from the IMF arrangement for many of the early years. As an example, between 1980 and 2000, Sub-Saharan African countries had paid more than \$240 billion as debt service, that is, about four times the amount of their actual debt in 1980. Yet SSA still owed nearly four times that amount twenty years later. Dembele noted, that one of the most striking illustrations of this apparent paradox of the IMF is the case of Nigerian debt. In 1978, the country had borrowed \$5 billion from the IMF. By 2000, it had reimbursed \$16 billion, however still owed \$31 billion, per President Obasanjo (Moussa, 2004). On average the developing world countries were paying \$13 on debt repayment for every \$1 received in grants.

From 1975 to 2005, the poorest 60 countries, dozens of them in Africa, paid \$550 billion in principal and interest on \$540 billion in loans, but they still had a \$523 billion debt burden (Smyth 2015).

On the other hand, in 2009, the IMF officially took measures to strengthen its support for low-income countries in response to the increased vulnerabilities caused by the global economic crisis. Since then, the IMF has overhauled its lending instruments to address more directly countries' needs for short-term and emergency support. In 2015, the IMF's support for its poorest members was boosted by increasing by 50 percent their access to concessional resources, and by permanently setting a zero-interest rate on loans to LICs hit by severe exogenous shocks (e.g., natural disasters) These measures were complemented by enhanced IMF support for LICs under the 2030 development agenda in a number of areas. The Fund has adopted a strategy to support concessional lending of about \$1.8 billion a year over the longer term, financed in part by contributions linked to the distribution of gold sales profits. (IMF Fact Sheet, Support for Low Income Countries) This accompanied by the World Bank's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries' Initiative (HIPC) may give well-performing Low Income Countries (LIC) in Africa some debt relief.

Exchange rates are another area where there has been major change. Currency values used to be fixed; later they were positioned as a float rate. But a key component of exchange rate theory was always that they were the result of international currency demand and supply, which in turn was triggered largely by trade flows and interest rates. Today, financial flows exceed trade flows by vast multiples. For example, the total value of U.S. merchandise exports is about \$550 billion per year. In contrast, the value of worldwide currency trades exceeds \$1.5 trillion per day. Therefore, currency prices are no longer mainly the result of financial flows that have

been caused by trade. Rather, the financial flows around the world set currency values and often impose the level of interest rates. Financial flows can now determine trade flows, since higher currency values mean higher prices for exports and lower ones for imports. Concurrently, a new phenomenon called "sticky prices" manifests itself when trade volumes do not behave the way they should in response to changes in the values of currencies. This occurs, for example, when the Japanese yen shifts from a level of 250 to the U.S. dollar, to less than 100 to the dollar, and the wave of imports still keeps on coming (Czinkota, 1982).

Nonetheless despite multilateral efforts continual problems and development deficiencies and disparities persist in the African market without much understanding or predictability or recourse. Some scholars contend that Africa's development crisis is as a result of its inward-looking trade system, characterized by the protection of domestic markets, subsidies, overvalued exchange rates and other "market distortions" that made African exports less "competitive" in world markets. Others argue that the exposure to entities like the World Bank, the IMF and predatory superpowers like Europe, China, and the United States are what is contributing to the underdevelopment of African countries (Moussa, 2004). It is difficult to fully contend with all the competing variables; however the everlasting fact is that many African economies continue to lag in the modern era. In truth, to fully grasp the Fund, its multilateral regulating structures and advisory mechanisms, one must understand some of the fundamental principles of the commodity it seeks to regulate, Money.

## The Four Prices of Money

According to Perry G. Mehrling, the esteemed Professor of Economics at Barnard College, Columbia University, there are essentially four prices of money, and these prices invariably determine the value of monetary transactions. The four prices are firstly, the Par price of money, which is principally the value of money today. That is the direct dollar value of the transactional value coded and transferred in real time. The second price of money is the interest rate, which is essentially the cost of money relative to a future day, i.e. the value of Money Tomorrow. Thirdly the price of money in relation foreign currency, the exchange rate – i.e. domestic money vs. foreign money. Lastly, the Price Level of money refers to money in relation to a fixed set of commodities. In the international context, these values are extremely important to GDP and the value calculus of IFI quotas and membership obligations.

Although these are important ways to think about money and its value, Dr. Mehrling does not mention the value of money in relation to credit; and the fractional reserve calculus that determines its value. This yet another subtle but deeply relevant aspect of money that must be fully examined, particularly in the African context. As Young (2015) posited,

From the purely quantitative point of view, credit is vastly more important than money. And yet that should not blind us to the fact that credit without money is impossible (Young, 2015).

Further to this, the hierarchy of “international money” is yet another crucial element to the analysis of credit and money. This hierarchy extends top-down from the dominant role currently played by the US dollar as the system’s reserve currency, to central bank swap lines, to the issuance of national money and expansion of national credit. The payments approach has two



additional distinguishing features: the importance of both public and private sources of liquidity to settle obligations between debtors and creditors; and the importance of gross flows and balance sheets (stocks) in assessing financial risks and vulnerabilities (Perry G Mehrling, 2012).

Young (2015) notes yet again,

A certain amount of cash must be in its vaults or must be easily available elsewhere—somewhat more than enough to meet the ordinary day-to-day demands of its depositors and creditors. This relatively small amount of cash—10, 15, or even 25 per cent of the bank’s debts to its depositors—is the bank’s “cash reserve (Young, 2015).

Accordingly, in the international context the most important currency transactions are those linking the “C6” — the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, European Central Bank (ECB), Swiss National Bank, Bank of Japan and Bank of Canada. These central bank swap lines help knit the system together at the global level. (Perry G Mehrling, 2012).

However, for our analysis, we will use Mehrling’s mode of payments perspective—one that looks at monetary transactions from the perspective of the International Monetary System as a payments system. According to Mehrling the payments approach has two distinguishing features that are central to the functioning of today’s International Monetary System. The first feature is explicit recognition of the importance and availability of liquidity through money markets to settle obligations between debtors and creditors. The second feature is the importance of gross flows and balance sheets (or stocks) on a sectoral basis in assessing financial risks and vulnerabilities. However, these functionalities are severely weakened, arguably by Monetary and Aid programs designed and implemented by the World Bank, USAID, UKAID and other donor programs. They are then further exacerbated by WTO and IMF operating rules and mechanisms.

It is well established in both theoretical and empirical literature that financial development is generally good for growth. It entails the wider use of existing financial instruments as well as the creation and adoption of new ones for intermediating funds and managing risk (Chami, Fullenkamp, and Sharma 2010).

According to the IMF, financial development positively affects growth through several channels that are particularly important for sub-Saharan Africa. Firstly, it is said to help catalyze savings into more usable forms, and supports efficient allocation of capital and enhancement of total factor productivity. Second, it supports diversification and management of risk. Third, it reduces information asymmetries, and transaction and monitoring costs. Fourth, it can reduce volatility of the economy by providing a variety of instruments and information to help households and firms cope with adverse shocks through consumption and investment smoothing. Levine (2005), in a comprehensive review of the literature, finds a robust linkage between financial development and growth (Montfort Mlachila, 2016). The question however, is not whether there are links between financial development and growth but rather whether the economies can grow to global scale and increase economic foothold on a global scale under the international monetary oversight, interjection, and scrutiny. Furthermore, are countries operating on an even playing field when they lack some key institutional, legal, and market environment to adequately adjust to international market fluctuations and distortions; but perhaps most importantly, are the market conditions created by sister agencies like the WTO, the World Bank and other donor agencies drivers for to ailing and failing banking systems?

For instance, in the financially developed part of the world, private money markets in normal times will absorb fluctuations in the net settlement of payments, providing the essential liquidity by expanding and contracting short-term international credits. In this way, each of the

globally integrated money markets has its own point of contact with a national money. The Eurodollar, for example (as noted by Merhling), is essentially a promise to pay privately issued US bank money, but US bank money is ultimately a promise to pay the publicly issued US currency. In the less financially developed part of the world, where there are no deep and liquid markets, this same task of absorbing fluctuations in payments more normally falls on the central bank, which must use its own balance sheet to do so. A key dimension of engagement and integration into today's International Monetary System, therefore, concerns the development of money markets that allow the central bank to step back to focus on supporting the private market rather than making it. Indeed, in considering the future of the International Monetary System, one must consider the future of this interlinked set of money markets (Thomas A. Bernes, Paul Jenkins, Perry Mehrling and Daniel H. Neilson, 2014).

Essentially development has a lot to do with money markets, cash, its relationship with other currencies, liquidity of those funds, leveraging of credit, and ultimately the exercise of power on the will of mankind to trust in an inevitable pay day. Thus, without an adequate money market the subsequent phases of money-leverage are weakened drastically, resulting in trade deficits, aid, and continued stagnation of third world economies. The IMF, World Bank, and WTO do not do much to assist LDC's with their internal money markets, in fact, many believe that they instead do a lot of harm to LDC internal money markets by constraining internal and external money mechanism, investment flows, aid programs, and trade processes such that money markets are suffocated.

The idea purported by anti- "Washington consensus" advocates is that the IMF, WTO, World Bank amongst other newly developed aid mechanisms work in tandem to undermine, distort, and cripple third world economies in order to lift their own 1<sup>st</sup> world economies to higher

and richer economic conditions. With regards to monetary policy, money markets and banking the IMF does the following, firstly it controls the four prices of money at the international level; secondly it provides advisory services to national regulatory monetary policy makers; and thirdly it provides monetary relief for those in need (IMF, 2016). In basic terms, it sets the rules of the game, gives advice on how to play the game, and provides safeguards for those that have trouble adopting to the rules. The first issue with this model is that the rules are generally imposed rules of play. The second matter of contention is that the advice being provided is solely provided to insure nations follow these imposed rules. The third issue is that the assistance provided for nations in economic trouble is only there to reinforce the imposed rules, that supposedly suffocate their internal money markets. Which also inadvertently lends away leverage through the application of debt forgiveness and other such mechanisms. Moreover, entities like the WTO and Aid agencies (through legal requirements, and regulatory statues) further exacerbate the situation by attacking the Central Bank's balance sheet on one hand, and draining the money markets on the other end. The rules, as straight forward as they may seem, set too high a standard to meet for least developed nations; and in fact, place a great deal of strain on their rudimentary systems. This has led many to reason that LDCs have limited control over their own economies and are subject to imposed controls.

The poor countries are constantly de-capitalized and their economies remain largely upon decision made in New York, London, Paris and other metropolitan centers (Holsti, 1995).

The standards impose also take away the very mechanisms used by rich nations in times past to accumulate wealth. It is as if a nine-year-old child is told that the minimum age for a ride is ten, but as soon as he reaches age ten he is then told that the age limit has gone up to twelve. LDC nations are thus consistently fighting against time and the inevitable steady rise of

unfavorable requirements to the rules of the game. However, despite the compliance hurdles, there is simply not much that effective monetary policy or banking regulation can do for without a steady supply of money. So again, money and money-markets are at the heart of the African economic problem.

In the case of money, African exports are not generating enough of it in global markets, and those that do, i.e. those in the mineral extractive sectors, these funds are often siphoned through upside profit sharing deals and the illicit financial flow of funds out of local banks, ultimately resulting in money market deficiencies. This is to say that a good portion of transactional funds from lucrative export markets do not end up in local African banks. When the richest African companies, individuals, and even governments store their liquid funds in international and foreign banks they directly undermine the growth of their own countries in exponential fashion. Moreover, when aid agencies, foreign direct investment companies, multilateral agencies and the like, all transact with one another (on behalf of African nations, i.e. aid) they also serve to undermine the money markets of these countries. Money market deficiencies do not only effect trade, they are the most crucial component to economic growth at the local and regional level. Banks use these stored funds to stimulate the economy by functioning as an intermediary for those with financial means and those with economic innovations. Ultimately fractional reserve banking pools together a lot of big and smaller deposits, and it's able to then turn around and lend those funds out in a variety of markets, some of them to big business but also to smaller enterprises and to households as well. These money markets, coupled with sound financial institutions, and fractional reserve systems alone can drive serious growth.

Some have called this the “money multiplier” effect of fractional reserve banking. That is because with this type of banking structure, one bank can essentially take in \$1,000,000 and lend out \$900,000 to a second bank, that bank can then lend out \$810,000, and a third bank can lend out \$729,000 such that \$1 million in deposits turns into nearly \$2.5 million in street value. In essence banks take in a deposit, they let out a loan, the loan becomes another deposit, which becomes another loan, and so on and so forth. According to Richard Werner (2005):

Bank credit creation does not channel existing money to new uses. It newly creates money that did not exist beforehand and channels it to some use.... What makes this ‘creative accounting’ possible is the other function of banks as the settlement system of all non-cash transactions in the economy. ... Since banks work as the accountants of record – while the rest of the economy assumes they are honest accountants – it is possible for the banks to increase the money in the accounts of some of us (those who receive a loan), by simply altering the figures. Nobody else will notice, because agents cannot distinguish between money that had actually been saved and deposited and money that has been created ‘out of nothing’ by the bank (Werner, 2005).

The ethics of this type of banking has not gone without intense scrutiny. Werner also writes:

This broader problem [is] that much of the terminology in banking appears to mislead the public. An innocent bank customer could be forgiven for believing that money ‘deposited’ with a bank was still the property of the depositor and hence safe in the case of a bankruptcy of the institution, while money deposited with a stock broker with the intention to speculate in the markets was at risk of being lost should the stock broker go bust. That the legal reality is precisely the opposite – money deposited with stock brokers is unencumbered by the broker’s bankruptcy since it remains the property of the depositor, held in safe custody as segregated Client Money, while money deposited with a bank, exempt from the Client Money Rules, is no longer the property of the depositor and thus in principle goes under together with the bank – is testament to the misleading character of banking terminology (Werner, 2005).

In any event, no matter where one stands on the ethics of fractional reserve banking, what is clear is that African banks lack the deposits to harness and make gains from the system.

African economies are therefore deprived of liquid resources to in turn stimulate the economic

growth through these generally acceptable banking practices. So, every dollar deposited in foreign banks dilutes the African economy in exponential proportions, resulting in stagnation and recession over time. This practice again, leads to similar traps of new-age feudalism similar to notions of information feudalism discussed in the previous chapter. If African countries are forever indebted to Western bankers, and therefore rely on international creditors to loan them the very dollars they have deposited, the system is not working in their advantage and will ultimately prevent proportional growth. In fact, in the 1860s during the course of the American civil war, the sitting U.S. president Abraham Lincoln found himself in a similar situation to modern day African leaders. Lincoln's United States were in a situation where London bankers and private New York banks essentially served as the principal creditors for all U.S. industries and the government writ large. Lincoln understood that the model was not sustainable and would ultimately result in the bankrupting of his nation, while essentially bankrolling elite London and New York oligarchs. To counteract this, he effectively convinced the U.S. Congress to authorize the issuance of interest free Legal Tender Notes backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government. These notes became commonly referred to as Lincoln's "Greenbacks," as a result of the green color of which the notes were printed on. Lincoln was thus able to maneuver away from the manipulations of money market systems controlled by foreign entities. It is this maneuvering that ultimately set the stage for the U.S. financial hegemony. Brian-Vincent Ikejiaku (2008) provided a worthwhile explanation as to how such systems of financial feudalism works in the African context, citing IMF structural adjustment programs among other systemic deficiencies:

Manipulations by the financial institutions and other lending agents, which were made feasible by the introduction of liberalism in Africa, helped in impacting negatively to the purse or coffers of African states, thus aggravated the debt crisis in the continent. For example SAP failed the majority of Nigeria; particularly it brought mass unemployment

(AFRODAD, 2007). Kenya also continues to express its displeasure at the IMF and the World Bank for forcing these policy changes on it (Wayande, 1997). In the early 1980s, Uganda was rocked by weeks of demonstrations, as industrial workers and students took to the streets to denounce President Milton Obote's IMF-imposed economic programme and in 1990, Matthew Kerokou of the Benin Republic in West Africa was removed from power following a wave of anti-SAP riots (Dare, 2001). It is therefore not surprising and understandable while notable scholars, such as Sachs (2005: 189) lambastes the IMF and World Bank for imposing draconian budgets to support SAP, which had: 'little scientific merit Vol. 1, No. 4 Journal of Politics and Law 4 and produced even fewer results (Ikejiaku, 2008).

However, Pan-African banks have been slowly filling the gap in the indigenous banking infrastructure. According to Mlachita (2016), Pan-African banks have been a driver for homegrown financial development. Their expansion has promoted greater economic integration and has contributed to improving competition and financial inclusion. These banks have increasingly filled the gap left by European and U.S. banks, which traditionally had dominated the financial landscape in Africa before the global financial crisis. However, their rapid growth also poses risks, the most important of which is related to the lack of adequate supervisory oversight on a consolidated basis and relatively weak internal governance frameworks. These vulnerabilities, if they are not addressed, may raise systemic risks that could endanger financial development. (Montfort Mlachila, 2016).

With respect to money markets and banking this trend combined with more linear trends for LDC nations in IMF policy has resulted in some positivity in the ability for African nations to build stronger monetary structures. According Zamf (2016), the improvement of the macroeconomic and business climate has also played a major role in advancing the prospect of African monetary systems, stating.

In the 1990s, many African countries were crippled by debt; from 2002, however, Africa's external debt fell after a series of initiatives to cut debt were put in place. The 1996 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the 2005 Multilateral Debt



Relief Initiative (MDRI) cut debt in 30 African countries by about US\$100 billion.<sup>23</sup> Africa's external debt is today lower than in OECD countries in relative weight. Public debt is, in most African countries, below 50% of GDP, which is generally considered a sustainable limit, but is rising again. This creates new risks, as 'debt levels [in African countries] do not have to match those of developed economies to trigger an economic crisis. In Africa, government revenues represent a lower share of GDP than in developed countries and often come from more volatile sources, such as export commodities (Ionel Zamf, 2016).

Finally, as it relates to interest rates, the real exchange rate (RER), plays a critical role in the economy of a country. Changes in the RER will invariably affect the competitiveness of internationally traded goods. Other macroeconomic effects such as the deterioration (improvement) of the current account deficit, and weaker monetary control will also result in such fluctuations. This is because the RER measures the cost of foreign goods relative to domestic goods. It gives a measure of competitiveness, and it is a useful variable for explaining trade behavior and national income. Most importantly, the real exchange rate is a key relative price that links the home economy to the rest of the world. Thus, the real exchange rate is an endogenous variable that is affected by different factors arising from different sources. Further, According to I. Elbadawi and R. Soto (2014): “countries that avoided massive RER overvaluation have been associated with sustained export-led growth and substantial diversification, with the East Asia countries, including China, Chili providing the most notable examples (Elbadawi & Soto, 2014).”

Edwards (1989) analyzes the relative importance of monetary and real variables in the process of real exchange rate determination in both the short and long runs. The equilibrium real exchange rate is defined as the value of the real exchange where internal and external equilibrium are attained simultaneously. The economy is in internal equilibrium when there is a clearing in the non-tradable goods market with employment at the natural level. The external

equilibrium (current account) is attained when the country's current account is sustainable. The sustainability of current account implies the equality of its deficit and the value of sustainable capital inflows that a country is expected to receive. Edwards (1989) developed a dynamic model of real exchange rate behavior in developing countries in order to explain the determinants of RER. Edwards considers that in the short run both real and nominal variables affect the equilibrium real exchange rate. However, in the long run only real fundamental variables affect the equilibrium the real exchange rate. He made a distinction between external and domestic fundamentals that are the determinants of real exchange rate. The external fundamental variables are international terms of trade, world real interest rates, and international transfers (ODA, FDI, remittances). The domestic real exchange rate fundamental variables are comprised of variables that can be affected by policy decisions and those that cannot be affected by policy decisions. The variables that can be affected by policy decision are trade restrictions such as import tariffs, import quotas, taxes on exports, exchange and capital controls, subsidies, and the composition of government expenditures. The variables that are not affected by policy decisions are technological progress (Dyendalayi, 2016).

Although changes persist, and African development continues, artificial setbacks due to externally imposed rules steadfastly undermines an already weakened monetary system. It is in this area that Africa is the biggest loser. Without proper money markets, interconnected banks, fiduciary controls, and quantitative mechanisms African countries are exposed to distortions of the four prices of money by other external actors. Although the IMF provides advisory services and seeks to regulate this from afar, its guiding interest isn't that of LDC nations per se, it is instead focused on global principles and internal equilibrium. This is what essentially brought down many African economies in the 1980s and 1990s through SAP.

## International Remittances

Each day thousands of immigrant workers in developed countries send money to their friends, families, and communities in the developing world. These individual transfers range from large scale business transactions, funds for community development projects, to very small incremental subsistence funds to sustain individual families. It may just be twenty or thirty dollars here or a few hundred dollars there, and in some cases thousands of dollars in a lump sum, so without a doubt the total sum of these flows reach enormous quantities in aggregate. According to the World Bank, the worldwide flow of workers' remittances during the year 2016 was about \$440 billion U.S. dollars (World Bank, 2017). With such magnitude, it is no surprise that international actors are taking drastic steps to monopolize remittance flow with new banking policies.

World Bank studies suggest that remittances represent 5 to 25 percent of GDP in the top recipient countries. This is certainly a different climate than that of predating the 1990s where many in both academia and the banking elite paid very little attention to the developments in this sector. However, within a few short years, this situation has completely changed. Around the turn of the millennium a global consensus was emerging among international institutions, state agencies, civil-society organizations, and private financial-services firms around the valuable contribution that migrants' remittances make to development in least developed countries. International institutions of various stripes in turn launched major projects linking the resources and capacities of migrants to their agencies' project portfolios (Bakker, 2015).

- The exchange rates.

- Fees and taxes.
- Fees charged by the company's agents abroad and certain other institutions involved in the transfer process.
- The amount of money expected to be delivered, not including foreign taxes or certain fees charged to the recipient.
- a statement that additional foreign taxes and fees may be deducted from the remittance transfer.

Given the shortage of external financing in developing countries, remittances are usually welcomed as means to promote investment and stimulate economic growth. Remittances also provide a source of foreign exchange to finance imports and relax balance of payment constraints (Luis & Vargas-Silva, 2013). Today's migrants therefore occupy critical positions in the policy prescriptions of experts, planners, and politicians, who see migrants' earnings and talents as important resources for generating growth in their home countries (Paerregaard, 2014).

A large fraction of remittances is spent on consumption (Zarate-Hoyos, 2004). Accordingly, remittances are capable of increasing the price of non-tradables in the receiving country, producing inflationary pressures. Previous studies also suggest that remittances may appreciate the potentially affecting the competitiveness of the tradable sector.

Microeconomic studies have shown that remittances have important impacts on different aspects of household behavior, including potential decreases in labor supply and may even provide the capital necessary for the development of macro/microenterprises (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001).

Faini (1994), highlights that the macroeconomic role of workers remittances is further underscored by their responsiveness to crucial policy variables. Demonstrating that theoretical considerations suggest that the flow of remittances ought to be affected by key macroeconomic indicators such as domestic interest rates and exchange rates. The debt crisis during the eighties, in particular the drying up of external credit, forced many developing countries to undertake severe adjustment measures in an effort to redress their external payments situation and save on scarce foreign exchange. Real exchange rate depreciation came to be seen, particularly in the context of World Bank-supported adjustment programs, as an essential step both to improve the current account and achieve the desired structural shift of resources toward the traded goods sectors. Similarly, the reform of the financial sector, in particular the increase or, more radically, the decontrol of interest rates, represented a recurring component of adjustment programs. These policies were quite likely therefore to affect both merchandise flows and workers remittances. Perhaps surprisingly, most of the discussion on the efficacy on adjustment policies focused on the former thereby overlooking the crucial role that the flow (Faini, 1994).

Along these lines, remittance inflows present a difficult choice for receiving countries, because they may exert contradictory effects on several conflicting policy objectives (external financing, inflation, export competitiveness, among others). In order to minimize the possible detrimental impact of remittances, receiving countries can use changes in fiscal policy and/or monetary policy (Luis & Vargas-Silva, 2013).

The Mexican experience represents a unique and interesting case for studying the interaction between remittances and monetary policy for several reasons. First, Mexico has a huge inflow of workers' remittances (largest inflow in Latin America). In the year 2006, Mexico's inward remittances accounted for more than 30 percent of the remittance inflows in Latin America, reaching over 23 billion U.S. dollars (Inter- American Development Bank, 2007). Equally important, after oil exports and Maquiladoras, remittances are the third source of foreign currency in Mexico (Cañas et al 2007). Finally,

during the last decade Mexico's Central Bank adopted inflation- targeting and a flexible exchange rate system. Thus, at least in theory, we have a central bank with a clear policy objective (Luis & Vargas-Silva, 2013).

According to Paerregaard (2014), some of the first attempts to capture fiscal remittances were made in the 1970s and 1980s by North African countries in response to the growing emigration to Europe and later to the Persian Gulf area. Recognizing that migrants returned a large part of their earnings to their families at home, the governments of the North African region attempted to ease remittance flows and channel them into productive activities (de Haas 2006, Paerregaard, 2014). Accordingly, in the 1980s and 1990s, several Asian countries also designed migration policies to stimulate economic growth through the remittances that migrants send home to their families. Among the most prominent cases is the Philippines, which for several decades has promoted temporary labor migration as a means to generate economic growth (Paerregaard, 2014). As a result, today the country's economy relies heavily on migrant remittances. To encourage its population to migrate and use their savings to support their families and invest them upon their return, the Philippine government has created an institutional framework that regulates labor migration, facilitates remittance activities, and encourages migrants to return once they have completed their contracts. The government has also created a program to protect its citizens during their stays overseas (Paerregaard, 2014).

Given the prevalence of African remittances, and its vastness and ever-growing utility by migrating workers. African nations, and LDCs in particular must find ever increasing ways to encourage and sustain the system. Moreover, LDCs and regional bodies must find better ways to harness its development potential by easing the way by which such transactions are made and

ensure feudalist/capitalist components are not the major beneficiaries of remitted African wages;  
that instead Africans retain the full potential of those remittances.

## CHAPTER 5:

### INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN AID AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

In this chapter, I will discuss multilateral aid to Africa in the forms of zero or low interest loans from the World Bank and will also focus specifically on bilateral aid to African countries from the United States, primarily from USAID. Moreover, I will discuss the relational nature of aid, the inherent implications, commitments and assertions therein; and how these implicit, and often explicit conditions trap and/or hinder nation states from moving out of aid dependency. The content in this chapter aims clarify the nature and history of aid; how foreign assistance is deployed; what types of foreign assistance exist; and how donor nations use foreign assistance as a policy tool. Given that this research focuses on trade, aid, and monetary policies at the multilateral and bilateral levels to draw conclusions about dependency, the goal is to give the reader sufficient background on key policy and procedural themes that affect the delivery on trade, aid and monetary operations. This chapter focuses on the aid operations and related transactions and gives the necessary foundation for the reader to analyze the development and aid data presented in the results section (Chapter 8).

Specifically, this chapter focuses on critical foreign assistance components (from both multilateral and bilateral mechanisms) that drive development in Africa.



## International Foreign Assistance

The question of aid starts with its origin and modern day historical trajectory; the conceptualization of aid from one state to another as a humanitarian gesture in one respect, and ultimately as geopolitical tool on another. In the modern configuration, many scholars have attributed the birth of Aid in this sense to U.S. president Harry Truman, who on January 20<sup>th</sup>, 1949 in his inaugural address announced a new aid initiative to provide foreign assistance to the poor countries of the world (Easterly, 2013). An excerpt from that address reads as follows:

We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people (Easterly, 2013).

It is difficult to capture precisely where country-to-country aid in a pure benevolent fashion began, as there are many incidences in history whereas states and political entities assisted one another for the sake of political gain and strategic import. In fact before Truman became president of the United States, Britain, France and other European nations were actively funding multiple initiatives around the world. It's the modern notion of aid in the form monetary transfers, budgetary support, technical assistance, humanitarian aid, and most importantly development assistance in the general sense that Truman is particularly relevant. That is because Truman was able to marry the ideas of geopolitics to the increasingly important sub-field of geo-economics. Truman was thus taking advantage of the changing world of the post-World War II era and the developing economically interconnected global community.

Community whereby global monetary transactions are interconnected, regulated, and controlled by newly established political epicenters. This combined with the success of US financial markets and US backed lending to Britain and France for the reconstruction of their war-ravaged cities, allowed for the notion of multiplying those efforts worldwide seemed nothing short of commonsensical.

Truman certainly understood how to use the weight and might of the rising superpower he inherited, but he was perhaps the first U.S. president to understand the nature and role of economics in the global arena. If we recall, it was only a few years earlier on March 12, 1947 that Truman unveiled his plan to provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces. The plan that would hence forth be known as the “Truman Doctrine.” The Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented U.S. foreign policy, away from its usual stance of noninterference or isolationism with regards to foreign and regional conflicts not directly involving the United States, to one of possible (often likely) intervention in faraway conflicts.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly process (Karpovich,1948).

Aid to poor countries in this sense, is largely built on notions of the Truman Doctrine ideology, in that financial support can yield desired outcomes, however aid in this regard seems to hold a stronger humanitarian sentiment, it is certainly designed to ultimately recoup geopolitical and geo-economic gains, albeit at a much slower but unremittingly longer basis.

In order to analyze Aid in this form further, it is imperative to define exactly what is considered Aid, as it has evolved and changed over the years. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, Aid is considered to be financial assistance provided to countries either through bilateral or multilateral institutions to poor countries. However, Aid even in this capacity is often misunderstood. This is because international aid doesn't flow to poor countries in a very clear, fluid or transparent way. For instance, work being done by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), including churches, mosques, media outlets, universities and even certain private enterprises can be considered international aid in this context. Multilateral institutions, like the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, the AU, the UN (and its numerous arms), also provide various forms of direct and indirect international AID to poor countries through various subsidiary mechanisms. Bilateral Aid, such as funding provided by the USAID, UKAID, DFID, Norway, China, Japan and other key donors directly to individual countries also fall into this category. So, Aid in general terms creates incongruities across many different lines.

Multilateral aid though, generally speaking, is provided by public international organizations (PIOs) and other multilateral agencies for matters of peace, security, poverty reduction and good governance. Multilateral Aid is therefore most commonly provided as Official Developmental Assistance (ODA), and has historically targeted poverty reduction and the promotion of public welfare and economic development in poor countries among broader peace and security needs. The World Bank, the World Food Program and the United Nations are key examples of public international organizations that provide significant amounts of ODA to developing countries. ODA is generated mainly from the 23 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). According to the OECD, the total figure in 2016 was around \$142 billion, which is the highest number ever recorded. Aid targets in this category have been set at

0.7% of Gross National Income for contributing members, but very few countries ever meet these targets and, in fact, the trend has been declining over time.

According to Besley and Perssons 30% of the \$120 billion of total ODA given in 2008, was given indirectly through contributions to multilateral institutions such as the European Union and the World Bank, and others mentioned above; and about one-sixth came in the form of technical cooperation and the remainder channeled through the Non- governmental, private and institutional sector. The largest regional recipient of aid is Sub-Saharan Africa, which received 33% of all ODA in 2007–2008, followed by 21% to Middle East–North Africa, about 15% each to South-Central Asia and the rest of Asia, 9% to Latin America, and 4% to Europe (Besley and Perssons, 2011). These numbers largely reflect what is transpiring a decade later. In 2016, \$528 million of \$157 billion of the in ODA (See figure 1), roughly 34% of donor dollars were provided indirectly through multilateral contributions.

However, many development scholars argue that the funding provided via multilateral institutions cover a host of activities, much of which are indecipherable at macro and micro levels, particularly to the everyday people the aid portends to assist. Officially these funds are designated to cover broad categories of services such as; government, civil society, health, education, conflict resolution, peace and security, social infrastructure, economic infrastructure, transportation, communications, energy, banking, financial service; business services, construction, trade policy, tourism, environment protection, budget support, food aid, humanitarian aid, and other general services.




Figure 1: Net Official Development Assistance

Unfortunately, much of these catch all categories end up only serving as buzz words and conforming modalities of thought for politicians, practitioners and citizens alike. Many laypeople, of whom are designated to receive these services, do not quite understand the designations of these categories nor do they understand how these categories of services are delivered in their respective countries. Moreover, they do not understand how or why these services are designated over others and who is designated to provide it and how such mechanism work within the broader scope of political, economic, and social order.

### Budget Support

“Budget support” is perhaps the most basic and fundamental form of development assistance, it is assistance that is likely easiest for most folks to relate to. That is because it is aid

in the form of raw dollars, a simple cash transfer of funds from one sovereign entity to another. This is aid that is most independent in nature; aid that gives the receiving nation the most latitude in its application and the most control over its use. However, this type of aid amounted to less than 1 percent of ODA funding in 2016 (OECD Report, 2016). Budget support is generally what most LDC nations are after; as budget support is the primary commodity in AID, it is the raw material that allows for growth in all other sectors. In many respects, Budget Support funds are the stem cells of international Aid, as it allows the recipient nation the most flexibility, and the most opportunity in its use throughout the government. Unfortunately, Budget Support has quite the opposite appeal to many of the OECD donor nations. The idea of Aid with “no strings attached” is no longer an attractive mechanism to donors in the increasingly globalized and competitive world of the new millennium. It is not that this hasn’t been tried in the past, in fact, traditional aid, particularly in the postcolonial era was in the form of budget support. The British and the French notoriously provided aid to former colonies in this form for much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The reforms that accompanied the implementation of the Bretton Woods organizations however, slowly eroded this model in favor of a more streamlined and targeted model. A model that had foreign policy and financial recoupment at the center of its Aid strategy. LDC nations also did not do themselves any favors for perpetuating the cycle of Aid through budget support. The mismanagement of donated funds by LDC elites and incompetent government operators is quite prevalent in the development literature. LDC countries often used Budget Support funds to prop up unprofitable parastatal organizations and pay for salaries and pension packages that did not generate any real economic value. As populations grew and the need for development increased, the Budget Support model quickly became unsustainable. Budget Support simply doesn’t pay dividends, its short-term returns are low and long term returns even less so. Aid in

the form of the many layers of ODA became the favored methodology over simple budget support.

This Aid Methodology is certainly not without its critics. Just as the Truman Doctrine receive much scrutiny over its implications in the geopolitical space of anti-communism and the cold war, twentieth century ODA has been similarly characterized as political means to subjugate, control and recolonize poor countries.

What began in the second half of the twentieth century as a distinct form of external intervention—foreign aid—has come around to merging with African states' political and economic goals in an unprecedented way. The result is a state that receives a large amount of funds from international donors and answers to their priorities as much as, if not more than, their own citizens. Thus, as governance specialist Geir Sundet argues, development has become the African state's most important legitimizing tool. And as political scientist Graham Harrison claims, it makes the most sense now to think of donors as part of the state. African gatekeeper states are as concerned with exports as they are with the flow of aid. "Gatekeeper state" is historian Frederick Cooper's term. Such states focus their attention outside their boundaries for the revenue flow that is essential to their existence. The consequence, however, is that leaders of such states have little incentive to pay attention to the needs and voices of their own citizens. A gatekeeper state is a legacy of colonial rule (Smythe, 2015).

This is certainly not the only view, foreign politicians that promote external aid certainly do not see the billions of foreign assistance they provide in that light. For instance, in a May 2007 speech addressing the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, President Bush made this point clear when he said, "We are a compassionate nation. When Americans see suffering, and know that our country can help stop it, they expect our government to respond. We help the least fortunate across the world because our conscience demands it. We also recognize that helping struggling nations succeed is in our interest (Fore, 2008)."

However, to view foreign assistance as a one-sided benevolent act is simply naïve on the one hand, and perhaps arrogant or ungrateful on the other. Politicians and heads of governments

understand this reality quite keenly and enter agreements accordingly. In the context of negotiated aid terms, these agreements are not at all considered an underhanded endeavor, despite the arguments from the many alarmists. The exchange of aid should thus be viewed as an act of helping one another towards a goal of mutual existence and harmony and not necessarily exploitation. Bush finished the segment by eluding to this notion by saying, “Although it is true that U.S. foreign assistance provides food to the hungry, medicine to the sick, security to troubled regions, and educational and economic opportunities to people of every creed, it is certainly not provided with impunity (Fore, 2008).”

In the 2016 Congressional Budget Justification the United States’ Chief diplomat on behalf of U.S. foreign assistance stated:

The funds will go directly toward strengthening our programs and platforms around the world to address ongoing and emerging national security priorities. It will protect our diplomatic personnel, facilities, and information. It will support the security partnerships and expand the global engagement and exchanges that serve U.S. interests across the globe. It will advance international efforts to mitigate and adapt to the harmful impacts of climate change. It will provide life-saving humanitarian assistance, and fund development programs that foster growth, health, education, democratic governance, and poverty reduction. (John Kerry, CBJ 2016)

Even Thomas Sankara a staunch African anti-imperialist understood this concept. In response to a journalist’s question on foreign relations, he said.

I think there is no such thing as unconditional friendship. Even love at first sight has, I believe, certain conditions, which, when they wear off, bring human beings back to earth and surprisingly cold realities (Prairie, 2007).

Cohen (2013) provides additional analysis to this notion of give and take, supported by E.K Hawkins, when he stated;



This idea was well articulated by the British economist E. K. Hawkins in his classic book, *The Principles of Development Aid* (1970), when he stated that the act of giving always involves some expectations from the donor. These expectations may range from expressed gratitude by the recipient to the donor to some use of the resources for an intended purpose, or some behavior change or activity of which the donor approves (Cohen, 2013).

By and large, this seems to be a reasonable notion of *quid pro quo*, however, there are certainly tiers of donor expectations along the “*quid pro quo* spectrum” that can be more intricately scrutinized. For instance, according to Gore-Booth (2011) of the 120-150 billion dollars in annual global aid flows, twenty percent remains “tied aid”—aid that requires recipients to buy goods and services provided by companies based in donor countries (Gore-Booth, 2011). Other forms of aid can be even more onerous on recipient nations in effect counteracting gains and internal strides towards development. Aid in the “civil society” realm has received much criticism for potentially undermining and subverting national and local government efforts to achieve a sustained localized and endogenous democracy and/or economy. And yet these are merely the more overt elements of aid that have proven problematic. There is a third category that is often left off the mainstream, and that is nefarious actors operating under the auspices of ODA. This area is particularly problematic for developing nations, as it tends to breed distrust in the entire system and drives a wedge between recipient and donor interests, in effect undermining much of the multilateral and bilateral aid mechanisms.

### **The Hierarchy of Foreign Assistance**

The key is in understanding the hierarchy of foreign assistance. At the lowest level there is Humanitarian Aid, this is aid that goes to the world’s most needy people, often in response to a

natural or manmade catastrophic event, i.e. hurricane, tsunami, earthquake, famine, war, etc. This type of aid general comes in the form of food staples, rice, water, shelter. This type of aid is meant to address the need of mankind at the very basic biological level. The area covered by Maslow's bottom rung, the physiological needs of man. In almost any way we examine this level of aid, it is difficult to find any inherent negativity in the provision of food, water, and shelter by anyone to the world's most needy. Regardless of geopolitical positioning or political intent, the act of delivering food, water, and salvation to dying human beings is without reproach. The humanitarian aid workers that work in this field, work solely to deliver life to otherwise desolate, desperate, and demoralized circumstances. Many of these aid workers in fact lose their lives in the pursuit of delivering basic sustenance to remote parts of the world. Given these circumstances it is difficult to see humanitarian aid as anything other than benevolent acts of humanity. The interesting distinction about humanitarian aid, is that this type of aid is largely targeted at individuals—the mitigation of individual human suffering, and not necessarily aid to a state, a government, or an institution. This is an important distinction, as it serves as a filter to cleans against nefarious or even incidental adverse geopolitical manipulations of aid provision. It is by no means completely ridden of corruption, manipulation or various forms of siphoning, however, the plight of the human condition and the intent for direct provisioning of the aid gives it a protective coating.

The second and third tiers of aid are in the health and education sectors respectively. These two forms of aid often move us slightly away from the strictly survival based aid mentioned above to something that addresses human needs at a step above that of the physiological needs. This type of aid still aims to address the human condition at its root—at the individual level, however it moves away from direct provision to more state and institution-based

provisioning. Essentially both the target recipient and the end user move closer to institutions and governments and away from the people. Education for the populous (the economy) and public health for the community becomes the greater concern over the individual education and health needs. The institutionalization of these services, and the formal aid response to it, breeds new forms of corruption and manipulation on both sides for the donor/recipient continuum. It is in this tier of aid that the people grow increasingly vulnerable to aid manipulations at both the state and international level. Africanist like Nkrumah, would likely argue that soft power elements of neocolonialism escape public scrutiny and state filters through aid in this sector. Although many would just as well contend that education and health are particularly innocuous fields of subversion, others view it as infiltration point that hits at the intellectual and personal epicenter of human development.

The third tier is civil society, advocacy, and political aid. This tier of aid is solely targeted toward institutions, governments, and state actors. This makes it much more susceptible to, and much more suspicious of outside influence and other potentially nefarious manipulations. This type of aid does not come in the form of dollars, food, medicine, or even brick at mortar, instead aid in this realm is often in the form of human capital—advisory services, technical assistance, and capacity building. This usually goes to third party implementers, international non-governmental institutions, advocacy groups and other non-state civil society and political actors. This is usually touted as youth development, institutional capacity building, enhancing democracy and good governance; or promoting free speech, freedom of the press, or advocacy. However, many skeptical thinkers view such aid as means to exercise control and dominion over the minds, institutions and governments of sovereign subjects—to in essence engage in the internal affairs of sovereign nations.

The fourth and highest tier is the military, intelligence, and security sector aid. This form of aid is most worthy of scrutiny as it generally provides nations with both lethal and non-lethal means to secure its borders and national interests through warring mechanisms. Again, this area of aid does not have a direct provision of goods or services to the individual, and it only serves at the institutional or governmental levels. This type of aid is perhaps most susceptible to corruption and manipulation of the highest order.

In any event, African countries and other LDCs should not look at foreign assistance as an adversarial tool, particularly because receipt of such assistance is always voluntary, and in many instances, serves a common need. In an ever-globalizing 21st-century, the world generally, and many OECD nations specifically face many disparate threats that are only exacerbated and often undermined by weak institutions, lack of economic opportunity, and lack of human development in remote parts on the world. Foreign assistance often works to provide funds and expertise to tackle such overarching global problems.

African countries need to better understand aid mechanisms and their interplay with geopolitics and align their interest to such mechanism. This should be done with the broader regional and continental context in order to maximize benefits across sectors, geographies, and broader Africanist interests. It is these nuances in multilateral and bilateral aid provision that can get lost in translation. Thus the lingering questions of how to engage, and what types of leadership and ideological components should underlie decision of this magnitude must be evaluated to further.

## Delivering Foreign Assistance

This understanding certainly does not dispel the many critics of foreign assistance. For example, Brainard (2003) acknowledges the many achievements of USAID assistance but also notes the negative foreign policy stipulations of such funding, stating that “development assistance administered by USAID is used to support local development efforts, but even for these programs recipient country designations often reflect foreign policy over and above need or performance criteria (Brainard, 2003). Further to this divide, he elaborates to say, “Development policy and foreign policy frequently pull U.S. foreign assistance programs in different directions.” Noting that often, U.S. economic assistance is equated with development assistance, which contributes greatly to international aid’s discredit. Thus, concluding that it makes little sense to measure the return of investment in economic terms and should instead be measured on political terms. When aid dollars are allocated according to geopolitical criteria, the development criteria is no longer the primary objective. In example, there are some cases where aid has yielded a desired geopolitical outcome while failing to yield economic or development gains, and in other cases where aid has failed on both accounts. Brainard, thus concludes that most examples of aid lost to corruption, waste, or diversion in the post-World War II era—as was the case in Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Liberia, Sudan, and Somalia— were allocated according to cold-war logic. Noting that for example, the billions of aid dollars poured into Egypt since the Camp David Peace Accords have yielded foreign policy gains, even though they have failed to produce durable economic or political modernization. On the other hand, even politically motivated assistance can yield impressive economic dividends where recipients are committed to reform and have sound economic policies, as happened in Taiwan and South Korea (Brainard, 2013).”

The issues outlined above are critical to the global system of aid delivery and need serious attention in order to enhance the ODA efforts around the world. However, this aspect mostly only deals with the political underpinnings at the highest level of the foreign assistance supply chain. There are also many other confounding complexities in delivering foreign assistance across borders that occur at lower levels. Cohen notes, “over the past 50 years, international development assistance itself has become a large scale ‘business’: its structures, including suppliers, clients, costs, prices, and institutional processes are all dynamic in the sense that they are ‘market-determined’—that is, what is requested and what might be provided changes in response to needs, perceptions, and even ‘fashion.’ These trends in many cases reflect learning at both the international and national levels and a growing number of types of actors (Cohen, 2013).” This is a fundamental problem with aid in the modern context. Although corruption in this arena has existed since the inception of Aid, the complexities and derivatives of corruption in procurement protocols, as well as in the general ethical business practices of non-government organizations (NGOs) has grown exponentially since that time, in effect jeopardizing large portions of the international aid pool. There are certainly the age-old complications of raw corruption, bribery, kickbacks and the like in contracting and grant issuance, but there has also been a proliferation through the years in the subtler arena of nonprofit business management, which has proven to be quite an elusive concept. On the one hand, it may be quite clear when something nefarious is underway such as skimming contracts, or officials demanding kickbacks. But it is something entirely different when business and aid are combined without controls or transparency resulting in inefficient and ineffective delivery. For instance, some nonprofit organizations pay salaries up to 500% above the equivalent positions in the local economies. In some respects, this can account for wastes and perceived

inequities that can severely affect service delivery. The same action is duplicated at the organizational level, which can have even harsher effects, this is because some organizations may charge donors up to 50% of the donated funds to cover the administrative overhead. This is usually captured in US assistance as what is referred to as the agency NICRA rate. NICRA is an acronym for Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreements; which are agreements between donors and NGOs setting a standard administrative rate for that organization. One problem with this model is that the costs are not uniform, some entities have low NICRA rates at around 10% -15% while others, most notably Universities have very large NICRA rates, often exceeding 50% of total donated costs. Most of those funds never leave the donor country, but still counts towards the bottom line aid figures. (2 CFR 200, Subpart A, Section 200.56 defines Indirect (facilities & administrative (F&A)) costs for “Major nonprofit organizations”

Indirect (F&A) costs means those costs incurred for a common or joint purpose benefitting more than one cost objective, and not readily assignable to the cost objectives specifically benefitted, without effort disproportionate to the results achieved. To facilitate equitable distribution of indirect expenses to the cost objectives served, it may be necessary to establish a number of pools of indirect (F&A) costs. Indirect (F&A) cost pools must be distributed to benefitted cost objectives on bases that will produce an equitable result in consideration of relative benefits derived. (2 CFR 200, Subpart A, Section 200.56)

These are costs outside of salaries, benefits, and other indirect services. Other organizations simply just mismanage funds due to little oversight and transparency of funds by both the donor and recipient nation. A good example highlighted by Smythe (2015) is Greg Mortenson’s Central Asian Institute, which was heavily funded to build schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan until a 60 Minutes report on the organization revealed that it had spent more money in the United States than overseas and that many of the schools were not in operation (Smythe, 2015)

Donor nations have devised increasing measures to manage for administrative costs, comingling of funds, transparency and the like. However, some of these measures also pose critical problems to aid effectiveness. One such measure is the practice of restricting funding for preset activities and demanding measurable indicators and deliverables to very narrow set of structures. Problems that arise for this fix has been less on the dollars and cents side, and more on the outputs and outcomes spectrum.

Donor nations are keen on seeing actionable improvement in sectors that they fund, and rightfully so. Many donors have devised very complex performance management and planning protocols for this very purpose. In so doing, they also tend to tie NGOs to a losing development agenda. This is because in order to actively monitor progress, one must have a set off criteria to work against. In theory, this should be quite a reasonable ask, however in reality it can tend to have an opposite effect turning the system upside down. Whereas programs work towards indicators and not towards the betterment of people or towards the solving of problems. Gore-Booth (2011) argues that instead of restricting funds, if donors provided more unrestricted funding to local civil society organizations (CSOs) there will be a better return on investment than the traditional aid delivery models have provided. He contends that the reasons for this are multiple and self-evident. Given the choice over how to apply money, local organizations will have a greater sense of responsibility than they will in fulfilling donor agendas. This will create needs-based solutions rather than donor-led mandates and therefore more aid will be more accountable to the populations they serve (Gore-Booth, 2011). His solution can certainly help aid avoid certain pitfalls, particularly the increasingly familiar scenario that can arise when aid is politicized. For example, as he notes in the case of Palestine where local CSOs have had to



invent activities in peace building and democracy to satisfy donor requirements rather than being able to respond to needs or consider the local realities (Gore-Booth 2011).

The management of funds are not in any better conditions at the governmental level, for instance, most foreign assistance, whether it be bilateral or multilateral is categorized into numerous conflating accounts, and overseen by multiple officials, organizations, and agencies, each with different standards of measurement and different modes of performance management. Assistance funds are also usually spread out between multiple geographies and demographics rarely coordinating delivery of services. Unfortunately, these realities of conflating accounts and overlapping mandates also presents many confounding negative side-effects. Firstly, it affects the service delivery, the experience and the overall effect the aid has on the end user. For instance, in a multi-donor environment, of which the most aid generally is provided, it is common to have multiple actors providing either duplicative, overlapping and conflicting services. Secondly, it affects the management and oversight of funds being administered from donor capitals. As Fore (2008) notes, this type of situation certainly leaves decision makers, including the key members of the foreign assistance policy makers without an effective way to judge trade-offs, weigh priorities, or allocate money in a truly strategic way to meet foreign and domestic policy goals (Fore, 2008).

### **Rethinking Foreign Assistance**

This is perhaps why Phillips (2013) suggests that aid should be reclassified into two additional categories – alienative and non-alienative. According to Phillips, international foreign assistance can have many negative effects. Moreover, he claims that certain types of foreign assistance tends to be more negative than others, especially within the soft category of aid. Stating that the latter tend to be more intrusive, longer term and have negative effects on capacity, motivation and “buy-in.” He called these “type B.” Non-alienative assistance on the other hand he claims, tends to be more instrumental, focused on gaps in capability, shorter term and less likely to have the negative effects. These he called “type A.” The issue here is one of process and effective development assistance. That is, it is as much to do with the “process” by which assistance is delivered as the product that is delivered (Phillips, 2013). Accordingly, he notes that the way aid is delivered today will not be critical for large countries where aid is a relatively very small component of national income; however, for smaller aid-dependent poor countries, which predominantly exist in the African landscape, the method by which foreign assistance has been delivered has been critical. He notes that aid is a key element in social and institutional development, and that its negative features become proportionately more critical for poor, aid-dependent countries (Phillips, 2013). The key is thus to find ways to deliver aid that is consistent with the capacity and need to make decisions and take responsibility

International policies outside the scope of aid programs, including those shaping the international terms of trade, also pose important constraints. Despite the market access provided to Africa by the African Growth and Opportunity Act, for example, U.S. and EU agricultural subsidies continue to constrain the development of African agricultural production. Trade preferences under AGOA are conditional on African governments liberalizing agricultural markets, but do not address the more important obstacles facing would-be African agricultural

exporters of subsidies in the richest markets. OECD countries pay their farmers more than \$300 billion a year in subsidies, more than five times total spending on overseas development assistance and greater than the national income of all sub-Saharan African nations combined.<sup>9</sup> The average cow in European Union nations receives \$2.20 a day in government support,<sup>10</sup> while three billion people in the world live on less than \$2 a day (Brainard, 2003).

However, despite the many problems with Aid delivery in the modern world, bilateral and multilateral assistance has proven to be a critical component to global harmony, and continued development. In fact, a series of studies, primarily by economists affiliated with the World Bank, established that although aid did not foster economic growth in every country in all circumstances, it did foster economic growth under set circumstances. Notably, aid was most successful when recipient countries had implemented political and economic reforms that resulted in greater accountability and freer markets. The emerging evidence led the DAC to assert that “properly applied in propitious environments, aid works (Breuning, 2012).

To this end, George W. Bush created the Millennium Challenge Cooperation (MCC) in 2004 to work with a select number of developing countries that have demonstrated a commitment to good governance and sound economic and social policies, where the opportunity for economic growth and poverty reduction is greatest. MCC’s founders in the Bush Administration and Republicans and Democrats on Capitol Hill embraced the idea that MCC would work in a new way with a small, select group of countries. Put simply, MCC was built on the idea that working with a limited number of well-governed poor countries could get a bigger bang for the U.S. development buck.

This concept works in part because it eliminates the quid pro quo aspect of development aid for policy alignment. This doesn't necessarily mean that policy prescriptions are no longer a part of the equation. In fact, it typically means the opposite, because it means that the policy aspects have been well handle and securely aligned well in advance of any aid provision. Again, this is not an inherently negative position for a donor nation to have when it comes to aid, as it is in the donor's best interest for its aid to go to countries that are aligned with their interests, and also to nations that are equipped to handle the aid in the most responsible and results producing manner. The benefit side of this type of aid is thus not on the combatting donor influence in the nation state, instead it is on the aid effectiveness side of the equation. When the policy factors are no longer unknown or are no longer manipulatable, the donor has much more incentive to give generously without fearing political fallout—and lost investment. The MCC in many ways is modelled on this premise, the premise that more dollars should go to needy countries that are natural allies of the US, aligned to US regional policy interests, are regional advocates for the US, those that already espouse US ideals, and those that strive for success under the international norms established in the post-world war II era.

Aid in this respect has a stronger likelihood of success. Largely because the necessary mechanisms to manage the resources already exist in the systems, and secondly the tools are made readily available, in abundant fashion right from the start.

## U.S. Bilateral Assistance in Africa

The United States remains the largest provider of foreign assistance in the world. The United States is by far the largest single foreign donor. It outspends the next largest, the United Kingdom, by more than \$10 billion a year; Germany, France, and Japan follow. In the last 70 years alone, U.S. foreign assistance has helped to rebuild Europe and launch the economies of South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong (CSIS Report, 2017).

Today, the U.S. manages foreign assistance programs in more than 100 countries around the world through the efforts of over 20 different U.S. government agencies. These investments further America's foreign policy interests on issues ranging from expanding free markets, combating extremism, ensuring stable democracies, and addressing the root causes of poverty, while simultaneously fostering global good will.

According to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) calculations (2017), foreign aid spending in 2015 broke down as follows:

Long-term development aid (38 percent) provides ongoing funding for projects to promote broad-based economic growth and general prosperity in the world's poorest countries. More than half of this goes to bilateral global health programs, including treatment of HIV/AIDS, maternal and family health, and support for government health-care systems, mostly in Africa. About 15 percent of this goes to multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the UN Development Program (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).

Military and security aid (35 percent) primarily goes toward helping allies purchase U.S. military equipment, training foreign military personnel, and funding peacekeeping missions. A smaller slice goes to "non-military security assistance", which includes counternarcotic programs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Peru, and elsewhere, as well as nonproliferation and counterterrorism efforts (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).

Humanitarian aid (16 percent) is spent to alleviate short-term humanitarian crises, such as those resulting from famine, earthquakes, war, failed states, or other natural or man-made disasters. This includes State Department and Defense Department disaster relief efforts,

as well as purchases of U.S. agricultural goods and funding for organizations such as the International Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).

Political aid (11 percent) is intended to support political stability, free market economic reforms, and democratic institutions. Programs include governance and justice system reforms, backing for human rights organizations, and support for peace talks and treaty implementation (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).

According to the CSIS, U.S. foreign assistance has achieved many positive results since its inception in the modern context. Noting that on a macro-level, U.S. foreign assistance helped to transform South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. They suggest that foreign assistance was instrumental in launching the Green Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s; and that it supported vaccinations that have helped to increase the child vaccination rate to 70 percent worldwide; and it helped to put the communist command-led societies of Central Europe on the path toward becoming thriving free-market and democratic countries. In more recent years, U.S. foreign assistance has achieved results on the global stage. For example, the U.S. aid in support of the Ebola crisis was both robust and swift in all three West African countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea) in 2014. With USAID in the lead, the U.S. government provided critical assistance and support that was instrumental in containing the outbreak. Its efforts to build capacity of affected villages, towns, and cities in the affected countries lends benefit to both the host nation and the U.S. national interests. The U.S. is also leading the charge in both its humanitarian assistance capabilities and the ability of the U.S. military to respond urgently to security threats anywhere around the globe. A few particularly relevant examples to this is the U.S. response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Pakistan earthquake of 2005, Hurricane Haiyan in 2014, and the Haiti earthquake of 2010. In these instances, there is no doubt that the

United States' unique capabilities and speedy response helped save lives and rebuild areas devastated by natural disasters (CSIS Report, 2017).

On other accounts, the US foreign assistance has had heavy influence in the Middle East for decades, with large amounts going to Israel and Egypt following the Camp David Accords in 1973 as a way to assure peace. More recently countries such as Colombia and Pakistan received large amounts of US foreign assistance to help combat the drug war in one instance and fight terrorism and the Taliban on the other. In all these cases, foreign aid was intended to be an incentive for behaviors successive US administrations believed were serving both US interests as well as marginal notions of altruism. The 2017 CSIS report outlines the philosophical policy outline.

[The U.S.] must continue to help developing countries respond quickly, save more lives, and keep threats far from U.S. cities and citizens. Helping poor countries become prosperous—as we did in South Korea, Poland, Chile, and dozens of others—opens new markets for American goods and services, and creates new American jobs from Claremont, New Hampshire, to Gary, Indiana, and beyond (CSIS Report, 2017).

The notion that development assistance as serving national interests versus its application on altruistic basis is analyzed further.

Although many Americans believe that the U.S. government spends up to 25 percent or more of the federal budget on foreign assistance, in reality it is no more than 1 percent. However small a percentage, it is important to note that these funds do not represent pure altruism; they are smart investments that contribute to the national security and prosperity of the United States. Recognizing this, two successive presidential administrations have consciously elevated the practice of development to the same level as diplomacy and defense in the national security toolbox since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 (CSIS Report, 2017).

There is no debate by those in the development community, to include recipients, donors, and implementers that the current U.S. assistance architecture is not without critical flaws. As of

this year, there are differing federal agencies engaged in assistance overseas, many of which are unaware of their counterparts operating in the same geographic areas.

A system cobbled together by amendments and revisions to the outdated Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. This government-wide assistance network is needlessly complicated at best, inefficient and wasteful at worst. Frankly, we have too many agencies doing this work, and this has decreased the overall coherence of our foreign policy (CSIS Report, 2017)

However, studies by the United Nations, the OECD, and many other respected institutions show that hundreds of millions of people have escaped the worst levels of poverty and deprivation due to U.S foreign assistance specifically. This does not mean that poverty has been eradicated, but it does suggest, according to Cohen (2013) and others, that wholesale denials of long-term positive effects of aid are exaggerated and incorrect (Cohen, 2013). Moreover, it is important to understand that development efforts have had some notable successes in the past half century. Incomes are rising throughout much of the world, the number of democracies has dramatically increased in the past 70 years, and the poorest countries have made important progress in narrowing the gap with the richest countries on child survival, life expectancy, declines in infant mortality, and literacy (Brainard, 2003). The countries accounting for the poorest fifth of the world population, predominantly those in Africa, have also seen life expectancy rise dramatically. By most accounts, foreign assistance has made important contributions in Africa through immunization campaigns, child survival strategies, and improvements to agricultural productivity. Improved sanitation combined with inexpensive oral rehydration therapy has also led to a two-thirds drop in deaths from diarrheal disease between 1980 and 1999. In one of the biggest triumphs of science and perhaps political will, both smallpox and polio have been almost completely eradicated during the last 50 years. But still too



many of the world's poorest countries have failed to close the income gap and poverty gap, despite high levels of foreign assistance (Brainard, 2003).

### **Changing Trends in U.S. Foreign Assistance: President Trump**

With the introduction of the Trump administration and his proposed foreign assistance budget cuts, as well as increases in military spending for the 2018 fiscal year, gives Africa some insight into changing trends in U.S. foreign assistance philosophy. President Trump's new budget cuts foreign aid spending, proposing an overall cut of 32% to all civilian foreign affairs spending. This amounts to roughly \$13.5 billion in global aid spending (The Guardian, 2017).

Food aid funding would drop from \$3.5bn in 2017 – enough to feed 67 million people – to \$1.5bn in 2018, enough to feed only 29 million. Beyond the food side, refugee assistance would be cut by nearly 20%. International disaster assistance, which covers the non-food needs of the world's conflict and disaster victims, takes a massive hit as well – dropping from \$2.5bn in the 2017 budget to \$1bn in 2018 (The Guardian, 2017).

The proposed budget calls for an increase of \$52 billion on top of the current \$575 billion base military budget. The United States will thus spend more money on military affairs in Africa but reduce humanitarian and development assistance across the continent in dramatic fashion. The Trump budget proposes cutting aid to Africa to \$5.2 billion in the 2018 fiscal year from \$8 billion now, a stark drop. The New York Times has reported that “Even some of the money still in the Trump proposal would shift to security areas from humanitarian and development, foreign policy experts say. That the U.S. is “radically narrowing the definition of why and how Africa matters to U.S. national interests,” said J. Stephen Morrison, senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Gone are the days, he said, when human rights,

development, economic growth and humanitarian relief dominated the American agenda on the continent (Cooper, 2017).”

The Trump administration has also proposed slashing programs that buy antiretroviral drugs for people who are infected with HIV by at least \$1.1 billion. This is nearly one fifth of current HIV funding in Africa. Researchers say the cuts could lead to the deaths of at least one million people in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. Overall, Trump’s budget would reduce Department of State funding by roughly a third and cut foreign assistance by about 29 percent. Trump’s proposal would thus move the U.S. away from traditional development assistance programs in favor of so called military assistance, short-term investments based on national security calculations (Helene Cooper, 2017). Relative to its population, Liberia has certainly been one of the biggest beneficiaries of U.S. aid in recent years, in part due to a surge in funding to help respond to the Ebola outbreak that killed 4,810 people in Liberia. In 2015, USAID disbursed \$511 million to Liberia, which has a population of 4.5 million people—or roughly \$114 in aid per person. The biggest African recipient of U.S. foreign aid that year — the Democratic Republic of Congo — received \$852 million, which equates to \$11 per person in the country of 77 million (Newsweek, 2017).

In this regard, African countries and particularly LDCs in Africa will face mass budget strains due to the changing U.S. posture on foreign assistance. Despite much of the criticism on Aid, many in the African development space are sounding the alarm in anticipation of an era of development decline due to these cuts. However, perhaps this may amount to better growth, after all, aid ineffectiveness has been a long rallying cry for skeptics in this arena. Other classical economists have steadily contended that nations just like companies should face harsh realities in order to make the necessary corrective compensations in order to be successful. Is it

possible that this could be the case? In which case, cuts in Aid can at minimum recalibrate modern foreign assistance philosophical trends by reprioritizing the development agenda altogether; or on the other end, using the opportunity to maximize efficiencies within an already broken system. This perspective is perhaps optimistic at best or naïve at worst, but nevertheless a perspective worthwhile to consider, particularly for African countries faced with filling an ever-growing aid gap. From the Africanist viewpoint, the idea of ridding oneself with at least some components of an inefficient, convoluted, and domestically destabilizing elements of the current aid provision mechanism has to be attractive. In some sense, one could view Trump's actions on aid cuts and increased military spending, as making aid truer, clearer, and more direct. In this sense, African leaders will be able to have a much better sense of the direct value-add of what is being provided via foreign assistance. In other instances, it will allow LDCs to stand up and make the difficult and necessary changes to the governing structures and service models to cope in the modern world more readily. This is something that at least some African leaders are identifying with.

## CHAPTER 6:

### AFRICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT IMPLICATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY

In this chapter I will examine African political thought origins, dimensions and developments in the modern era. I will examine recent trends and the related policy implications of African-centered international and public policies. I will highlight key figures in the development of pre-independence and modern African political thought. The aim to draw attention to African political thought as it existed in the pre-independence era and juxtapose that against modern day afflictions of African political thought. In this chapter I aim to provide background and historical reference to African political thought application in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This will serve as key background for the measurement of African Political Thought Word Indicators for modern leaders (i.e Yahya Jammeh, Macky Sall, Aboulaye Wade) outlined in the results section (Chapter 8). I will specifically review key African political thought pioneers (Kwame Nkrumah, Moummar Gaddafi, and Sekou Toure) and demonstrated how these leaders contributed to African political thought.

From a broader perspective, I look to analyze modern academic and policy-oriented discussion around the state of African unity, solidarity, and political leanings in current African culture. What those theoretical perspective and policy leanings mean to development and bilateral and multilateral engagement in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## Political Africanization

One of the compounding issues with the study of African economic policy and in many cases African studies in general is overwhelming ubiquitous acceptance of Western dependency in the literature. That is, the dependency on Western ideas, knowledge, wealth, technology, education, etc. to a point of exhaustion and extinction. This dependency has grown and evolved and expounded upon itself to a point where many Africans unwittingly depend on Westerners for their very own lives, livelihoods and domestic and intrinsic responsibilities. Even within the prominent academic literature and the African intellectual base, there seems to be a consistent proliferation and proselytization of pro-African rhetoric and commentary that explicitly identifies Western and European powers as the sole culprit for the negative position of the African people in the modern era. There seems to be a persistent need to refer to past atrocities and injustices and invoke blame and responsibility on foreign societies, individuals and governments meanwhile reliably neglecting to look inward to the role of African people in the plight of their own lives.

The problem with this type of rhetoric is that the positions of these writers and scholars effectively undermine any progress in the development of solutions and stability on the multiple fronts of that question. Their position is generally counterproductive, and distracting, mainly for two key reasons. One, the analysis is often historical, dating back decades if not centuries, which in turn only serves to focus attention on the past, and therefore distracts one's attention from future solutions. Two, it places the blame and consequently the responsibility on external forces, which in effect implicitly suggests that the solutions to African problems will be generated externally as well. Both of these effects work against strengthening African independence and

Africa's global prominence. Much of the rhetoric also fails to provide any concrete solutions to African problems and the general negative African predicament. Written materials on African studies thus robustly cover the many historical injustices perpetuated by European powers, the continuation of these injustices, and the relationship between the two but rarely offer any meaningful way to resolve these problems. From a public policy standpoint, clearly a proactive, systematic and constructive dialogue is what is lacking. In this regard, academics, leaders, and politicians mustn't only identify historical and current problems, but they are also obligated and required to come up with detailed and thoroughly analyzed solutions that can proactively rectify these injustices. It is the African people's responsibility to right the wrongs of those that subjected them to the many injustices of the past and not that of any foreigner, regardless of affiliation. In so doing, Africans steer their own lives and their own future towards righteousness and prosperity. Africanist need only place blame, responsibility and progression on their own shoulders and guide the continent to a new future. As former American University professor and renowned Ghanaian author George B. N. Ayittey (2006) has said:

African problems must be solved by Africans. The prevailing, deep-seated tendency – largely orchestrated by African despots to conceal their own failures – blames Africa's problems on external factors—colonial legacies, the lingering effects of the slave trade., Western neocolonialism, imperialism, and the World Bank, among others. This externalist orthodoxy, which held sway for more than forty years after independence, portrays Africa as a 'victim' and suggests that the solutions to Africa's problems must come from external sources. This orthodoxy has lost its relevance and validity. It is kaput. (Ayittey, 2006)

However, Africans need not look too far in history to find the right kinds of solutions to current African problems. After all, contemporary African problems are not all that contemporary, novel or provocative for that matter. These problems have been around for most of the modern era and are merely tangential to, and derivatives of, the many problems African

people have faced in the sixteenth through twentieth centuries. Africans simply have to look into their own recent past to unearth a long history and legacy of leadership, courage, and intellectual guidance for a liberation agenda. To examine this, we can simply start with the African colonial freedom fighters of yesteryear. Figures like Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba, Sekou Toure, and Mnamdi Azikiwe guided by intellectuals like Du Bois and Garvey have had a significant impact on African liberation, Pan-Africanist ideology as well as contemporary African political and economic philosophy. Garvey called to all descendants of Africa “ to establish a universal confraternity among the race; to strengthen the imperialism of independent African States; to establish commissaries or Agencies in the principal countries of the world for the protection of all negroes, irrespective of nationality; to establish universities, colleges, an secondary schools for the further education and culture of the boys and girls of the race; to conduct a worldwide commercial and industrial intercourse (Fergus 2010).” In fact, it was Nkrumah who initially said that Africa needed young leaders to emerge and lead their respective nations before contemporary writers talked about the tiger generation or the cheetah generation.

"Africa needs a new type of citizen," he said, "a dedicated modest, honest, informed, man. A man who submerges self in service to his nation and mankind. A man who abhors greed and detests vanity. A new type of man whose humanity is his strength and whose integrity is his greatness." (Nkrumah, 1963)

It was also Nkrumah that sounded the alarm of neocolonialism and its many manifestations in his 1946 publication ‘*Towards Colonial Freedom.*’ In terms of the hegemonic exploitation of Africa, Nkrumah was critical in his analysis of the dimensions of exploitative policies that were the structural framework of the colonial system. He was also forward leaning enough to observe and predict future exploitative neo-colonial adaptations by colonial powers. Nkrumah was so keen on the nature of the global economic food chain that he deemed a lack of

West African solidarity “irresponsible (Nkrumah, 1962).” Nkrumah understood precisely how the international economic system functioned and it was clear to him that Africans needed to unite in order to combat the massive level of exploitation African countries were being subjected to. He was able to expand on the notions of inequality and oppression of the black and African race expounded by Pan-African thinkers like Garvey and Du Bois into some concrete actionable ideas that he could bring to his country. Being born in a rural setting and working his way through the upper echelon of African politics and the intellectual strata he had a particular vantage point that allowed for him to readily and accurately assess his country’s situation.

He noted that existence for the colonial peoples under any imperialist rule resulted in a perpetual state of economic and political exploitation. According to Nkrumah imperialist powers needed the raw materials and cheap African labor of the colonies for their won capitalist industries. Through what he called “a system of monopolist control” they eliminate native-African competition, and use the colonies goods (Nkrumah, 1971). In attempting to legitimize their presence they claim to be improving the welfare of the native population. Such claims he noted, are merely a camouflage for their real purpose of exploitation to which they are driven by economic necessity (Nkrumah, 1971).

In fact, the notion of ‘controlling your own narrative’ was a constant theme for Kwame Nkrumah, in his book *Consciencism* (1964) he warned Africans against the thirst for Eurocentric intellectualism at the cost of their own African intellectual and academic history. He understood quite well how the Western educational system was framing and trapping the minds of African students, leaders, politicians, and civil servants into a continued life of intellectual servitude and inferiority. He understood that history could and in fact was being manipulated and fabricated by means of a systematic dominance of the psyche. Nkrumah writes:



It is not only the study of philosophy which can become perverted. The study of history too can become warped. The colonized African student, whose roots in his own society are systematically starved of sustenance, is introduced to Greek and Roman history, the cradle history of modern Europe, and he is encouraged to treat this portion of the story of man together with the subsequent history of Europe as the only worthwhile portion. This history is anointed with a universalist flavoring which titillates the palate of certain African intellectuals so agreeably that they become alienated from their own immediate society (Nkrumah, 1964).

To briefly elaborate on this thought, Dr. Wilfred David (2004) writes that “serious mistakes are being made by Western historians and analysts who merely record how things have happened, thereby suggesting that no alternatives existed or that events had to have occurred the way they did (David, 2004).” If we compliment Dr. David’s point with Theodore Zeldin’s view, we will learn that “history with all its endless procession of passers-by, most of whose encounters have been missed opportunities, has so far been a chronicle of ability gone waste. But the next time two people meet, the result could be different. This is the origin of anxiety, but also hope, and hope is the origin of humanity (Zeldin, 1999).” This lets us know that history is all encompassing, as it covers the scope of the entire world and of each individual inhabitant in it. The point that can be drawn from Zeldin’s quote is that history cannot be contained within the narrow scope of European historiography. We cannot account for the entire realm of history by the mere microscopic totality of “documented history”, however meticulously outlined the information may be. In which case there cannot be just one history or just one way of uncovering history for that matter. Instead history is occurring every day, everywhere and with everyone and it only stands to get document by mere happenstance and thus cannot be relied on as the final and complete depiction of reality. As Fabre and O’Meally have said, “history is not so much a fixed, objective rendering of ‘the facts’ as it is a process of constant rethinking and reworking in a world of chance and change.” (Fabre & O’Meally, page 3)

In order to achieve African prosperity, Africans need to seize the chance and create the necessary change to in turn inspire the type of hope that Zeldin has identified. In short, Africa needs to control its own identity, culture and history. No entity foreign or global can define Africa for Africans. In order to protect this notion, Africans must stand in unison in protection of their collective intellectual sovereignty. In fact Nkrumah embodied this type of determinism and selflessness for the African cause. Nkrumah was widely known for taking very little for himself and giving much to his family, community, country and national neighbors. Kwame Nkrumah often took on the world single handed with not more than a singular vision of a prosperous Africa and blind conviction to the cause. We recount his speech to the newly formed University of Ghana on July 20<sup>th</sup>, 1948.

In establishing the Ghana National College, we have taken upon ourselves a grave responsibility. The times are changing and we must change with them. In doing so we must combine the best in Western culture with the best in African culture. The magic story of human achievement gives irrefutable proof that as soon as an awakened intelligentsia emerges among so-called subject people, it becomes the vanguard of the struggle against alien rule. It provides the nucleus of the dominant wish and aspiration, the desire to be free to breathe the air of freedom which is theirs to breathe. If we cannot find breadth of outlook and lofty patriotism in our schools and colleges, where else, in the name of humanity, can we find them? (Autobiography Nkrumah, 91).

Nkrumah and many of the post-independence African leaders set the bar and the foundation for a prosperous self-sustaining continent. It is therefore arguable that it is up to the African people to reawaken the legacies of these African giants in order to follow in their footsteps and work to systematically and deterministically eradicate poverty, corruption and stagnation on the continent. If we simply examine just one post-independence African leader, Nkrumah, we will find that he alone has left a clear blueprint and legacy for African liberation on multiple fronts of the equation. Whether it is on the economy, the political environment,

corruption, regionalization or Pan-Africanism, Nkrumah has left African political axioms that new generation Africans should heed. In example, according to Nkrumah the theory of the national liberation movement proceeds from three fundamental theses: The dominance of finance capital in the advanced capitalist countries; the export of capital to the sources of raw materials (imperialism) and the omnipotence of a financial oligarchy (finance capital) reveal the character of monopolist capital (Nkrumah, 1971). In regard to unity and Pan Africanism, in the book, "*Kwame Nkrumah*," by Bankole Timothy, we are told that Nkrumah dreamed of organizing all Africans in the United States so that they might return and perform useful services for Africa. He was the moving force behind the organizing of the first General Conference of Africans in America, in September 1942. At the same time, he dreamed of West African Federation and together with Mnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria and Durosimi Johnson of Sierra Leone, they planned on returning to their respective countries to start political agitation toward this objective. (Jackson & Clarke, 2001)

These actions demonstrate that the contemporary African problems are not all that contemporary after all, and that Africans have sought to solve these global and interconnecting problems since the dawn of African independence. It also shows that African leaders and African political philosophy were indeed effective and prominent in the early days of independence; and that the utility of the two had positive effects for those developing nations. Therefore, African countries, their leaders and their institutions should awaken the lost memories of African leaders and African political thinkers to cause of unity, collaboration, poverty eradication, economic improvement and sustainable development of the African continent.

Africans must therefore awaken the dormant histories of the African psyche and unleash the memory and knowledge of the painful past. Knowledge that may not be so pleasant to utter

or recall but may be instrumental in shaping the way we envision and live in the modern. Ayi Kwei Armah the African novelists who has written extensively on the notion of how “dormant histories” can affect future change said”

The events that shattered our people were not simply painful events. They were disasters. They were strange and unnatural disasters. Those who survived them could only survive in part because they found a way to forget the catastrophe. When you’re still close to past dangers that threatened to wipe you out, even remembrance pains you. Our people forget a lot of things in order to survive....

Is forgetfulness natural?

It is natural, but only for a while not for all time. Forgetfulness helps the diseased cross over the time of greatest pain. It is a sort of sleep, like that brought on by herbs to help a sick man when his disease has exhausted him. In that case forgetfulness works towards health. But when the period of forgetfulness is prolonged unnaturally, then it doesn’t work towards health. It works towards death (Awosika, 1997).

These are the elements of which give birth to African political thought and other critical modalities of thought for the African and diaspora communities writ large. In some respects this reawakening can take place in the modern era, to reinvigorate African activists and policy makers towards a more poignant and directed African ideological and political platform that can spur growth and speed up development.

### **African Political Thought**

In this section, I will analyze the major contributors and origins of modern African political thought and its many manifestations throughout the early pre/post-independence regimes in Africa. I will navigate some of the critical milestones in the historical development of the African political identity and its subsequent sub-personalities. In particular, I will examine

some of the policy positions of Africa's most dynamic and prolific leaders of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, namely Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. I will examine these three subjects as they have both experienced times of immense popularity, and have both led independent African nations while seeking a global strategic union of the continent as a whole. They have also taken practical and scholarly approaches to examine African ideology in effort to set endogenously African domestic policies. Their failures and successes will be examined to some degree in this piece.

Although African political thought is indeed rich, it is unfortunately not well documented. To effectively capture African political thought prior to the pre-independence movement is likely a very daunting task. This may be due to the lack of adequate language facilities to sufficiently synthesize and distribute for mass consumption, or simply due to the isolated and fractured nature of many of the local peoples of Africa during that time. Nevertheless, as time passed and as the geopolitical landscape changed, as well as the world becoming more and more interconnected the need for clear vision for the African political positioning arose. The social degradation and subjugation that was experienced during the transatlantic slave trade as well as the humiliation and inequality Africans suffered by foreigners during the colonial period, catapulted the radical and drastic movement for a pro-African state and ideology. Thus, African Political Thought as we know it today mostly stems from the political and social movements of that era and thereafter. These are new (in relative terms) ideological frameworks of which modern day Africa was built and in fact are crucial to informing us about perceptions of socio-economic, cultural and political conditions in Africa. According to Blommaert (2014), these ideological frameworks are a feature of the struggle that carries hybridity in itself; a struggle that defines a suitable modern state organization in which an

African society can be molded, and which can at the same time provide maximum guarantees for stability and social and political cohesion, and provide optimal conditions for socio-economic development (Blommaert, 2014).

Therefore, to meaningfully discuss African political thought in the academic context as well as in the modern globalized framework it is best to start with the ideological trends of pre/post-independence African leaders of yesteryear. There are many such leaders that contributed heavily to African political thought in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. These are men like Mnamdi Azikiwe, Sekou Toure, Nelson Mandela, Thomas Sankara, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Frantz Fanon, Marcus Garvey, Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, and even infamous characters like Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and the late Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. However, it is not just political practitioners and policymakers that contribute to African political thought. Activists, novelist and other noble citizens have contributed immensely to African thought. Writers like Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka, and W.E.B Dubois have all played very important roles in the development of African political thought and scholarship. African political thought is a distinct thing. It is an authentically African historical, cultural, political and socio-economic examination of humanity among Africans, its territories and its relationships with external forces. African political thought has its roots in the supposition of humanity, justice, culture, respect, dignity, integrity of African people and the belief that Africans are equally entitled to the inalienable rights of mankind. As Blommaert (2014) has said, African political ideologies, as an essential ingredient of modern African politics, are historically contingent phenomena which converge at the crossroads of African society (or a complex set of societies) and a modern state structure to. “They represent attempts at grasping the realities of the postcolonial African situation, at getting power over the conditions under which these states have to function, and at

influencing them in the sense of structuring power relations in ways that can be legitimized by reference to the ideology (Blommaert, 2014).”

Many of the leaders mentioned above used this general theme of equality and reciprocity as a guiding force in their interpretation of the transforming African world. They implemented policies that aimed at solving the global injustices and the perceived societal fractures with their inherited way of life. Unfortunately though, in recent years the world has not seen many prolific African political thought leaders emerge on the international scene as they had in the recent past. Many have thus concluded that the giants of yesteryear have left a leadership void that continues to plague African development. Adamolekun (1988), wrote:

If, on the whole, sub-Saharan Africa has had only a few political leaders who qualify to be referred to as giants, the vast majority of them emerged and performed during the nationalist struggle phase. The roll-call of the giant nationalist leaders includes Nkrumah of Ghana, Toure of Guinea, Cabral of Guinea-Bissau, Kenyatta of Kenya, Nyerere of Tanzania, and Mugabe of Zimbabwe. In contrast, we saw that developments during the nation-building phase were not conducive to the emergence of giant leaders. Worse, some of the giant leaders of the nationalist struggle phase suffered a diminution of their stature during the nation-building phase because of their inability to grapple successfully with the problems of national integration and socio-economic development (Adamolekun, 1988).

African political thought in this respect is important to examine closely and study where notions of ideology in one instance, and nationalist implementation on the other diverge; how does ideology in the form of African political thought effect international relations; and in turn how do the combined effects of leadership, international relations (in the form of multilateral and bilateral relations) effect development at local and human levels in African countries (namely Senegal and The Gambia). These are the critical areas of governance that this study aims to provide introductory analysis into.

## Nkrumah-ism and Its Development

In the case of Kwame Nkrumah, he was a staunch opponent of all forms of imperialism and colonialism. In fact, he wrote many articles and books on the subject. His first book titled *Towards Colonial Freedom* took a very hard-lined stance on the subject and outlined the many injustices and contradictions that existed within the colonial system in Ghana and in other neighboring African nations. He later wrote another book titled, *Neocolonialism*, which quickly and notoriously became a controversial piece of literature, particularly in Western societies, so much so that it has been documented that the book effectively took him out of “good terms” with the United States and its various Western counterparts. Some have even speculated that it was the catalyst that accelerated his fall from power in the late 1960s. Nkrumah was purely an African at heart. He was simply someone that recognized that he was first and foremost a black African in the global schema. He completely embraced the fact that he could never change that arrangement and in fact, never desired to. His Political thought came out of this conviction.

From early in his life Nkrumah dedicated himself to the intellectualism. He took his studies seriously as a boy and took to it continuously throughout his entire life. He took every opportunity to educate himself, and when he wasn't educating himself he used the time to educate others. Nkrumah, clearly understood the power of education and used it to harness power. Nkrumah was also devoted to the African cause. I mean this in no sinister sense of the word, I simply mean to say that he spent his days working for, and working diligently towards a goal of African progress and global equality. That is every day, for as many hours available, without exceptions. Nkrumah, unlike many of his compatriots held the long view on life. He worked diligently in the 1930s and 1940s with the 1950s in mind. Nkrumah's vision of Africa



was certainly not without his own ambition for continental leadership in mind. In fact, his commitment to a grand plan for African integration predated his departure from Ghana in 1935, in search of University education (Tunteng, 1973). The quest for education and involvement in nationalist activities was not mutually exclusive for Nkrumah; through education he could master the revolutionary strategies of men who later became his mentors, and as an educated man, his claim to nationalist leadership would certainly have more credibility than might otherwise have been the case. In this sense, Nkrumah recognized and sought education as an important instrument of national and continental leadership (Tunteng, 1973).

Kwame Nkrumah organized people and their ideas for his own personal reasons and for the aim of African progress. Through his written works one can quickly piece together that Nkrumah was quite clear on what he wanted for himself, as well as what he wanted for the people of Ghana and the people of Africa. He had a clear vision for Africa and knew what it would take to accomplish it, and set out to systematically implemented his vision by building coalitions and using the system to his advantage. For Nkrumah these were merely the mechanisms that were available to be employed to craft his political agenda.

Nkrumah's general political thought as outlined in his books *Neocolonialism, African Must Unite, Consciencism*, as well as in his autobiography is one that is driven heavily by the following five notions: 1) Anti-Imperialism: (Anti-Colonialism/Neocolonialism); 2) Pan-Africanism (African Unity/Solidarity); 3) African Political Freedom; 4) African Economic Freedom; 5) African Intellectual Freedom. Above all Nkrumah was a revolutionary; an African leader advocating for change at the highest order of operations.

These themes are not at all surprising when one familiarizes themselves with Nkrumah's basic sense of conviction. Nkrumah being someone who grew up during the height of colonial rule in Ghana detested every form of colonial rule or subjugation. Perhaps, he was even paranoid and unreasonably suspicious to such forces. Either case, it formed the basis for both his domestic and international political agenda. From the notion of '*Self Government Now*', to '*Positive Action*' to '*Towards Colonial Freedom*' to '*Africans Must Unite*' to '*Neocolonialism*' we see the same concept reasserting itself in different points in the space time continuum of political activism in Ghana and post-independence Africa. In his book *Conscienceism* he tackles historical and intellectual freedoms, albeit he often cited Western philosophy to support his position, he nevertheless found Western subjugation in all facets of the African existence intolerable. No matter what Nkrumah did, he was leading a revolution. Protests against the colonial system, and demands for reforms, were to him nothing less than revolutionary work (Tunteng, 1973)

Nkrumah was also one of the staunchest proponents of African political unity. He was perhaps the biggest political figure (Head of State), with the exception of Sekou Toure of Guinea, that supported the idea of Pan-Africanism in all of African history. Sure, there have been plenty of writers and scholars that have called for the union of African nations; However, on the other hand, there have not been many heads of states that strongly advocated for the institutionalization of this concept. Nkrumah was the chief public practitioner in this regard. The *Ghanaian Times* hailed Nkrumah-ism as "the new African ideology that is out to save our continent from the threats of neo-colonialism and show the way for African unity (Tunteng, 1973)." He writes in his book *Africa Must Unite* as well as in remarks at the 5<sup>th</sup> Pan African congress that Africans must unite in order to secure the individual rights as global citizens of the

world. Exposing ideas of collectivism, nationalism and shared Africanism to unite his African compatriots. During a speech on foreign Policy in 1959, Kwame Nkrumah said: "In Ghana we regard our independence as meaningless unless we are able to use the freedom that goes with it to help other African people to be free and independent, to liberate the entire continent of Africa from foreign domination and ultimately' to establish a Union of African States (Nkrumah, 1959)."

Nkrumah had strong anti-imperialist convictions and was extremely concerned over the idea that of external economic exploitation by colonial powers, as well as new mechanisms of exploitation, he aptly coined as "neocolonialism." He also grew increasingly paranoid of Western geopolitical and economic interest in African generally, but also into Ghana and his role therein mores specifically. According to Biney (2009), Nkrumah believed Western imperialist interests were responsible for what he termed the "economic squeeze" imposed on Ghana by the artificial forcing down of the price of cocoa. Accordingly, he believed that the IMF refusal to grant credit guarantees in 1965 was also part of a strategy to destroy his government. He thus concluded that, if Africa was to survive, there must be an "African revolution" and that his compatriots must establish an "All African Union Government (Biney, 2009)."

As it turns out, perhaps Nkrumah was not paranoid with out cause, according to newly unclassified information the involvement of several Western powers in the overthrow has been confirmed (Biney, 2009).

In 2001, newly released American government files revealed that the USA, Britain and France were complicit in the overthrow. According to journalist Paul Lee, 'formerly classified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Council (NSC) and State Department documents confirm long-held suspicions of US involvement in the coup d'etat that overthrew Nkrumah's government on 24 February 1966'.<sup>20</sup> The memoranda reveal that the plans between the three Western countries went back to February 1964

when the US State Department proposed to their British counterpart a plan 'to induce a chain reaction eventually leading to Nkrumah's downfall (Biney, 2009).

This goes to the idea of the everlasting themes of protectionism, anti-imperialism, African unity and other resounding themes in modern African political thought. The pre-independence leaders had a supreme interest in safeguarding against exploitation; theft; encroachment on sovereignty; political manipulation; and the like. Nkrumah thus, never let go of his goal of achieving a pan African state that would be strong enough to insulate African people from unfriendly interests.

Unfortunately, Nkrumah's ideas of a Pan-African state would never materialize but history has certainly favored him as one of the forefathers of the Pan-African thought on the continent; and unlike many other heads of state, Nkrumah has immortalized his thoughts through his 13 books and numerous articles under his editorship of several newspapers. Nkrumah will also set the stage for regional integration by founding (among others) the Organization of African Unity which will later transform into the African Union on the leadership of another staunch Pan-Africanist public practitioner.

### **Gaddafi and His Green Book**

In this section, I will provide a bit of history and prospective on the largely misunderstood Muammar Al Gaddafi of Libya. I aim to provide an alternate perspective of the often erratic and radical Gaddafi, one that highlights his Pan-Africanist outlook on government, macroeconomics and international order; and his role as pioneer in African political thought.

Gaddafi is an atypical Pan-Africanist that has had long and strong beliefs in African unity, integration and economic supremacy on the world stage. Muammar Gaddafi believed heavily in the idea of people. Not so much “people” as being “the individual,” but rather “people,” being the, “collective,” i.e. the family, the clan, the society, the African. He believed in strength in numbers and in self-governance for the people and by the people. In his manifesto titled, ‘The Green Book’ which was released in three volumes throughout the span of the 60s and 70s he explained the nature of people, their inherent power and pitted African “people power” against the Western concept of “representative democracy.” His Green Book stood on the three basic tenets. 1) People Power; 2) Economics through Socialism; and 3) 3<sup>rd</sup> Universal Theory

According to Gaddafi democracy was a farce because it doesn’t account for the peoples’ interests; instead it merely serves as a mechanism to elect members of the community to fulfil the needs of the government. In this regard, he deemed that the representative nature of Western democracy might be worthwhile, however, the government usually had its own agenda and thus the elected members would merely do what the government decreed and only serve as minions and “go-betweens” working between the community and the government.

Gaddafi like Nkrumah believed not only in organizing people but he also understood the power of ideas and the power of unity. These are three themes that make Nkrumah and Gaddafi similar. Firstly, they both had immense pride in themselves as Africans, as individuals, and as intellectuals. They believed in their individual and societal entitlements; and were not prepared to compromise even in the slightest. Secondly, they empowered themselves by empowering their people and by promoting collectivist rhetoric. Thirdly, they challenged the orthodoxy through scholarship and independent thought. In this regard however, Gaddafi doesn’t quite

compare to Nkrumah as a scholar but he has certainly made his mark on the formation ideas, as well as in implementation of grand philosophies.

With respect to this, Gaddafi is credited for the development of “Third International Theory” which is at times also referred to as “Third Universal Theory.” In his book, he outlines the basic structures and tenets of the theory, which is largely based on socialist ideas regarding the economy, social justice, efficient production of goods/services, and a zero-tolerance policy of exploitation (both internal and external). The theory, in practice is fueled by “people power,” its central theme is participatory democracy, as oppose to Western representative democracy, which according to Gaddafi was too passive to truly demonstrate the will of the people. Unlike in the West, under third universal theory one would not vote once every four years for a President and local parliamentarian who would then make all decisions for them. Ordinary Libyans made decisions regarding foreign, domestic, and economic policy themselves. (Chengu, 2013) The theory itself certainly had its flaws and many have criticized it as lacking substance or lacking adequate implementation mechanisms. But in Muammar Gaddafi fashion, he developed practical institutions to deliver his experimental governance model to the Libyan people.

In 1977 the people of Libya proclaimed the Jamahiriya or “government of the popular masses by themselves and for themselves.” The Jamahiriya was a higher form of direct democracy with ‘the People as President.’ Traditional institutions of government were disbanded and abolished, and power belonged to the people directly through various committees and congresses. The nation State of Libya was divided into several small communities that were essentially “mini-autonomous States” within a State. These autonomous States had control over their districts and could make a range of decisions including how to allocate oil revenue and budgetary funds. Within these mini autonomous States, the three main bodies of Libya’s democracy were Local Committees, People’s Congresses, and Executive Revolutionary Councils. (Chengu, 2013)

The idea that should be noted in the case of Gaddafi’s Third International Theory is its Authenticity, its African-ness, and its inherent assertion that Africans can govern themselves in

way that is different than the Western ideal. In that sense, Muammar Gaddafi was certainly a man of grand ideas; ideas of which were often humanitarian or communal in nature and often encompassed strong themes of Africanism, independence, and economic prosperity. For instance, in 1999 Ghaddafi, determined to rid Libyans of their dependence on imported foods successfully spearheaded a \$33 million project that was able to provide over 2 million cubic meters of water per day to the otherwise arid deserted lands of Libya. This flow of water allowed Libya to create green zones in the Libyan desert that would ultimately generate wealth measured in the trillions. Ghaddafi, if anything was a person who had an alternate unique perspective to the world and was staunchly unwilling to compromise that perspective simply because the status quo dictated it. Where his contemporaries saw obstacles, he saw opportunities. Where his colleagues sought to comply, he sought to rebel. His drive always seemingly to maximize his ability, as well as the ability of his people to govern themselves, feed themselves, and ultimately determine for themselves the courses of their lives without interference.

One area where the United Nations Human Rights Council praised Mr. Gaddafi profusely is women's rights. Unlike many other nations in the Arab world, women in Libya had the right to education, hold jobs, divorce, hold property, and have an income. When Colonel Gaddafi seized power in 1969, few women went to university. Today, more than half of Libya's university students are women. One of the first laws Mr. Gaddafi passed in 1970 was an equal pay for equal work law, only a few years after a similar law was passed in the U.S. In fact, Libyan working mothers enjoyed a range of benefits including cash bonuses for children, free day care, free health care centers, and retirement at 55. (Chengu, 2013)

In his 2009 New York Times Opinion Editorial regarding the Israel and Palestine conflict, he opined in his usual grand fashion advocating for the creation of "Isratine"—a neologism for a one state solution to the perpetual Arab/Israeli conflict. The term of "Isratine"

was received as a laughable suggestion but conceptually Gaddafi was, as usual, challenging conventional modes of thought.

But everywhere one looks, among the speeches and the desperate diplomacy, there is no real way forward. A just and lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians is possible, but it lies in the history of the people of this conflicted land, and not in the tired rhetoric of partition and two-state solutions. (Gaddafi, 2009)

Gaddafi was not only pioneering and innovative on the global stage but also in his regional and domestic policy agenda. Gaddafi went on to introduce many other African-centric policies, treaties, and agreements as the head of state of the relatively small north African country Libya. In fact, Gaddafi (in concert with Mbeki and Obasanjo) are largely credited for the creation of modern day African Union, a transformative organization from the largely ineffectual Organization of African Unity (OAU) established in 1963 and disbanded in 2002. Gaddafi had envisioned Libya to rise as an Afro-Arab powerhouse that could stand up to the West and demand reforms of the international system, as well as negotiate world treaties, international trade deals, and imminent global matters on equal terms. However, through time and multiple political and economic blunders with world powers Gaddafi came to the realization that Libya would never develop in isolation, and without a new comprehensive strategy he would never be in position to demand the reforms he envisaged. After inadvertently severing critical relationships with the Arab league, Gaddafi due to his often-erratic behavior he was forced to turn south to his contemporaries in Black Africa. Being a politically savvy operator, he quickly mobilized his resources and aligned them to continental Africa's needs, and regional leaders like Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria (two of Africa's biggest economies) followed suit. A Pan-African vision that would put him at the top of the 54 nation, 11.7 million square mile, 1.2 billion population, resource abundant, and 2<sup>nd</sup> largest continent of



the world was born. In fact, Gaddafi opened the Sirte extraordinary summit with a presentation beyond an African Union but instead a complete recreation of the African geopolitical landscape, asking African leaders to sign on to the creation of a 'United States of Africa' plan. The plan entailed the creation of a continental presidency with a five-year term of office, a single African military force, and a common African currency (Tieku, 2004). Gaddafi's plea that African leaders 'give up a little bit of their sovereignty in the interests of the whole of Africa' was never fully or truly considered as a realizable goal by African leaders (Pompey 2000). The leaders of Egypt, Kenya and Uganda for example blocked the resolution when they publicly insisted that the idea of an African super-state was premature (Kipkoech 1999). Many of the African leaders also feared that Gaddafi's Arabic persuasion may predispose him to use non-African cultural perspectives, rather than an African centered paradigm, as a basis for defining a better world vision. Be that as it may, his call for an African super-state, like that of the Casablanca bloc of the 1960s, is a central pan-Africanist strategy to achieving collective power in the contemporary international system (Akonor, 2007).

Muammar Gaddafi inherited one of the poorest nations in Africa. However, by the time he was assassinated, Libya was unquestionably Africa's most prosperous nation. Libya had the highest GDP per capita and life expectancy in Africa and less people lived below the poverty line than in the Netherlands. Libyans did not only enjoy free health care and free education, they also enjoyed free electricity and interest free loans. The price of petrol was around \$0.14 per liter and 40 loaves of bread cost just \$0.15. Consequently, the UN designated Libya the 53rd highest in the world in human development. (Chengu, 2013)

He was also an individual that did not back away from his freedom fighting and liberation movement background. In his 2009 UN General Assembly speech he noted that the African Union deserved a permanent seat in the Security Council for the organization to reflect modern state of affairs and remain equitable. He also declared that Africans deserved

compensation, amounting to \$77.7 trillion for the resources and wealth that had been stolen in the past. That colonization should be criminalized and people should be compensated for the suffering endured during the reign of colonial power. He added, that the superpowers of the world had complicated interests and used the United Nations for their own purposes. Stating that the Security Council did not provide the world with security, but instead gave it “terror and sanctions,” noting that it is through this terror that international actors are able to ward off unpopular world leaders and hang them to death without due process or international law or precedence. Referring to the unorthodox trial and execution of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussien. Strangely it was only a matter of two years later that he himself would face a paradoxically similar fate when he was killed amidst unclear circumstances during the NATO led bombardment of Libya during the Arab Spring.

The death of Ghaddafi certainly left a big vacuum in the political and military landscape of modern Libya. In all, since his death there are now an estimated 1,700 armed groups and militias are active in Libya, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The U.N. also estimates 2.44 million people — about a third of Libya’s population — have been affected by the fighting, which has led to shortages of food, water, electricity and medical supplies and reduced access to health care and public services (Boghani, 2015). Gaddafi, hardly the figure without major controversy. Despite the UN Human Rights Council’s working report<sup>3</sup> that commended Gaddafi and the Jamahiriya government for human

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<sup>3</sup> The Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, established in accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, held its ninth session from 1 to 12 November 2010. The review of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was held at the 13 meeting, on 9 November 2010. The delegation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was headed by the Vice Minister for European Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abdulati I. Alobidi. At its 17th meeting, held on 12 November 2010, the Working Group adopted the report on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 2. On 21 June 2010, the

rights reforms as late as January 2011. Gaddafi and his government are also widely credited for massive human rights violations, particularly during the run up to the Arab spring in mid-2011. His government was often cited for brutal treatment of protestors, arbitrarily detaining dissidents, kidnapping political adversaries, and extrajudicial killings of captured individuals.

### **Sekou Toure and the Formidable Decline**

In this section, I will provide a brief history of one of Africa's most prolific and most vocal critics of European colonialism, Western imperialism and third-world exploitation. I will talk about the rise and fall of Guinea's Sekou Toure; his legacy as an African political thought

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Human Rights Council selected the following group of rapporteurs (troika) to facilitate the review of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Argentina, Norway and Senegal. 3. In accordance with paragraph 15 of the annex to resolution 5/1, the following documents were issued for the review of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: (a) A national report submitted/written presentation made in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) (A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBY/1); (b) A compilation prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) (A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBY/2); (c) A summary prepared by OHCHR in accordance with paragraph 15 (c) (A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBY/3). 4. A list of questions prepared in advance by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Latvia, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden and the Netherlands was transmitted to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya through the troika. Those questions are available on the extranet of the universal periodic review. I. Summary of the proceedings of the review process 5. During the interactive dialogue, statements were made by 46 delegations. A number of delegations commended the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the preparation and presentation of its national report, noting the broad consultation process with stakeholders in the preparation phase. Several delegations also noted with appreciation the country's commitment to upholding human rights on the ground. Additional statements, which could not be delivered during the interactive dialogue owing to time constraints, will be posted on the extranet of the universal periodic review when available.1 Recommendations made during the dialogue are found in section II of the present report.

leader and his role in Afro-Franco relations; and his shortcomings as a public policy practitioner. This chapter will give insights into African political thought, and the making of a man that would lead the Pan African movement in Africa for much of the early post-independence era.

By September 1959 President Sekou Toure of the Republic of Guinea had come to symbolize the turbulent political revolution of mid-twentieth century Africa; but more than that Sekou Toure had come to symbolize the rise of African independent political thought (Marcum, 1959). A counter narrative that would become so intense that it would go on to define his legacy as a pioneer of African political thought and committed proponent of an independent united African front. Sekou Toure was a believer in African independence on all fronts. After all, it was he and Kwame Nkrumah who originally dreamt of building a “United States of Africa.” He staunchly supported the anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles of his era and attempted to topple pro-West conservative regimes in Africa (Harshe, 1984).

Sekou Toure was born in 1922, at Faranah, Guinea to a Malinke father and Fula mother. Being born from two of the most prominent tribes in Guinea allowed him to develop and cultivate the necessary ties, language skills and cultural acceptance to navigate the tumultuous tribal/community relationships of 1950s Guinea. Toure was elected president of the Republic of Guinea (Conakry) at age 35. His rise was tied to a large degree to his role as one of the founders of the inter-territorial *Rassemblement Democratique Africain* (RDA) in 1946 (Marcum, 1959). Toure was effective at launching this organization despite divisive ethnic particularisms and the hostile reaction of the colonial administration. Therein he managed to lay the foundations of a disciplined, nationalist political movement that would slowly captivate the minds and passions of the Guinean public. Opportunistically profiting from training offered by the Communist-controlled *Confeder'ation Ge'nerale du Travail* (CGT) of France, whilst utilizing his people-

organizing skills and trade unionism as a platform from which to launch into a meteoric political career. All the while rejecting domination by the European trade unions as well as through the colonial administration. However, by 1956 this arrangement grew increasingly tenuous prompting his split with the French CGT in favor of founding an all-African labor movement (Marcum, 1959), establishing himself as the premier pro-African party in Guinea. He also served as the Secretary General of the coordinating committee of (CGT) unions for the entire French West Africa. In this role, he successfully launched the 67-day strike of Guinean workers in 1953 and compelled the French administration to concede their demands, eliminating the mandate of a forty-hour work-week in Guinea. He had also raised a flag of revolt against French imperialism when France introduced *loi-cadre* reforms in 1956 to follow the policy of 'divide and rule' in former French Africa (Harshe, 1984). However, it was the referendum of September 1958, that provided Sekou Toure the prime opportunity to directly challenge the French colonial system and European trade unions and subvert the "gradualist" approach to independence. Sekou Toure mobilized the Guinean people through his all-African labor movement to reject De Gaulle's offer to join the French Community and opt for immediate political independence. Instead independent Guinea, under Sekou Toure's leadership, would be on African terms and not dictated by European powers. The prolific organizing of the Toure led PDG combined with the fervor of national independence—which was captivating African minds in the late 1950s to produce a vote of 1,136,000 to 57,000 against the de Gaulle constitution and colonial rule. In a matter of the time it took to tally the votes, Guinea had become the first territory of French West Africa to assume independent political sovereignty. He is famously quoted as saying "we prefer poverty in freedom to riches in slavery" rejecting the de Gaulle plan for the post-independence French commonwealth. There is no 'shame' in being black or even underdeveloped. The latter is

the creation of the white man. The Sekou Toure quote, therefore, became the essential statement of a resurgent Africa (Adamolekun, 1988).

He, like Kwame Nkrumah and Gaddafi had difficulty merging and operationalizing his pro Africanist philosophy with Western modes of modernization and governance. He thus crafted his own methodology of government, incorporating democratic and socialist modalities in the Guinean context. He was convinced that socialism was compatible with traditional African communalism, more specifically Malinke and Fula traditions, and was therefore determined to utilize it as lynchpin of his administration. In so doing, he often rejected materialism and class struggles as inconsistent with Guinean /African realities because he did not perceive any antagonistic contradictions among classes within Guinean society. He understood that African governance modalities needed upgrading in order to engage on the world stage but was reluctant to accept such modalities at face value and thus insisted on Africanizing alien system, as well as accounting for African historicity and culture. For Toure his policies were either African in origin or African by adaptation. He would often use terms like 'African socialism', 'Negritude' and 'African personality to describe his administration. He shared Nkrumah's pan-African vision for the complete freedom of the African and the eventual political unity of the continent. To this end, he ensured that the 1958 independence constitution of Guinea contained the following provision: "The Republic may conclude, with any African agreements of association or of community, comprising partial or complete surrender of sovereignty with a view to achieving African unity" (Adamolekun, 1988). Furthermore, Sekou Toure unequivocally opposed the racist rule in the Republic of South Africa and condemned the Western allies of the latter, especially France for selling arms to South Africa. Guinea under Sekou Toure was also among the few African countries which broke off diplomatic relations with Britain when there was a

conspicuous failure on Britain's part to establish majority rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Under Sekou Toure, Guinea enjoyed the distinction of being a leading light of African unity movements. In fact, Guinea entered into union with Ghana (1958) and Mali (1960) with the idea of establishing the 'United States of Africa'. It has also been among the pioneer African states within the Non-Aligned Movement). Sekou Touré's African policy, undoubtedly, elevated him to a position of an elder statesman in Africa and raised Guinea's stature on the overall African scene (Harshe, 1984).

However, despite Touré's pan-African zeal his 26-year reign was plagued with a host of mishaps. He like his compatriot Kwame Nkrumah was seriously handicapped by the failed one-party state experiment which proved to be a systemic barrier to any form of real representative democracy it aimed to provide. According to Harshe (1984), the official single-party, the PDG, permeated in all the spheres of national life; farmers, laborers, workers, youth, women, and even intellectuals were brought within the party fold. In fact, Harshe notes that in 1967 Sekou Toure reorganized the official party structure by establishing *Pouvoir Revolutionnaire Locales* (PRL) which functioned as the fundamental grassroots body of the one-party state. There were roughly 8,000 PRL units covering all the villages and urban centers across the entire country. The formation of the PRLs was inspired by the Chinese cultural revolution. After introducing the PRL the national leadership in Guinea made it clear that "it had lost confidence in the generation which had inherited the revolution and which now constituted a swollen, opportunist, conservative and deeply entrenched bureaucracy" The so-called "revolutionary ideology" played a very pervasive role in one-party system. Even the entry into the highly competitive fields of study like polytechnics was ultimately determined by the political criteria. The tone of this revolutionary ideology was primarily set by Sekou Toure, time and again. President Sekou

Toure. in fact, was regarded as the 'Supreme Guide and Strategist' of the Guinean socialist revolution. He consistently enjoyed a pre-eminent position within the party as well as the state. As a result, the decision-making process, both at the party level as well as state level were deeply undemocratic and compromised (Harshe, 1984).

While Toure was increasingly vocal on the international stage he clearly had begun to lose grip on domestic matters. Social cohesion, economic development and general progress within the Guinean fabric were descending at rapid pace in the latter years of his presidency and many took notice. Toure may have been successful in mobilizing Guineans of 1958 against the French, culminating in the historic "No" vote of 1958 (the vote for independence) but he certainly failed during his 26-year rule to satisfactorily resolve the contradictions and diversities within the country. Although he made efforts to promote national integration (Adamolekun, 1976), inter-ethnic conflicts deteriorated to such a low point that Toure in 1978 openly accused the majority Fula ethnic group of being anti-national (Adamolekun, 1988).

Sekou Toure was clearly an Africanist leader with grand visions for Africa, however, he utterly failed in bringing about unity and sustained development for the Guinean people. His legacy, like Nkrumah is thus forever tainted with a smear of inadequacy. The question, however remains, whether the Sekou Toure's ideological convictions themselves were at fault or whether his lack of experience as a head of state, combined with his socialist leanings, and one-party state apparatus was what ultimately led to his undoing. History has certainly favored his ideology of his implementation; however, much is to be discovered in the realm of ideology and African political thought more generally. This study aims to provide some preliminary and introductory insights into these elements of African leadership in the modern globalized framework.



## CHAPTER 7:

### SENEGAL, THE GAMBIA, AND AFRICAN UNITY

In this section, I will provide a brief background of The Gambia and one of the regions most controversial presidents in the post-independence era, its history as a democratic state and Jammeh's record as a military man, liberation fighter, dictator, herbalist and pro-African anti-imperialist activist; and how his tenure and legacy have shaped The Gambia's international stature, engagement, and perceptions in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This chapter aims to provide insight into the stylistic and pro-African leadership aspects of the Yahya Jammeh administration of The Gambia and juxtapose critical ideological elements against their respective Senegalese counterparts, as a key component of a comparative analysis. I will also briefly examine Senegal's history with France and Laïcité tradition, but most importantly its evolution into becoming one of the most important and internationally recognized African states in the region. Thus, this chapter will cover key inflection points in Senegambian history, as well as critical points of diversion from a common Senegambian international engagement strategy.

The Chapter also aims to throw light on critical conditions of African regionalization and African unity through modern African institutions such as the African Union.

The sections on The Gambian and Senegal, respectively, cover the comparative and historical portions of how international policy has and is currently deployed in Africa, while the latter section on the African Union aims to demonstrate a future outlook for multilateral and bilateral policy engagement throughout Africa. These areas of analysis are critical to the understanding of an African-centric trade, aid, and monetary policy platform in Africa generally, and in Senegal and The Gambia specifically.

## **The Gambia: Democracy and Yahya Jammeh**

The Gambia is Africa's smallest non-island country. It is also one of Africa's most densely populated countries with towns located upriver and, on the banks, but most Gambians live in the capital city of Banjul (and surrounding "Kombo" area) and rural villages in land. The major ethnic groups are essentially the same to those in Senegal and consist of the majority Malinke but also include Wolof, Fulani (Fulbe), Diola (Jola), Serer, and Soninke peoples. The Gambia is a strip of land 15 to 30 miles (25 to 50 km) wide on either side of the Gambia River and extends almost 300 miles (480 km) into the interior; with the exception for a short coastline along the Atlantic Ocean, it is surrounded by Senegal. (Gailey, 2017). The Gambia has sparse natural resource deposits and a limited agricultural base, and relies heavily on remittances from workers overseas and tourism. About three-quarters of the population depends on the agricultural sector through subsistence-farming for its livelihood and the sector provides for about one-quarter of GDP. The agricultural sector has untapped potential with less than half of arable land is cultivated (Sassen 2014; Taylor, 2013).

The Gambia has been described as "an extreme example of a territory which owes its existence entirely to colonial policy." This is because it is an obvious carveout from the much larger country of Senegal, stretching from the coast inland along both sides of the Gambia river, and making up the strip about 300 miles long and 15-30 miles wide. Although roughly following the course of the river, it does not extend to the natural limits of the basin on either side, nor does it reach the source, which lies in Guinea (Robson, 1965). Wholly surrounded by Senegal except on its seaward margin, another critical feature of The Gambia is that it largely isolates the

southern region of Casamance from the rest of Senegal (Robson, 1965). The Gambia gained its independence from the UK in 1965. Geographically surrounded by Senegal, it formed a short-lived Confederation of Senegambia between 1982 and 1989. In 1991 the two nations signed a friendship and cooperation treaty, but tensions have flared up intermittently since then.

Under the leadership of The Gambia's first president H.E. Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara The Gambia enjoyed quite the favorable reputation amongst its fellow African independent states; a reputation of being a beacon of burgeoning democracy and an exemplar of the adherence to rule of law and the preservation of human dignity and human rights in Africa. It was because of this reputation that the African Union chose The Gambia for the permanent headquarters of the African Union's Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. Unfortunately, that reputation was short-lived as a result of the bloodless coup orchestrated by Yahya Jammeh and his military companions in 1994. In the ensuing decades, the Gambia went on to witness its reputation as the standing bastion of human rights and democracy in West Africa deteriorate. When Yahya Jammeh took power in 1994 he vowed to hand over power to the civilian authority once elections could be scheduled, executed, and concluded. However, by the time a year had past, Yahya Jammeh had a slightly different outlook for the future of the Gambia. He would go on to stay in power for the ensuing 22 years.

Jammeh was a very charismatic leader, who came onto the scene promising liberation for the people of The Gambia, promising farmers, teachers, and laborers fair employment practices, income redistribution and a transparent government. He promised to tackle corruption and government theft in the statehouse and in the national assembly; and promised to help build a more stable democracy in The Gambia; one that promoted justice, equality and economic prosperity for the poor. Jammeh often quoted liberation fighters such as Thomas Sankara and

Sekou Toure and delivered his arguments in the local languages such that it would reach the masses with full vigor, unfiltered. In his initial declaration to the Gambian people on July 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1994, with great conviction he stated that “there was rampant and outrageous corruption of the state to point that national coffers were looted by few individuals who for the previous three decades made sure they remained at the top;” and that misuse of public funds and misuse of the state machinery for private ends were the order of the day and would no longer be tolerated (Yahya Jammeh July 22<sup>nd</sup> Coup Speech). He espoused all of what African liberation was about; and the Gambia people who were eager for change embraced him for it. The only area of contention at the time, was the methodology by which Jammeh and his contemporaries took power. The idea of yet another coup on African soil, albeit bloodless, was not something many in the African community writ large had a stomach for. Fortunately for Jammeh, the combination of his youthful exuberance, humble appearances, commitment to justice, and seeming disinterest in political longevity made for limited scrutiny in both domestic and international observations of those circumstances. It was also heavily rumored that the international community, including neighbor Senegal had grown increasingly dissatisfied with president Jawara’s foreign policy aims in the region, and certainly The Gambian community had grown tiresome of the lackluster domestic agenda and recessing economy. It is against this backdrop and this political context that Yahya Jammeh was given leeway (internationally and domestically) to take hold of power at least in interim of establishing a new government for The Gambia.

However, in a slow turn of events Yahya Jammeh tightened his grip on power as the head of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC), using newly found leverage to bar three major political parties from participating in the upcoming elections, only to later declare

that he would step down as head of the AFPRC to stand in as a civilian in those very elections. Yahya Jammeh would go on to win that election and 3 other heavily disputed contests throughout his 22-year reign.

As it were, early in his presidential development Jammeh grew increasingly fanatic, progressively erratic and more and more unpredictable over time and would instead systematically entangle The Gambia in international scandal and infamy rather than prosperity of any kind promised during the early days of his 1994 coup. Jammeh insisted on regularly adding grandiose titles and acclamations to his name, asserting that foreign officials and dignitaries refer to him as “His Excellency Sheikh Professor Alhaji Doctor Yahya Aziz Jemus Junkung Jammeh Babili Mansa (Ayittey, 2012).” He was not a sheikh, doctor, professor or even a babili mansa for that matter but insisted on being referred to as such. He often pontificated on subjects of religion, politics, academics, and morality without demonstrating much nuance or commanding any level of adherence to, or knowledge of any of the subjects. This left him vulnerable to puns and jokes further discrediting himself as a political authority, while also undermining himself as a statesman. He was a narcissist of the highest degree which made the Gambia increasingly vulnerable to his antics, as The Gambia had limited checks and balances in the weak Gambia government infrastructure to effective counterbalance power. It was not long before Jammeh would make outlandish claims, asserting that he was a self-taught healer that could cure AIDS and infertility, and could command herbal remedies on Tuesdays and Saturdays to cure diseases that had baffled modern practitioners for over half a century. Later that year he went on to tell the BBC that he would rule The Gambia for a billion years if God was willing. He also threatened to behead all homosexuals and condemned the European Union and the U.S. for – in his words – promoting homosexuality as a human right (Scheinert, 2014).

Jammeh remained perpetually unperturbed by the criticism of human rights groups. "I will not bow down before anybody, except the almighty Allah and if they (human rights groups) don't like that, they can go to hell," he told the BBC in a 2011 interview (Ejime, 2017). This type of outright defiance towards the values promulgated by the international community led one reporter to write "President Jammeh must undoubtedly be aware of the fate that befell leaders that crossed the West and has sought a path that differs from Western dictates – but he remains unyielding to the hilt." (Akomolafe, 2015).

It was in 2007 that Jammeh reached the height of unpredictability when he announced his mandate to cure AIDS using a secret remedy consisting of 'seven herbs named in the Qu'ran. This news was not initially picked up widely by the international community, likely because by 2007, 13 years into his reign the international community had already learned to take his statements with extreme caution. The story was later picked up by CNN and even inspired a *Law and Order* episode depicting a fictional African claiming to have the cure for Aids, whilst his helpless countrymen deteriorated. Jammeh although staunchly a pan-Africanist, he often mistook pro-African for anti-western. Some have thus contended that his claim to cure aids was mostly a move to combat a long legacy of western dominated medical care on the African continent.

The President and his supporters constructed skepticism about his cure claims in similar terms:

He said the West would disagree about his ability to cure the AIDS virus because of the billions of dollars they get from the HIV/AIDS Campaign Fund - President Jammeh's discovery of the medicine to cure HIV/AIDS attracted unjustifiable criticisms by many sceptics, in particular, so-called Western medical practitioners who have a vested interest in ensuring that no one should claim to have a cure for HIV/AIDS (sic) so long as these discoveries are not from the Western laboratories. (Cassidy, Rebecca, and Melissa Leach)

When Pan-Africanists criticized NEPAD's many failings, chiefly that it does not sufficiently recognize African peoples as partners for, and of, development; and that it was merely an appeal to the goodwill and benevolence of the industrialized countries for aid and investment; and that NEPAD was an elite driven process that provides no means for mobilizing the African masses for real development; and finally that it was driven by AU's interest in securing international capital and maintaining neo-colonial relationship with the West, (rather than pursuing genuine inter-African cooperation). Yahya Jammeh led the charge of a group of AU leaders who questioned the wisdom of the entire enterprise, stating that: 'People are sick and tired of African beggars. Nobody will ever develop your country for you. I am not criticizing NEPAD, but the way it was conceived to be dependent on begging' (Lokongo 2002). It was apparent that the lack of dialogue within Africa on the creation of NEPAD contrasted with the activist approach to getting Western approval, provoked President Jammeh of The Gambia, to further remark:

If it is an African project, why take it to the Westerners to approve it? Was it necessary to take it to the G-8 Summit? That is why I am skeptical about it . . . If the problem is an African one, what I believe is that before talking to the G-8 . . . we should have brought it to Africa, and each country should have gathered its intellectuals and allowed them to debate it—as we did with the African Union project. (Taylor, Ian)

In the exclusive interview published in the November 2013 issue of the pan-African magazine, *New African*, The Gambia's President Jammeh explains in detail reasons why he made the decision to sever ties with the 53-member states body of the Commonwealth of Nations. He expounded that:

I am surprised people believe you have to have a problem with someone first before you decide to leave that person... The British were here in the Gambia for 400 years, and in that time they only built one high school... Colonialism brought us nothing but poverty, backwardness, exploitation and slavery ... under it, Gambians were not [even] trained to be doctors or scientists (New African, 2013).

He explained to New African a day after the withdrawal: “We want to be very independent of anything that has a vestige of colonialism, especially where the same old story goes... you follow something that is keeping you backward, colonialism or neo-colonialism in any form should be kicked out of Africa that is my belief.” (Akomolafe, 2015, New African) Referring to the reference made by the Queen of England, calling it a “vestige of colonialism.”

On the subject of the International Criminal Court (ICC) that arouses so much controversy as many Africans believe that the court only targets African, President Jammeh points to African leaders themselves, explaining that all African indictees to the ICC, have been referred there by Africans themselves:

"I know there is not a single case apart from that of President Bashir (of Sudan) which an African government didn't refer voluntarily to the ICC ... it is very shameful that, instead of being brave and putting cases before the African Union and letting our continental body sort it out, we want to use international institutions to solve our problems. (New African)"

A few days later, when he addressed a horde of supporters, who took to the streets to protest the failed attempt at toppling his government – which is often accused by the West and human rights organizations of being dictatorial – he said: “We Gambians have our own values and those of this country, how we live and our democracy can never be decided or dictated by a foreign capital. If defending my country’s dignity and Africa as a people constitutes being a dictator, then I am a proud dictator.” (Akomolafe, 2017) Jammeh certainly was not shy about his convictions on this subject, even before the United Nations General Assembly, he voiced his dissatisfaction with what he deemed the exploitation of LDCs by Western multinational companies, stating;

The locust’s I am talking about are the Western Multi-National companies that exploit our Natural resources as well as agricultural produce taking 95% of their financial value and leave us the owners of these resources with only 5% or less at most. Is it not interesting that with regards to mining of African mineral resources only four African



countries receive more than 3% royalty from these Multi National Mining Companies? The rest receive only 3% royalty or even less. In the case of petroleum exploitation, few countries receive above 15% royalty etc. (Yahya, Jammeh, 2009)

Finally, my delegation has been following keenly but with deep dismay, the protracted negotiations and a seeming connivance to prevent the reform of the Security Council. Africa would like to see to this Reform undertaken and a balanced representation of the Continents in the Security Council. My delegation therefore urges the President of the General Assembly to exert more effort on the issue within the term of this 64th General Assembly, and ensure that the continent of Africa has at least two permanent seats at the Security Council with full veto powers or else any resolution passed by the Security Council will not be binding on Africa or any AU Member State by the end of 2010. Africa, a continent ten times the size of Europe does not have a single permanent seat at the Security Council whilst Europe has more than one permanent seat. Africa has been subjected to discrimination, marginalization, exploitation and humiliation for a very long time. We the Africans are no longer going to accept this status quo. We will put an end to this very soon. (Yahya Jammeh, 2009)

However, despite his consistent pan-African flares, the former Gambian president had an uncanny and unique ability to undermine his own credibility and international standing. Perhaps his biggest political blunder in this regard, and what will likely have the most impact on his legacy, is the mishandling of the 2016 election, where on one hand, he valiantly conceded defeat to Adama Barrow inspiring convictions of a true statesman, only to flip on the matter 2 days later inciting outrage, protests, and the eventual and now infamous ECOWAS intervention into Gambian internal affairs. His legacy will thus forever be tainted by the circumstance of which he left office, which unfortunately (for him) only served to reinvigorate perpetuating ideas of Jammeh as an eccentric megalomaniacal despot. When Yahya Jammeh conceded defeat after the December 1 presidential elections, the gesture was widely hailed and described as an indication of great hope for democracy in Africa particularly for the Gambian people, who Yahya Jammeh ruled with an iron-fist for twenty-two years. The flip on the other solidified the notion that a tyrannical zealot that would do anything to stay in power.

In the case of the Gambia, Yahya Jammeh's reign marks a major inflection point in Senegambian relations as well as The Gambia's relationship and reputation with broader Western and international world. Marking change in perception where The Gambia once enjoyed an amicable relationship with Senegal and was deemed a beacon of hope and joy, as the smiling coast of Africa, to a reputation of overshadowed by military rule, human rights violations, and governance through impunity.

The questions of leadership, ideology and its interplay in international relations and human development are increasingly important in Africa, and in The Gambia in particular.

### **Senegal: Interregional and Societal Balance**

In this section I will review Senegal's history and interconnectedness with The Gambia from a cultural and sociopolitical perspective and how those relations swayed and frayed in the post-World War II era. I will also briefly examine its history with France and Laïcité (secular) tradition, but most importantly its evolution into becoming one of the most important and internationally recognized African states in the region.

On many accounts Senegal is recognized to be a beacon of hope for African democracy, good governance and stability in the new millennium. In fact, according to Freedom House, Senegal is currently one of the most stable democracies on the African continent. Freedom House highlights Senegal's many achievements over the past few decades as meaningful strides

towards democracy, namely, the two peaceful transfers of power <sup>4</sup> between rival parties in 2000 and 2012, respectively. The Freedom House report also cites the steadily improving condition of civil liberties in Senegal, among other signature achievements, such as the development of a thriving civil society, and the country's stellar reputation for access to independent media and public engagement in free expression and debate (Freedom House, 2017). Indeed, Senegal has had a long history of cultivating a good reputation in the international arena. If one simply examines the standard indicator for Freedom House's civil liberties scale, which goes from 1 (the best score) to 7 (the worst score), from 1972–2006, fifty-seven countries have at one time or another received a score of 6 or 7 on civil liberties. In contrast, Senegal never received a score worse than 4 in any one of these years (Stepan, 2013).

Incidentally, Senegal is also ranked highly by many other international authorities as not only a leading democracy in Africa but also as a democracy juggernaut in the Islamic world. The Religion and State Codebook ranks 152 countries in the world on measures of “discrimination and/restrictions against religions.” On this index, Senegal had a better ranking than all but two of the European Union's twenty-seven members. Also, in attempting to rank countries on a democracy scale, the political scientist Ted Gurr created Polity, which has a twenty-one-point scale running from minus ten to plus ten. For the last two editions of this scale, in 2000 and

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<sup>4</sup> Senegal was ruled by a Socialist Party for 40 years until Abdoulaye WADE was elected president in 2000. He was reelected in 2007 and during his two terms amended Senegal's constitution over a dozen times to increase executive power and weaken the opposition. His decision to run for a third presidential term sparked a large public backlash that led to his defeat in a March 2012 runoff with Macky SALL, whose term runs until 2019.

2004. Senegal's average score for 2000 and 2004 was the highest of the forty-three Muslim-majority countries included in the Polity scale (Stepan, 2013).

In any event, contemporary scholars of all accords are increasingly keen on highlighting Senegal as an example of achievable democracy on the African continent. Particularly in a climate where many analysts continue to depict African nations as endemically unstable and fraught with corruption. So, in this regard Senegal has certainly stood out as a stable relative to other neighboring nations. Senegal's long history of participating in international and regional peacekeeping and mediation efforts has also lent further credence to the notion of Senegal's stability in the region.

Perhaps this should not be too surprising giving Senegal's history with the West, and more relevant, its long history and reputation as a French colony and ally. In this regard, Senegal certainly has had quite a rich history in promoting Western-democratic integration as well as in espousing Franco-Laïque<sup>5</sup> influence originating as early as the sixteenth century<sup>6</sup>. Interestingly, through all this time Senegal has managed to maintain a pro-Western democratic posture, all the while also operating under rigid Afro-Islamic cultures and traditions. This is quite a complicated

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<sup>5</sup> According to Ottaway 2013, the wording of the phrase from Article 1 of Senegal's Constitution offers an almost direct parallel to wording in Article 1 of the French Constitution of 1958, which declares France a "république indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale." Laïcité in France is a version of what Ahmet Kuru has called "assertive secularism," subordinating religion to the state and forcibly cleansing the public sphere of religious influence.<sup>1</sup> Laïcité takes on a different institutional shape in Senegal, characterized by the three dimensions of benevolent secularism: differentiation, cooperation, and principled distance.

<sup>6</sup> The peoples of Senegambia have been in regular contact with Europeans since the middle of the fifteenth century. The first Europeans to visit them were Portuguese ship captains sent out by Prince Henry the Navigator in his effort to outflank North African Islam and tap the West African gold trade directly. For these early explorers, who slowly and cautiously moved their ships along the barren Mauritanian coast, the Senegal River area was the first hint that richer regions lay to the south (Klein, 1968).

arrangement that Senegal has been able to seamlessly transition to, and maintain through centuries. This is likely only feasible due to Senegal's measured and nuanced approach to diplomacy and international relations from the outset of Senegalese foreign relations with the West. In this sense, the calculation of pragmatism and cooperation between religious and secular leaders in the early colonial times to the present took precedence over any strict adherence to religion or culture, thus giving Senegal a unique ability to navigate tumultuous geopolitical landscapes for the past five centuries.

In fact, it was during the seventeenth century when the Senegambian coastline became increasingly globally significant as a result of the development of sugar plantations and the slave trade in the Caribbean, that subtle differences between the Senegalese and Gambia geopolitical and diplomatic modalities began to delineate slowly. As a matter of historicity, the Senegambian area was a mostly homogenous zone, neither country (Senegal nor The Gambia) had much of an identity, other than that of "West African," to the European world at this point. However, as the coastal bases of Goree, St. Louis, and James Island became the center for the commercial penetration to mainland of Africa, the British and French carved out portions of the Senegambian area for commercial pursuits, thus forever dividing the social, economic and political allegiances to the West along those lines.

However, it was in first half of the nineteenth century that France exercised most of its influence on Senegal's geopolitical trajectory, vis-a -vis the Gambia. It was in this period that France directly colonized Senegal and adhered to strict policy assimilation<sup>7</sup>, which sought to

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<sup>7</sup> The French assimilation concept was based on the idea of spreading French culture to the colonies outside France in the 19th and 20th century. Natives of these colonies were considered French citizens as long as the culture and customs were adopted. This also meant they would have the rights and duties of French citizens. The meaning of assimilation has been greatly

unify the laws, tax regime, and political institutions of overseas territories with metropolitan systems in France. In this arrangement, permanent residents of Saint Louis and Gorée essentially lived under the same laws and had access to the same legal and political institutions as commune residents in metropolitan France. It was on the 10 August 1872, Paris granted Saint Louis and Gorée the same legal status as communes in France. The municipal decree organized Senegal's communes according to the basic unit of city government. In 1880, Paris extended commune status to Rufisque. Dakar received commune status seven years later. Thus, Senegal's Four Communes existed as enclaves of republican rights as far back as the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Jones, 2013). Saint Louis represented the old colonial capital, centered on commerce along the Senegal. Rufisque and Dakar gained importance as modern ports that were connected to the railway. These actions constituted the slow integration of Senegal into the global fabric of pre-World War II era, as well as the post-World War II new world order. This is perhaps reason why many members of the Senegalese elite continue to express pride in the fact that their country has one of the best political records in post-independence Africa—conceding to only Botswana as the other African county that can boast a similar record. During the nineteenth century, these four coastal towns in Senegal enjoyed commune status, which meant that their inhabitants were considered to be French citizens rather than colonial subjects. And as early as 1914, the first Senegalese was elected to the French National Assembly (Ottaway 2003), further separating Senegalese and Gambia relations along geopolitical lines.

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debated. One possible definition stated that French laws apply to all colonies outside France regardless of the distance from France, the size of the colony, the organization of society, the economic development, race or religious beliefs. A cultural definition for assimilation can be the expansion of the French culture outside Europe

This history is particularly important to the current political mindset in Senegal and its implications for democracy and globalization in the modern era. This is perhaps the initial and most significant inflection points in the Senegambian political fabric. The bifurcation of Senegal and Gambian international engagement strategy. The socio-cultural differences that exist between the two countries can be largely traced and attributed to their different colonial pasts.

The topography and demographics of The Gambia and Senegal are without a doubt similar, both consisting of Wolof, Mandinka, Soninke, Fula, Serer, Diola (Jola), and other groups. Precolonial Senegambia was a multiethnic society with a good deal of ethnic intermarriage and intermingling of cultures. Ethnic minorities were known to enjoy a high degree of autonomy, the right to choose their own chiefs and leaders, and representation in political institutions. Hospitality toward strangers constituted a cardinal virtue in most Senegambian societies before colonial rule. Host societies had few qualms about granting land-use rights to stranger communities. During the colonial area, Senegal and The Gambia were one of the few European colonies in Africa where race and ethnicity were not major sources of conflict (Gellar, 2005). However, despite being demographically similar, it is the historical differences between francophone Senegal and Anglophone Gambia that has helped shape current trends in contemporary Senegalese and Gambian democracy, governance and ultimately multilateral engagement strategy. The transition from colonial rule to independence also presented a critical juncture, a window of institutional indeterminacy during which the current differences geopolitical strategy, bilateral and multilateral engagement were further defined.

In this regard, there was a wide diversity of preferences regarding the place of Western-democracy, economic-transparency, African-culture and Afro-Islamic religiosity in an independent African state, and elites actively pursued these preferences as the end of colonial

rule approached. In short, the institutional configuration of secularism in Senegal and economic expediency in The Gambia endured the multi-tolerations because it affected the preferences within the key blocs bargaining over the relationship between religion, the state and the economy. Institutional structure thus encouraged a diverse coalition of support in Senegal, notably Muslim leadership, state political elites, and the Catholic minority (Buckley, 2016).

In recent history Senegal has been able to further ascend in regional and global status as it continued to leverage this nuanced secular, religious, and indigenous mixed method of governance. In this respect, Senegal surpassed The Gambia in “stability,” at least from an international perspective, by also becoming what Stepan called, a “highly unusual” third world country, in that, like India, Senegal had never been ruled by a military regime, and has therefore been free of what he called “the problematic prerogatives.” Noting that in sub-Saharan Africa, more than thirty newly independent countries have had major military involvement in their governments (Stepan, 2013). This unusual status has certainly helped shape the political realities of Senegal in the past few decades, despite being on par with the likes of The Gambia as recently as the mid-1990s.

However, according to Faye (2013), the stability of Senegal’s political economy mostly came about as result of developments in the early 1980s due to a series of political and economic reforms, beginning with the progressive return to the multiparty system (1978–80) and the negotiation of Senegal’s first structural adjustment program (SAP, 1979–80). The SAP programs in Senegal essentially tested the limitations of this balance between religion, culture, democracy and the economy, and ultimately exposed weaknesses within the setup. Many Senegalese believed that the SAP agreements handed over sovereignty and economic decision making to non-Senegalese parties. This is because the parties to SAP negotiations were limited



to the government and the Bretton Woods institutions in conjunction with other international donors, who ultimately pronounced the goals and conditions of the SAP wholesale to the Senegalese public without their input. Senegal had signed programs with donors without consultations with or support from, the population. Thus, causing the SAP to crumble under the weight of criticism, distain, and lack of transparency. Critics of SAP complained that Senegal was submitting to the dictates of international financial institutions and foreign interests. Mounting political pressure and the violence following the 1988 reelection of Senghor's designated successor, Abdou Diouf, contributed to the government's decision to cease compliance with the SAP, resulting in its suspension (1989–93) and the deterioration of Senegal's relations with the international donor community (Beck, Toure, Faye, 2013). This will mark one of Senegal's few decisions against the international donor community, however, history will ultimately vindicate the Senegalese as SAP was largely discredited as means to boost LDC economies in the late 1990s.

Senghor's emphasis on dialogue as the main instrument for preventing and resolving conflicts, his philosophy concerning the complementarity of human civilizations, and the convergence of different civilizations toward a universal civilization contributed to preserve and strengthen Senegalese traditions of ethnic tolerance. During the 1960s, Senegal welcomed large numbers of immigrants from Mali, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau who came to settle in Senegal. Although recognizing ethnic and regional identities in his distribution of ministerial posts and party offices, Senghor downplayed ethnic politics (Gellar, 2005).

President Senghor initiated Senegal's passive revolution in 1976 when he opened up Senegal's political process to be reflective of the diversity of views. In the process Senegal's one-party system was reformed into a multi-party liberal democracy to accommodate demands of the

opposition for greater participation. With the assumption of power in 1981, President Diouf further integrated the opposition into the political institutional structure by legalizing all political parties, irrespective of their ideology. In so doing, "the organic crisis he had inherited from Senghor was defeated (Saine and Fatton, 1988).

The institutions of secularism in Senegal, from the independence period to the present day, demonstrate the dimensions of benevolent secularism: (1) differentiation of religious and state institutions, (2) cooperation between religion and state in the public square, and (3) principled distance between the state and religious communities. Although basic even-handedness among religious traditions is a key value, there is no assumption that substantive state support for a religious community need violate that neutrality (Buckley, 2016). Senegal has thus developed a very sophisticated and nuance approach to internal governance and external relations. Evidenced early in Senegalese statehood by Senegalese Foreign Minister Doudou Thiam<sup>8</sup> who was able to navigate international relations by carefully weaving policy between liberal and conservative ideals, without committing to either. He is credited for writing one of the first scholarly books on African foreign policy in which he expressed the hope that African policymakers could avoid involvement in the 'intense ideological conflict' between international patrons. He also questioned whether several cherished foreign policy goals (i.e. pan-Africanism, African cultural consciousness, African socialism, and neutralism) would remain unfulfilled due to what he perceived as the institutional shortcomings of African foreign policy establishments. Particularly those concerning the lack of a foreign policy tradition within the newly independent states; the largely untested, imported foreign policy structures; and, perhaps most important, the

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<sup>8</sup> Doudou Thiam, *La politique étrangère des états Africains: ses fondements idéologiques, sa réalité présente, ses perspectives d'avenir* (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1963).

lack of a democratic culture capable of serving as a counterweight to the 'personal idiosyncrasies' of individual leaders (Schraeder and Gaye, 1997).

In any event, Senegal continues to make strides towards perfecting this balance and improving liberties, democracy, and good governance. Freedom of the press has steadily advanced in Senegal since the mid-1970s. This trend has been accompanied by the proliferation of daily and weekly newspapers in the capital, the appearance of newspapers published outside the capital devoted to the discussion of local political issues, and the emergence of a wide range of government critics and analysts reporting on political, economic, cultural, religious, and sports events, activities, and themes (Gellar, 2005).

The trend toward greater autonomy of civil associations that began under Diouf has continued under Wade, and likely with Sall. With the proliferation of civil associations, it has become increasingly more difficult for the government or political parties to capture or dominate farmers, laborer organizations, professional associations, and youth groups. The growing number, density, scope, and democratic nature of most Senegalese associations have effectively provided counterweights to state power and alternative mechanisms to the state and markets for meeting people's needs (Gellar, 2005). This in turn has likely created a stable policy environment, and correspondingly even foreign policy outlook for Senegal.

Continuity in policy, leadership and ideological aims can certainly have positive effects on the government and economy generally. It is perhaps this stabilizing force, and the notion of a consistent ideological element within the Senegal international relations apparatus that has allowed it to successfully navigate centuries of foreign meddling in its internal affairs. The question of leadership, again, is certainly at play. Does leadership and/or ideology matter in the

grand scope, particularly as it relates to international relations and development? In regards to this study, are the stylistic and ideological offerings of Sekou Toure and Kwame Nkrumah supremely effective, or conversely is it the more control, nuanced, and systematic discipline displayed by Senegal ultimately superior. These are some of the questions this research seeks to draw preliminary attention to as an introductory component to a broader continent-wide analysis.

### **The African Union and Unification Effort**

In this section I will give a brief overview of the African Union, its inception, objectives, ideas, and progress to date, in an effort to display key policy areas from which Senegal, The Gambia, and African countries writ large can benefit, particularly, in terms of leadership, political ideology and policy formulation.

The African Union (AU) was launched in July 2002 much to the credit of then president of Libya Muammar Gaddafi. The AU was to replace the widely regarded ineffectual Organization of African Unity (OAU). The proposal to launch the AU was made in September 1999, during an extraordinary session of the OAU Assembly convened in Sirte, Libya to expedite the process of economic and political integration on the continent at the behest of late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. After member states signed the Constitutive Act of the African Union in July 2000, the new organization was officially launched two years later in Durban, South Africa. Although the AU had been conceived by the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi as a "United States of Africa," its structures were loosely modeled on those of the European Union (EU). Among the aims of the AU was promotion of democracy, human rights and development across Africa. Its vision is that of: "An integrated, prosperous and peaceful

Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena (African Union Organizational Primer Source: Peace Research, 2006).” The vision was intended to be of a new, forward-looking, dynamic and integrated Africa. The African Union would essentially be the organization spear-heading Africa’s internal development and regional and sub-regional integration. Its first chairman was then South African president, Thabo Mbeki. As of June 2017, with the AU’s recent acceptance of Morocco into the organization after long embroiled controversy over the Western Sahara, the AU has 55 members, covering the entire span of continental of Africa.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) authored the 1980 Lagos Plan of Africa (LPA) that first outlined a Pan-Africanist integration plan through the continent’s existing Regional Economic Communities (RECs). It was in 1994 that the OAU members ratified the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC), also known as the Abuja Treaty. The AEC would aim to achieve a continent-wide economic and monetary union and a Pan-African Parliament (PAP) between 2028 and 2034 after completing five phases: creation of regional blocs (by 1999), strengthening intra-REC integration (by 2007), establishing free trade areas and customs unions in each bloc (by 2017), establishing a continent-wide free trade area and customs union (2019), and establishing a continent-wide African Common Market (by 2023). Most recently, the AU’s Minimum Integration Program revised the penultimate stages of this sequence (Edozie and Gottschalk 2014).

In practice the AU has four core political organs which include the AU Assembly consisting of the 54 African heads of state; the executive council covering the representative foreign ministers; the permanent representative committee consistent of ambassadorial

appointees; and the 15-member peace and security council. The AU's chief commitment is to provide African centered solutions to Africa's most challenging problems. The goal was thus to promote unity and solidarity of African states; to coordinate and intensify cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; to safeguard the sovereignty of and territorial integrity of members states among many other social, political, economic matters.

The AU's economic agenda aspires to engage with the new global economy in distinctive ways that would break with the past as Mbeki asserts (Ajulu, 2001). It would establish a continent-wide economic community by engaging strategically in international political economic structures of regional economic integration, international trade, and foreign direct investment, aid, and development. The idea is that under AU guidance, each sector would reinforce each other through various levels of economic, political, and private suborganizations. For example, the AEC program, the African Central Bank (ACB), the African Investment Bank (AIB), the African Monetary Fund (AMF and its all-Africa currency, the Gold Mandela), and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) would work in harmony to support continental and regional goals (Edozie and Gottschalk 2014).

However, many believe that AU members, eschew any genuine commitment or seriousness to the Pan-African ideal of an empowered African super-state that would increase the capacity of Africans to be a true global competitor. While Libya's Gaddafi (1999) argued passionately for a transformative entity, in the form of a confederation of African states, as a 'historical solution' to the continent's numerous problems, an overwhelming number of his fellow African leaders remained deeply skeptical about his vision of a 'United States of Africa'. And although the AU is certainly the premier convening authority in Africa presently, it certainly has not achieved the many goals it set out to achieve. The AU has much more work to do if it is to realize its vision in

so far as its commitment to solving Africa's own problems, amalgamating and disseminating best practices continent-wide, and amplifying the continent's voice on the world stage. As a Pan-African forum, the AU may be able to bridge regional divides through partnerships across its 55-member states and has increasingly become the choice venue in which consensus on African and global issues are formed, however, it continues to be hampered by the lack of necessary organizational structures, political backing, financial resources and global buy-in to be truly effective at its mission. Since its inception the AU has struggled for a clear identity. This battle between the "Monrovia Group" and the "Casablanca Group" on whether the organization and its governance aims should encompass full continental and territorial authority or whether the traditional 'status quo' of governance based on pre-existing boundaries and governance structures. The AU's lack of identity in this regard continues to eschew criticism as the OAU, and AU have failed to act sufficiently as numerous crisis plague the continent, such as those in Rwanda, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and most recently the humanitarian and political crisis in South Sudan.

In fact, there are only a few organs of the AU that are actually fully established and effective. These are the Organs of the Assembly, composed of Heads of State of government or their duly accredited representatives; the Peace and Security Council, authorized via decision AHG/Dec 160 (xxxvii) of the Summit of Lusaka, July 2001; the Executive Council, composed of Ministers or authorities designated by the Governments of Member States; and the African Union Commission; the Commission composed of the Chairperson; the Deputy Chairperson; the eight Commissioners and Staff members; the Permanent Representatives' Committee Composed of Permanent Representatives of Member States accredited to the Union.

The other critical organs of the AU such as the Pan African Parliament, the AU organ charged with ensuring the full participation of the local African people in governance, development and economic integration of the Continent; the entity commissioned to set the protocol relating to the composition, powers, functions and organization of the Pan-African Parliament has not been established to date. In fact, it exists in a very minor form on a consultative basis as an advisory service to the AU but is certainly without any real mandate. Further to this, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), the advisory organ composed of different civil society, social and professional groups of the Member States of the Union; the Court of Justice; the African Central Bank; the African Monetary Fund; and African Investment bank are noticeable absent in the African Union's aim for the legitimacy. The statutes determining the functions, powers, composition and organization of some of these entities have been perhaps prepared, however, there is an omnipresent void in the political landscape with regards to their functionality that is crippling progress in African States. There are several other disjointed subsidiary organs that operate on the auspices of the AU. These include the two judicial and human rights arm of the organization, namely, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights in Arusha, Tanzania and the African Commission for Human and People's Rights in Banjul, The Gambia. The AU has also recently established its development arm, charged with coordinating Africa's development, the New Partnership for Africa's Development, better known as NEPAD.

The Commission is the key organ playing a central role in the day-to-day management of the African Union currently. Among others, it represents the Union and defends its interests; elaborates draft common positions of the Union; prepares strategic plans and studies for the



consideration of the Executive Council; elaborates, promotes, coordinates and harmonizes the programs and policies of the Union.

However, other key elements like Muammar Gaddafi's call, since 1975, for abolishing national armies to create a single African army has gained little traction in African circles and has certainly been a constant point rebuffed by the international community. There are thus numerous problems with the AU's current organizational structure, important amongst these are: the lack of mechanisms to counter unilateral action of strong member countries; the non-veto power decision making structure; and the selection and inclusion of conflict prone countries as force members. The financial apparatus of the AU is also something that is characteristically lacking.

Current AU strategies and programs indicate continued reliance on international capital and the uncoordinated development of individual national economies. No real attempts are being made to achieve continental African economic unity despite the obvious economic wisdom of such an approach. The observation by Green and Seidman (1968), almost half century ago, is still true today:

Africa as a whole could provide markets able to support large-scale efficient industrial complexes; no single African state nor existing sub-regional economic union can do so. African states cannot establish large-scale productive complexes stimulating demand throughout the economy as poles of rapid economic growth because their markets are far too small. Instead the separate tiny economies willy-nilly plan on lines leading to the dead ends of excessive dependence on raw material exports and small scale inefficient 'national factories' at high costs per unit of output. Inevitably, therefore, they fail to reduce substantially their basic dependence on foreign markets, complex manufactures and capital.' (Green and Seidman, 1968)

Although the African Union in many international circles had largely been viewed as a somewhat ceremonial, loosely organized, and poorly managed group of African nations, its role and importance in international and African regional politics has become increasingly relevant.

The African Union Commission through new leadership has certainly taken heed to its critical

intercontinental role as interlocutor, advocate, and coordinator of political, economic and strategic interests of both member states as well as a continentwide development agenda. This is certainly evident by the creation of the African Union's Agenda 2063 Development Agenda, which is being dubbed the 2017's outgoing African Union Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma of South Africa signature achievement. In recent years the African Union has also taken major steps in African intracontinental trade. The African Union was able to facilitate and complete several rounds of negotiations for the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). This flagship program aims to ease customs barriers, reduce tariffs, and harmonize technical standards on the continent, effectively addressing the many trade concerns that have long plague the growth of a continent-wide African common market.

With regards to peace keeping operations, the AU as well as Regional Economic Communities (REC) are increasingly playing a more central and vital role throughout Africa. AU troop contributing countries are increasingly carrying the lion's share of first responders to African conflicts, notably places like Somalia, Central African Republic, South Sudan, and the Lake Chad Basin, often assuming more offensive mandates and casualties than the United Nations and many other countries are willing to bare.

The African Union also launched the African Union Visa-free Common Passport in 2016 allowing unfettered access to intercontinental citizens and businessmen. Although currently only available to select national leaders it is poised to pave the way for more intracontinental flow of people, goods, and services throughout Africa.

Finally, the African Union most recently took steps towards greater self-financing and fiscal governance reform. In July 2016 at the AU Summit in Kigali the AU resolved one of its

biggest problems, the finances. The AU members agree to finance 100% of AU's operations, 75% of its programs, and 25% of its peace keeping operations from internally generated sources. The passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution UNSCR 2320 (2016) in May further supported this agenda by laying the foundation for an AU and UN partnership that would work solely to find an equitable balance on financial burdens associated with peace keeping operations on the African continent. All this to say, that the AU is moving in the right direction in its effort to meet continent demands for internal development.

Although the AU has not quite achieved what Thabo Mbeki revealed as the foremost rationale for the institutional establishment, that is, the full African transformation and modernization of the African economies to end the unequal and exploitative economic relations between Africa and the West, the work of the AU has certainly made strides towards such an achievement. Ultimately it will be up to the AU to administer and govern the intertwining policy space of continental economics, geopolitics and diplomacy. The AU and its partner organizations are certainly uniquely positioned to fill this void in the ever-growing global development, trade, aid, and monetary arena of the globalized 21<sup>st</sup> century. This is the unique space outlined throughout much of this text, that is the intersection of African leadership, multilateral and bilateral relations, and human development on the continent. The AU will be the driver of African development if it can effectively control key areas of continental policy.

## CHAPTER 8:

### DATA RESULTS, ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATIONS

In this chapter, I will provide numerical, graphical, and analytical data concerning the information gathered with respect to African political thought content in speeches given by selected pioneering African heads of states at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). This data will be presented along with similar data concerning Senegal and The Gambia for a specified time period (2009-2016). The data in this section aims to provide insight into the underlying relationship and convergence between African political thought, multilateral and international policy, and the socio-economic conditions of The Gambia in comparison to neighboring Senegal between those years.

Further, I will provide trade, aid, monetary, and development data utilizing primary economic data from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and United Nations to support conclusions of correlative relationships between African Political Thought Word Indicators (APTWIs) and human development in the Gambia and Senegal. The quantitative framework has been complimented with additional data sources such as [foreignassistance.gov](http://foreignassistance.gov), [investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org](http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org), and the human development index (HDI) for the analysis of multilateral/bilateral agreements, investment treaties, and development across key sectors. The HDI will serve as individual data points of development measures for an overall analysis of the validity of underdevelopment theory and the dependency argument in this analysis.

## AFRICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT WORD INDICATORS (APTWIs)

Table 1: African Political Thought Word Indicators (Aggregate Count)

Nkrumah/Toure/Ghaddafi Political Thought Indicators	Africa	Colonialism	West/US/UK/France	Race/Black People/Slavery	African Union/OAU/AFDB	African Political Freedom	African Economic Freedom	African Intellectual Freedom	African Unity/Solidarity	Pan Africanism	Anti-Imperialism	Total
Nkrumah 1960 (UN)	103	26	22	5	0	6	4	0	6	0	12	184
Nkrumah 1961 (UN)	61	19	36	3	0	8	18	2	1	0	1	149
Nkruma 1962	44	30	9	0	6	9	21	2	21	0	21	163
Guinea 1960 (UN)	132	61	1	8	1	9	12	0	11	0	30	265
S. Toure 1962 (UN)	92	10	3	4	3	3	10	4	25	2	5	161
Mandela 1994 (UN)	3	1	0	22	2	2	1	0	1	0	2	34
Libya 2009 (UN)	14	10	30	5	10	3	6	1	0	0	11	90
Gambia 2009 (UN)	41	0	5	10	1	1	9	0	0	0	4	71
Senegal 2009 (UN)	22	1	1	1	5	1	1	1	3	1	0	37
Zimbabwe 2009 (UN)	10	0	5	0	0	2	5	0	0	0	1	23
Gambia 2010 (UN)	24	0	4	2	4	4	3	2	0	0	3	46
Senegal 2010 (UN)	10	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	15
Zimbabwe 2010 (UN)	4	0	4	0	2	4	8	0	0	0	0	22
Gambia 2011 (UN)	13	1	0	0	3	2	0	0	1	0	1	21
Senegal 2011 (UN)	17	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	18
Zimbabwe 2011 (UN)	6	2	8	3	5	1	0	0	0	0	1	26
Gambia 2012 (UN)	11	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	3	19
Senegal 2012 (UN)	11	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	16
Zimbabwe 2012 (UN)	5	0	12	0	2	2	2	0	1	0	12	36
Gambia 2013 (UN)	18	5	6	0	3	1	2	3	3	1	9	51
Senegal 2013 (UN)	8	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	1	12
Zimbabwe 2013 (UN)	3	2	8	0	1	5	3	0	0	0	7	29
Gambia 2014 (UN)	19	1	5	6	0	1	2	0	1	1	3	39
Senegal 2014 (UN)	7	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	9
Zimbabwe 2014 (UN)	6	2	5	0	1	3	2	0	0	0	3	22
Gambia 2015 (UN)	15	2	2	2	0	2	2	3	0	0	3	31
Senegal 2015 (UN)	1	0	0	3	0	0	3	0	1	0	1	9
Zimbabwe 2015 (UN)	9	1	2	0	6	4	7	2	0	1	9	41
Gambia 2016 (UN)	27	14	3	15	1	4	1	1	1	1	4	72
Senegal 2016 (UN)	15	0	0	1	2	2	7	0	0	0	3	30
Zimbabwe 2016 (UN)	4	3	2	0	3	2	4	0	0	0	4	22

This table depicts the number of times each word (header) was used in the respective UNGA speech.

## **African Political Thought Word Indicators (APTWI)**

With regard to African Political Thought Indicators (APTWIs), the study examined both quantitative and qualitative components of the UNGA speeches delivered between 2009 and 2016 by representatives of Senegal and The Gambia. As a control, the study also examined speeches given by the known Africanist administration of Robert Mugabe, (i.e. Zimbabwe) over the same period. The study also examined speeches delivered at UNGA by 20<sup>th</sup> century African political thought leaders Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure to set the baseline and high-end spectrums for African Political Thought Indicators tallies for a given speech, and for given African political thought dimensions.

On the quantitative side, the study found that the 1960 UNGA speech content of Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure scored highest on the African Political Thought Word Indicator (APTWI) count by massive margins (See Table 1). This is a measurement that tallies the overall number of pre-identified APTWIs used in a given speech before any UNGA convention. Nkrumah and Toure's speeches registered 265 APTWIs and 184 APTWIs respectively in that year. Of all the speeches transcribed and codified, there were in fact, only three other speeches in the study that broke the 100-word maker; all three speeches were those of Nkrumah (1961 & 1962) and Toure (1962). Because these scores ranged above 100-words and were well outside current trends in APTWIs usage, this researcher considered them to be extremely high APTWI-content speeches and served as a marker for the pre-independence or early post-independence era. On the other hand, scores that were collected within the study parameters of (2009-2016) that ranged between 70 and 100 APTWIs were placed in the high APTWI-content range; scores

ranging between 30 and 69 were rated as mid-high APTWI-content speeches; scores between 15-29 were rated as mid-low APTWI-content speeches; and scores ranging below 15 were rated as low APTWI-content speeches.

There were only three scores in the high range; nine scores in the mid-high range; ten scores in the mid-low range; and four scores in the lowest range. This outline follows the normal curve data distribution whereas the majority of the speeches fell in the middle ranges and only a few fell to the extremities. In this arrangement, we can visually see the distribution of countries across an African political thought continuum. The Gambia by and large fell on the high end of the spectrum with three of the highest scores in modern era. Senegal conversely fell on the low side, registering six out of six of the lowest scores recorded. Zimbabwe interestingly, mostly held the middle ground within this spectrum.

The Gambia outperformed Senegal in the number APTWIs registered year over year. Meaning that in any given year the Gambian score was higher than that of their Senegalese counterparts in that same year. Zimbabwe also consistently outperformed Senegal year after year except for two years (2009 & 2016) where Senegal's APTWI score was higher than that of Zimbabwe. However, Senegal's highest APTWI score of 37 ranged in the mid-high category outperforming several individual Gambian and Zimbabwean years on its own. In terms of raw performance, The Gambia had an average score of 43.75 whilst Senegal had an average score of 18.25. Zimbabwe split the difference with an average score of 27.63. This tally of APTWI scores on the aggregate exposed a key categorical trend based on national leaders' ideological affiliations that was not previously detected. Based on the assumptions drawn at the outset of this investigation, and the use of APTWIs by these three countries, we can begin to see where their respective administrations fall within an African political thought spectrum. Based on the sheer

number of APTWIs used over the course of eight years, The Gambia clearly ranks highest amongst its counterparts in the study. Senegal on the other hand ranks lowest, while Zimbabwe is in between the two countries covering the middle ground. Further to this point, The Gambia didn't register any scores in the lowest APTWI-content range while Senegal was the only country in the sampling to score in the lowest category. Senegal had four scores in this category (2010, 2013, 2014, and 2015). The Gambia on the contrary was the only country apart from Nkrumah's Ghana, Toure's Guinea, and Ghaddafi's Libya (highly publicized performance) that scored in the high range. The Gambia registered three scores in this category (2009, 2013, 2016). These scores put each respective country in two very distinct ranges within the APTWI spectrum-- putting the Gambia squarely ahead of Senegal on the usage of APTWIs on the international scale for the period examined. In fact, The Gambia and Yahya Jammeh surprisingly outperformed Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe on this test, who only registered an average score of 27.63 APTWIs for the same years (2009-2016). This is a significant recording given that Robert Mugabe and Zimbabwe are considered hardliners in the Africanist thought leadership space. The Gambia and Yahya Jammeh outperforming Zimbabwe on indicators of African political thought is a worthy point of analysis towards asserting a meaningful high/low spectrum of African hardliners. The Gambia's placing in this study in relation to Zimbabwe can certainly give us insights in to trends in the geopolitical space and how those trends related to development more generally.






Figure 2: Number of African Political Thought Word Indicators in a given speech

One area of note that had a determining factor in APTWI scores, is the length of their respective speeches. For instance, president Mugabe of Zimbabwe systemically delivered shorter speeches than those of both The Gambian and Senegalese delegations. This can perhaps be attributed to the age of the Zimbabwean president's age relative to the of Senegalese or Gambian representatives. To this end, this researcher found that the longer the speech, in general terms, the more prevalent APTWIs were in those speeches recorded, and the more qualitative references to African political dimensions were present (see qualitative analysis subsection). In this regard, the research found that speeches delivered by pre-independence leaders i.e. (Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure) far outpaced those given by their contemporary counterparts.

Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure averaged 9,901 and 13,684 words per UNGA speech respectively, in contrast to a range of 1,052 words on the low end to 3,282 words at the very high end for those in sampling (The Gambia, Senegal, Zimbabwe) giving speeches in 2009 through the 2016 timeframe (see figure 2). This could also mean that had Mugabe given longer speeches, he would cover more APTWIs. The Gambia registered a high of 3,143 (2010) and a low of 2,395 (2016) with an overall average of 2,880 words per UNGA speech delivered. Senegal on the other hand registered a high of 3,282 (2009) and a low of 1,118 (2013) giving it an average score of 2,003 words per UNGA speech delivered. In the case of Senegal, there was a clear declining trendline on the base wordcount for its delegation's speeches between 2009 and 2016, as well as clear marker distinguishing the Abdoulaye Wade era (longer speeches) and the Macky Sall administration (shorter speeches). This could likely be explained by simple stylistic differences or by attributing the seasoned Abdoulaye Wade's longer speeches to his general familiarity and comfort with the UNGA platform, versus Macky Sall's relatively unseasoned participation on the UNGA platform. However, the study revealed that the trendline remained

relatively stable through the Macky Sall era, indicating that novelty on the international stage was not the defining factor for the length of his speeches. The last five speeches delivered by president Macky Sall and the Senegalese registered 1,506; 1,244; 1,447; 1,118; 1,612 respectively, marking a distinct shift from the previous administration's average of 3,033.




Figure 3: Total Length of UNGA Presidential Speeches

On the qualitative side of the UNGA speech analysis, the study also recorded key differences in the content and delivery of presidential speeches by the Senegalese and Gambian delegations addressing the UNGA. Beyond the key differences in the numbers of APTWIs present in Gambian and Senegalese speeches, there were also key stylistic, content, and tonal differences in their delivery. To examine some of these differences, the researcher highlights selected excerpts, and analyses of UNGA speeches delivered by the Senegalese and Gambia delegations with regards to key political thought dimensions and subject areas.

Further to this, the study revealed particular trends in both qualitative and APTWI counts when it came to four broad categories of African political thought. These categories were set up in correlation to the APTWIs structures that broadly addressed key dimensional perspectives of Nkrumah/Toure's African political thought perspectives. The first of the four categories were that of ideological trends linking to notions of the "political/economic unification of Africa." This category of APTWIs comprised of the following observed APTWIs 1) Africa, 2) Pan-Africanism, 3) African Unity, and 4) African Solidarity. The second category related to ideological trends concerning matters of national freedoms, i.e. 1) Sovereignty, 2) Political Freedoms, 3) Economic Freedoms, and 4) Intellectual and Cultural Freedoms. The third category consisted of APTWIs addressing concerns of hegemonic exploitation, economic subjugation and/or imperialism, these APTWIs covered the scope of 1) The mentioning of any Western Powers, to include (US, France, UK, Belgium, West); 2) the usage of the term(s) Colonialism/Colonization; 3) the words Imperialism/Imperialists. The final category was concerning elements of African political thought concerning race, justice and equality. This dimension covers the issue of racial inequalities and global injustices of grand order; matters

concerning directed exploitative conditions of international law, border security, migration, and international policy on the basis of race.

### **Analysis of the “African Unity” Political Thought Dimension**

The study found that The Gambia again out performed Senegal when it came to usage of APTWIs within the African Unity dimension. The Gambia held an average of 22.1 African Unity specific APTWIs in its speeches while Senegal had an average of 12.1 APTWIs. This is to say that the Gambian delegation on average made 10 more references to Africa (generally), African unity or African solidarity in speeches delivered to the United Nations General Assembly than those given by the Senegalese delegations.

The control country, Zimbabwe, recorded an average of 6.1 whilst Nkrumah and Toure had an average score of 85 and 131 APTWIs in this field respectively (see figure 3). However, the data revealed that much of the APTWIs usage in this category was attributed to the simple mention of the term “Africa” and not to a specific plea for African unity. For instance, of the 131 references made by Toure, an average on 114 of those words were simply the recording of the word “Africa” and did not contain any further mention of unity, pan-Africanism or solidarity. The word usage itself has valuable implications as it denotes some sort of general idea of collectivism, though the usage of the terminology in of itself is not a unifying policy directive. However, the research demonstrated a significant decline in its usage today than that of yesteryear. To this notion, the term “Pan-African” in all its forms was used a mere total of three times (twice by the Gambia, once by Senegal, and none by Zimbabwe) over the span of eight

consecutive years of UNGA speeches. Based on this evidence gathered, the idea of African unity/solidarity or pan-Africanism is virtually inexistent in today's African political thought lexicon. One could thus imply that if it is not in African leaders' words, then it very well must not be in their minds either. It was a particularly interesting observation to see the terminology completely removed from Mugabe's chosen vocabulary, given his pleas for pan-African development during his early liberation days.




Figure 4: APTWI - African Unit Dimension

With regards to the qualitative analysis of the African political thought dimension of African unity, Sekou Toure was again the most formidable of advocates for broader African political integration and African solidarity amongst the African nations studied. Both he and Kwame Nkrumah staunchly pleaded for an economically and politically integrated single African mega country. In his 1960 UNGA speech, Sekou Toure was quoted as saying “unity is the key to all success in Africa. And that where it did not exist, imperialism is strengthened, and any idea of independence would be precarious.” (Sekou Toure,1960). In the same speech he also swore allegiance to the African people generally, stating that:

We solemnly affirmed in the name of the people and Government of the Republic of Guinea, which upholds the ideals of justice, solidarity and unity of the African peoples, that the liberty of Africa is indivisible and indissolubly bound up with the liberty of the whole world. (Sekou Toure, 1960)

Kwame Nkrumah also took the floor and expounded his position against imperialism and divisions amongst the African ranks by stating that:

What is at stake now is African unity, peace and security and not the ambitions or interests or rights or legalities of the great powers. Do not let us repeat in the twentieth century the errors and follies of the nineteenth. (Kwame Nkrumah, 1961)

Although both Nkrumah and Toure made limited mention of African unity, the idea of solidarity and collaboration amongst African nations was central to their message. Their 21<sup>st</sup> century counterparts also followed suit with similar gestures of solidarity with fellow African states. Ultimately though the idea of African political unity has mostly ebbed and flowed in popularity amongst African policy makers over the past 50 years and therefore its presence in



UNGA speeches generally followed similar trends. Surprisingly however, it was Senegal's Abdoulaye Wade who in 2009 issued the most charging assertions of African unity compared to others within the time period analyzed. He said:

Turning to the situation in Africa, Senegal welcomes the considerable progress made in the peaceful settlement of disputes and in the integration process towards establishing the United States of Africa. The accomplishment of African unity is the only viable answer to the challenges of globalization, the creation of large groupings and the redefinition of the rules of governance. It is also an essential condition for the establishment of lasting peace and stability on the continent. (Abdoulaye Wade, 2009)

If we recall 2009 was also Senegal's highest yield APTWI year. However, for all of his public posturing and international grandstanding on Africanist philosophies, the Jammeh administration never made such strong assertion for an African super state during the years I examined. Jammeh's administration also had a low APTWI indicator score for African multilateral institutions—that is the APTWI indicator accounting for the use of terms referencing the African Union, African Development Bank, or the Organization of African Unity. The Gambian delegation had an average score of 2.25 APTWIs per speech in this category. Although low in general terms, the score did outrank the Senegalese average score of 1.25 multilateral based APTWIs per speech. Rhetoric concerning African unity in the form of a single super state or the African Union was not very prevalent in The Gambian speeches (or in the case of Zimbabwe or Senegal for that matter), however the notion of solidarity in terms of a common cause was increasingly evident throughout the speeches given by the countries studied.

In fact, one area of repeated attention was the point of UN security council reform to include a permanent seat for the African bloc. Both Nkrumah and Sekou Toure made captivating overtures to the UNGA as early as the late 1950's. In their respective 1960's speeches, both

Nkrumah and Sekou Toure called for reform to the Peace and Security Council to accommodate the African and Asian blocs.

I would suggest that when the Charter of the United Nations comes to be revised, a permanent seat for an African nation should be created on the Security Council, in view not only of the growing number of African Members of the United Nations, but also of the increasing importance of the African continent in world affairs. This suggestion applies equally to Asia and to the Middle East. (Kwame Nkrumah, 1960)

The Gambian and Senegalese delegations continued their predecessors' legacy by continually pushing for reform to the United Nations Security Council(UNSC) 50 years later. The Gambian delegation served as a persistent and reliable torch bearer on the subject, addressing the matter of UNSC reform eight out of eight speeches given on the UN floor. Below are direct quotations for the speeches delivered by The Gambian delegations.

Finally, my delegation has been following keenly but with deep dismay, the protracted negotiations and a seeming connivance to prevent the reform of the Security Council. Africa would like to see to this reform undertaken and a balanced representation of the continents in the Security Council. My delegation therefore urges the President of the General Assembly to exert more effort on the issue within the term of this 64th General Assembly and ensure that the continent of Africa has at least two permanent seats at the Security Council with full veto powers or else any resolution passed by the Security Council will not be binding on Africa or any AU member state by the end of 2010. Africa, a continent ten times the size of Europe does not have a single permanent seat at the Security Council whilst Europe has more than one permanent seat. Africa has been subjected to discrimination, marginalization, exploitation and humiliation for a very long time. We the Africans are no longer going to accept this status quo. We will put an end to this very soon. (Yahya Jammeh, 2009)

One of the major reforms that we all agreed on is that the size, composition and working methods of the Security Council should be improved. In the absence of action to implement the reform, the legitimacy of the actions of that body will be open to question. Africa's demand for greater representation in all categories of council membership is rooted in the need for justice and for an end to its marginalization. It is therefore high time to stop consigning Africa to the fate of second-class membership within the United Nations through its perpetual exclusion from the important decision-making that takes place in the Security Council. (Mamadou Tangara, 2010)

My delegation would like to repeat what we said before; that the reform of the UN must recognize the geopolitical realities of the African continent and its peoples. Africa is no longer the colony of any country and must be respected and treated as such. The system of veto power and flawed representation in the Security Council can no longer be tolerated and in fact runs counter to the spirit and letter of the basic principles of equality and fair play as enshrined in the UN Charter. (Aja Isatou Njie-Saidy, Gambia 2011)

The stalled reform of the Security Council is disheartening and even dangerous. Year in and year out, we come to the General Assembly. We meet in various forums to discuss the issues. We hold dialogues and exchanges and come up with proposals. Then we get nowhere. I will mention what Kofi Annan said at the time of launching his well-known report “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”, namely, that no reform of the United Nations is complete without the reform of the Security Council. I think that is critical. It is as valid now as it was when it was said seven years ago. The resistance to change should come to an end. The paralysis of the reform agenda must come to an end. We cannot afford as a group to be in a state of coma when larger regional interests, especially those of Africa, are at stake and get shunted around or jettisoned. Africa needs to be at the table and we will not budge on that demand, as previous speakers have said and as our heads of state have reiterated here. We must reform or risk delegitimizing the actions taken, and the decisions made, in the name of our collective security. (Aja Isatou Njie Saidy, 2012)

Africa’s legitimate quest for full representation on the Security Council continues to be a strong warning that needs to be urgently heeded. International peace and security are the business of all, and Africa, a continent whose resources, ranging from material to human, have helped to bail the West out of poverty to reach affluence from the thirteenth century up until today, cannot be expected to continue to play second fiddle in the Security Council or in any international organization from now on. The Gambia remains resolute in its stance that the permanent and non-permanent membership categories of the Security Council should be equitably distributed regionally and expanded to conform to current geopolitical realities. The Gambia stands by Africa’s demand for two permanent seats as well as two non-permanent seats, as clearly articulated in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. How long will the international community continue to ignore the legitimate right and aspirations of a continent of 53 states, all members of the General Assembly? The calls have been very loud and very clear, but some Western Powers continue to ignore them. That must end, or the Assembly will see a very dignified, determined and independent Africa assert its legitimate rights worldwide in its own way. (Yahya Jammeh, 2013)

It is also necessary to increase the credibility and effectiveness of the Security Council by making sure that selective justice is abandoned and rejected by all Members of the United Nations family. From all indications, there is an imperative need to inject new ideas and impetus into the Security Council and to expand its membership to reflect current geopolitical realities. Moreover, respect for the principle of equal sovereign rights of peoples and the need to promote and respect peaceful relations among all States, rich or poor, black or white, should be the overriding considerations for the peaceful coexistence

of member states — that is, if 2015 and beyond is to bequeath a peaceful and prosperous world to future generations of the human race. (Yahya Jammeh, 2013)

Given the current membership of the Security Council, the reform of that important organ of the world body is long overdue. We African leaders have for a very long time been calling attention to the need to restore the effectiveness and legitimacy of the United Nations by allocating two permanent seats with full veto powers, as well as two non-permanent seats on the Security Council to reflect current geopolitical realities. If the demands for the reform of the Security Council in the interest of equity and justice cannot be accommodated, then concrete action must be taken for the General Assembly to assume all the powers of the Security Council and its responsibilities, including the power to impose sanctions. Under such an arrangement, all decisions of the General Assembly would have to be voted for by all members and endorsed by the majority of its membership, thus ensuring a more democratic and transparent global body called the United Nations. (Yahya Jammeh, 2014)

Top priority should be given to increasing the representation of African countries in particular, which will provide us with better opportunities to participate in the Council's decision-making process. "We must bear in mind that African nations represent more than 1 billion people in this body and constitute 54 sovereign States here, making it ever more important and more qualified for the allocation of the two permanent and two non-permanent seats that Africa rightly deserves. But our calls have never heeded despite persistent appeals, as articulated in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, among others. (Aja Isatou Njie Saïdy, 2015)

"Africa has the highest representation in the General Assembly, yet that continent, with over 1.2 billion people, has been denied the right to a permanent seat on the Security Council. The Islamic Republic of the Gambia therefore once again calls for the expansion of the Security Council to facilitate the allocation to Africa of two permanent seats with veto power and two other non-permanent seats. "Africa's legitimate demands have been well documented and articulated in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. A wellstructured and fully inclusive United Nations is what the world needs, and Africa is ready to take its rightful place and play a more pivotal and effective role in world affairs.

The Senegalese also carried the torch on the matter of UNSC reform, addressing the matter on the UN floor seven out of eight speeches given. Although in other instances Abdoulaye Wade and the Senegalese delegation had generally sidestepped unequivocal assertions of fault by premier members of the international community, in the case of the United Nations Peace and Security Council, both Abdoulaye Wade and president Macky Sall were

equally vehement about Africa's inclusion into the Council. They made those points clear in excerpts below.

For 16 years now, Security Council reform has been an important item on our agenda. It is a paradox that an organization, universal in its mission, should remain deadlocked 64 years after its creation by the elitist nature of its principal body. The leader Al-Qadhafi summarized our position on that issue. As Africa is the only continent not represented among the permanent members, despite the fact that it's the focus of 70 per cent of the Council's work, that historic injustice must be corrected by granting the continent here and now, outside the context of overall reform, one seat with the right of veto that could be held by the Chairman-in-Office of the African Union. Let us ensure that this session is the one at which we finally solve the issue of Security Council reform so that we can focus our efforts on other important issues. (Abdoulaye Wade, 2009)

Turning to the situation in Africa, Senegal welcomes the considerable progress made in the peaceful settlement of disputes and in the integration process towards establishing the United States of Africa. The accomplishment of African unity is the only viable answer to the challenges of globalization, the creation of large groupings and the redefinition of the rules of governance. It is also an essential condition for the establishment of lasting peace and stability on the continent. (Abdoulaye Wade, 2009)

How can we preserve a credible role in global governance for the Organization if Africa — which makes up more than a fourth of its members and accounts for more than 70 per cent of the issues on the agenda — does not have a permanent seat on the Security Council? Several years ago in this hall, in order to put an end to that anomaly and to right an historic injustice, Senegal proposed that — independent of the ongoing reform, which will take time, given that it began 17 years ago — Africa be given a permanent seat with veto power. (Abdoulaye Wade, 2010)

The current Security Council system has certain advantages. A Security Council, an international order, must exist, but it must be improved. But in its current functioning the Security Council has a fundamental role, which is to ignore the African continent. Even on recent issues, such as Libya, Africa has no permanent seat with a right of veto. (Abdoulaye Wade, 2011)

I call for the remedying of a historic injustice to Africa. 70 per cent of the issues on the Security Council agenda are African questions, and Africa is absent, even on the question of Libya. Libya is an African country. Therefore, it would be good to have an African country with a permanent seat on the Security Council with a right to the veto. I am not talking about a non-permanent seat; it must be permanent. (Abdoulaye Wade, 2011)

With respect to the reform of the Security Council, Senegal reaffirms its belief in the African position expressed in the Ezulwini Consensus. It is only justice and common sense that Africa, the continent with the largest number of countries at the United Nations, and whose problems take up most of the work of the Council, should be fairly

represented in that body. Indeed, the democracy required of States should also be required of the Organization to which they all belong. (Macky Sall, 2012)

The acuteness of the current crises is symptomatic of the status quo that continues to bog down the process of Security Council reform. I hope that the upcoming celebration of the seventieth anniversary of our common Organization in 2015 will mark the start of a reformed and renovated Security Council. (Macky Sall, 2014)

It makes sense to enlarge the Security Council to ensure that it reflects these new realities that we all represent here. Senegal, which is a candidate this year for a non-permanent seat on the Council, reasserts its commitment to the African Common Position on Security Council reform, in line with the Ezulwini Consensus. (Macky Sall, 2015)

Increasingly the charter is being ignored and the Council seen as irrelevant as countries put pursuit of their national interests before almost anything else. The time for moving forward on Security Council reform is now. We will be pushing more than ever for action in the General Assembly to make the Council better reflect today's realities and needs. (Mack Sall, 2016)

### **Analysis of the “African Freedoms” Political Thought Dimension**

Further to African unity, the study conducted an evaluation of the African political thought dimension concerning African freedoms, i.e. political, economic, and intellectual freedoms; the study found that the Gambia yet again outpaced Senegal in commentary concerning African freedoms as outlined. The Gambian delegation recorded an average of 5.37 APTWIs in the African freedoms dimension whilst its Senegalese counterpart recorded an average of 2.5 APTWIs in this dimension (see figure 4). The Zimbabwean delegation recorded an average of 7 APTWIs and Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure both averaged 19 APTWIs concerning such freedoms. This dimension on aggregate reinforces the significant downward shift in collectivist rhetoric concerning Africa and its various nation states. Disaggregating the figures in this dimension displayed the increasing and decreasing order of importance relative to national interests. On all accords though, the economic freedoms produced the highest number of APTWIs, this is for both pre-independence leaders like Nkrumah and Toure and for those of

modern Senegal, Zimbabwe, and The Gambia. This gives us a clear display of priority areas of concern, i.e. that economics is the main policy concern of current and past African leaders, particularly within this dimension.

Political freedoms were secondary to the economic freedoms, leaving intellectual and cultural far behind on the APTWI scale. In fact, ideas of intellectual and cultural freedoms came up an average of less than one time per speech given, making the “Intellectual Freedoms” APTWI and the “Pan-African” APTWI two of the least relevant metrics analyzed in this study.

Within the qualitative analysis, the prevalence of African intellectual/cultural freedoms within the context of the speeches given by the Senegalese and Gambian delegations were similarly unremarkable. I had originally hypothesized that pre-independence 20<sup>th</sup> century African political thought leaders like Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure held these sentiments in high regard, thus drawing the assumption that there would be a heavy measure of references to the infringement of African intellectual freedoms at UNGA conventions. However, there was surprisingly very little commentary regarding African intellectual or cultural freedoms by either. Both Nkrumah and Toure reference ideas of African intellectual/cultural freedoms an average of just 2 times per speech, and in all occasions, they were merely complimentary points to broader issues. Both the Senegalese and Gambian delegations paid tribute to both matters of culture and intellectual freedom in differing ways. In the case of the Senegalese, their focus was on paying tribute to black and African heritage through the arts, and the diaspora; drawing attention to African history, and its contributions to society at large. Abdoulaye Wade noted:

I would like to conclude by recalling that Senegal will host, from 10 to 31 December, the third World Festival of Black Arts, after the first two, which were held in Dakar in 1966 and Lagos in 1977. This gathering is a reaffirmation of the artistic, cultural and intellectual identity of the black world, and it carries a message of openness, dialogue and

fraternity from Africa and its diaspora to the whole of humanity, for the respect of all cultures and civilizations. All are cordially invited.

On the other side of the coin, Yahya Jammeh and the Gambian delegation paid homage to intellectual freedoms with regards to distortions in knowledge systems infiltrating the mind of young Africans; the invocation of soft power tools on unsuspecting minds to control economies and politics at will. Jammeh stated that:

Today, after fighting for our freedom and liberating our continent, we are being prescribed a new religion — democracy, human rights and good governance — by descendants of the same colonial powers. Present-day Africans cannot be hoodwinked by anyone, any more, and we are determined to defend our independence and dignity, and to take control of our own natural resources at any cost and by any means necessary. (Yahya Jammeh, 2013)

The study concluded with limited observations of African intellectual/cultural freedom indicators realized from both the quantitative and qualitative recordings.






Figure 5: APTWI - African Freedoms Dimension

## Freedoms and Comparative Linguistics

With regards to the quantitative analysis of African freedoms dimension, again it was the economy that reigned supreme; and Jammeh and The Gambian delegation held the party line in usual order, routinely calling for freedom from economic traps and exploitative policies. In his speech he routinely used terms that had a resounding resemblance to talking points of Africa’s pre-independence past. In 2009 Jammeh said:

Africa and Africans are the poorest of the poor, despite the fact that the African continent is the world’s richest in terms of mineral and other natural resources. The sad truth is that, despite the fact that the African continent is the source of 90 per cent of the precious

minerals, gemstones and strategic raw materials for the industrialized North, we Africans are the poorest of the poor. (Yahya Jammeh, 2009)

Whilst the time and circumstances of the Toure and Nkrumah-world (mainly colonialism) is different than that of today, many believe that the plight of the African people has only incrementally changed over the past 60 years and therefore a sustained pressure on this front is necessary. In this regard, Jammeh in many ways has been one of the few remaining torch bearers of this notion. At least one of the last on the presidential and the highest diplomatic and international plains of modern society. Unfortunately for the Africanist, Jammeh has also proven ill-suited for their cause, as he has never found the right balance of taking the moral high ground while maintaining a semblance of diplomatic decorum. His uncanny ability of alienating himself with often uneven delivery and a propensity for using inflammatory language will forever be his legacy. For example, in the same 2009 speech he went on to say that:

It is no fault of ours if we Africans are poor today. This situation has been brought about by the perennial invasions of the locusts and their permanent presence in Africa. They devour 90 per cent of our useful resources, from agricultural and mineral to flora and fauna. These locusts are present in all resource-rich African countries today. This devastating permanent invasion is exacerbated by another destructive phenomenon — the permanent drought that affects all African countries without exception. We cannot do anything about these two deadly scourges of the African continent. In the case of the locusts, they are protected by a one-sided international treaty imposed on all third-world countries, not only Africa. As for the drought, it is even worse, since no irrigation system in Africa can eradicate it (Yahya, Jammeh, 2009)

The locusts I am talking about are the Western Multinational companies that exploit our Natural resources as well as agricultural produce taking 95% of their financial value and leave us the owners of these resources with only 5% or less at most. Is it not interesting that with regards to mining of African mineral resources only four African countries receive more than 3% royalty from these Multi National Mining Companies? The rest receive only 3% royalty or even less. In the case of petroleum exploitation, few countries receive above 15% royalty etc. (Yahya, Jammeh, 2009)

African resources have been looted continuously from the eleventh century to date. Everything in Africa that the locusts set their eyes on is looted even today. Even dead bodies have not been spared by the locusts. Graves were and are being desecrated and

human bodies called mummies have been stolen from Africa. In such a situation, where even Africans in their graves are not spared by these rampaging locusts, who in his right mind could expect us in Africa to develop and become rich? In Africa, “R.I.P.” on a tombstone, which normally means “Rest In Peace”, has never been respected. “R.I.P.” really means “Respected If Poor” — that is, the body in the tomb will rest only if it was not buried with any precious jewelry. (Yahya, Jammeh, 2009)

Our agricultural produce like tea, coffee, cocoa, etc. are bought at prices fixed by the buyers in most cases at an average price of not more than one US dollar per kilo whilst the same produce are being sold at more than fifteen US dollars per kilo when processed. So for every kilogram of our agricultural produce worth fifteen dollars at the international western market we get only one dollar! How can Africa develop and emerge out of this abject poverty? African resources have been continuously looted from the 11th century to date. (Yahya Jammeh, 2009)

The UN must come to the rescue of Africa otherwise we Africans stand ready to liberate ourselves from this eternal bondage at any cost. As from now the AU would work towards ensuring that African nations and our Farmers get their rightful share of our God-given natural and agricultural resources. We will no longer accept less than 65% royalty for our natural resources (Yahya Jammeh, 2009)

Although some of Jammeh’s points can be argued effectively, his bombastic and combative manner is certainly off-putting. If one juxtaposes this against remarks given by Kwame Nkrumah, it is certainly not difficult to see similarities in speech, however it is also equally unchallenging to discern the stylistic difference in their delivery. Nkrumah, albeit formidable and unwavering on policy terms, often approached powerful adversaries with a more cunning and practical temperament. After all, Nkrumah was a very savvy politician who demonstrated through action that bold ideas coupled with unrelenting incrementalism was nothing less than common practical sense. Something Tunteng (1973) referred to as Nkrumah’s ability to temper revolutionary commitments to favor moderation whenever politically necessary (Tunteng, 1973). It is perhaps this political sixth sense that one could argue was lacking in Jammeh’s approach to international politics. For instance, in his 1960 speech to the UNGA, Nkrumah prefaces much of his antagonistic rhetoric with political softeners to counteract potentially negative feedback. Prior to delivering his rebuke on imperialism Nkrumah aptly

states that “Africa does not seek vengeance.” And that “It is against her very nature to harbor malice.” He goes on to say that Africans “do not ask for death for our oppressors or the ill fate of slave masters [or colonizers];” but instead Africans should “make an assertion of a just and positive demand [for the future].” He then infuses flowery poetic language to draw the point, stating that “our voice booms across the oceans and mountains, over the hills and valleys, in the desert places and through the vast expanse of mankind's habitation, and it calls out for the freedom of Africa; Africa wants her freedom; Africa must be free. It is a simple call, but it is also a signal, a red light of warning to those who would tend to ignore it.” (Nkrumah, 1960)

However, his cunning overtures and stylistic affirmations did not mean that Nkrumah did not put the international community's feet to the proverbial fire. He goes on to state that the United Nations must face its international responsibilities head-on, “and ask those who would bury their heads like the proverbial ostrich in their imperialist sands, to pull their heads out and look at the blazing African sun now travelling across the sky of Africa's redemption.” (Kwame Nkrumah, 1960).

Thus, rhetorical style, decorum, and political diplomacy are certainly confounding variables in this study and warrant some minimal analysis. It can be argued that it is not the rhetorical content that holds sway over multilateral/bilateral relationships, but instead that it is rhetorical style, this researcher evaluated this idea further. In this example, we can see clear similarities in the content of the speech between Yahya Jammeh, and 1960 Kwame Nkrumah, however, we also get a sense of stylistic differences in the delivery on content of controversial political subject matter, so perhaps both content and delivery matter when it comes to public policy. However, when we apply the same level of analysis to Nkrumah as we have with Jammeh and the Senegalese leadership, we see that although Nkrumah is much more revered as

an Africanist, his rhetoric similar to Jammeh did not yield lucrative trade or aid deals with the West. Furthermore, in the case of this study, content is the primary area of focus and driver of conclusions, and therefore stylistic nuance albeit critical for an overall analysis, does not sway judgement in this regard. Further to the point, when we examine the speeches delivered by the Senegalese delegation, we see a distinct lack of correlative application of content to that of speeches delivered by Nkrumah, Toure, Mugabe, or Ghaddafi. For example, in the same year (2009) the Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade struck quite a different, nuanced (stylistic) tone on the subjects of inequality and poverty (so much so that the content was lost by many).

### **Analysis of the Anti-Imperialism, Race, and Equality Dimensions**

The APTWI scores for the Anti-Imperialism Dimension followed a similar trendline to those of the broader raw tally scores of APTWIs discussed in earlier sections (see figure 5). However, in this dimension the data displayed further polarity on the low end of the spectrum with regards to Senegal. Eight of the lowest nine scores were those of Senegal, showing that the Senegalese delegations steered clear of any sentiments of imperialism, casting blame, or explicitly naming key western nations in their speeches. Senegal had an average score of 1.35 APTWIs in this dimension per UNGA speech given. When we compare this to the Sekou Toure and Kwame Nkrumah, who registered average scores of 55 and 59 per UNGA speech respectively, we can easily conclude that interest in this line of rhetoric has diminished tremendously over the past 50 years, particularly for the Senegalese policy makers. The Gambia had lower scores than that of Nkrumah and Toure but scored significantly higher than Senegal

averaging 9.75 APTWIs in this dimension. Zimbabwe registered 11.62 per UNGA speech leading the 21<sup>st</sup> century African leader cohort.

Dr. Mamadou Tangara, the sitting foreign minister of The Gambia, expressed many of the qualitative components of the Anti-Imperialism Dimension of African Political Thought in a speech delivered before the United Nations Security Council. He said:

It goes without saying that Africa has been the perpetual target of exploitation and a specimen or subject of marginalization. Africa has been isolated in global trade, technology and cooperation, and African leaders have been targeted and humiliated in unfair proportions. Yet, Africans have much more to offer than their resources. Africa still bears the hallmarks of dialogue, democracy and sound governance structures whose roots can be traced to her olden days of glory. In spite of this, there are persistent cunning attempts to misguide the African people into accepting alien precepts that apparently contradict our political culture. (Dr. Mamadou Tangara, Gambia 2010)

It is lamentable that the assessment criteria used as basis to provide assistance to needy people or nations in distress are tied to political affiliation cloaked in inexplicable "good governance" issues. (Dr. Mamadou Tangara, Gambia 2010)

The newly elected Senegalese president Macky Sall also addressed the matter of economic exploitations in his 2012 UNGA speech, championing the notion of "a fairer new world order." The stylistic delivery, directed specificity and content-based conviction in his speech drew parallels to remarks given by both Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure




Figure 6: APTWI – Anti-Imperialism Dimension

This was perhaps president Macky Sall's most forceful statement concerning African political/economic freedom in any given speech he delivered to the UNGA. It was unclear as to whether timing of his ascension to the presidency played a role in his speech, however, successive speeches became less and less directed to similar themes. In 2012 Macky Sall stated:

In a time of so many old and new challenges, history has shown that paradigms have changed and that old solutions will definitely not work. We need to redefine our priorities, invest in the real economy and agree on a new and fairer world order. The African continent, having endured centuries of slavery and exploitation, cannot afford to accept yet another Trojan Horse and be duped into forfeiting its resources in a contest hobbling its progress and well-being. We call for new relations with Africa, not acting upon Africa and Africans but acting with Africa and Africans, in a spirit of cooperation and fairness, taking into account all parties' priorities and interests. That is the hope we declare here in the United Nations. It is also what we call for in the relations between the New Partnership for Africa's Development, on the one hand, and the Group of Eight, Group of 20 and other partnership mechanisms, on the other hand. (Macky Sall, 2012)

In 2013 Macky Sall returned with similar themes, however with a bit less vigor. He had also noticeably shifted his stylistic approach to more similarly resemble the stylistic preferences of his predecessor president, Abdoulaye Wade, in remarks concerning global economics. In this regard, his remarks focused more pointedly on institutional processes and matters of foreign assistance provisions rather than sheer exploitative culpabilities. He stated:

Senegal calls for the reform of international economic and financial governance, notably the terms for accessing credit and obtaining financing for economic and social development projects. Let us not pave the road to the future with the instruments of the past. While plummeting official development assistance no longer meets Africa's needs, the trend towards progress should lead us to explore other innovative financing mechanisms available to our countries. Africa is no longer a zone of turmoil and humanitarian emergencies. Africa has become an emerging center of opportunities and investments for innovative and mutually beneficial partnerships. (Macky Sall, 2013)

It makes sense to reform global economic and financial governance through a more equitable representation of the new realities and greater flexibility with regard to access to credit, to put an end to the paradox of resources that are available but not accessible. In our mining industries, it makes sense to establish, along with transparency, codes and contracts that are fairer and more equitable, reward and protect the investor and preserve the interests of States and local populations. It makes sense to combat more vigorously illicit financial flows that cost Africa between \$30 billion and \$60 billion per year — a loss that is more than official development assistance. If Africa were to receive fair



payment for its resources and recover the equivalent of 17 per cent of those assets that have been fraudulently invested abroad, it could settle the entirety of its debt and finance its own development needs. (Macky Sall, 2015)

The Gambian delegation however stuck to its usual style of making targeted claims of culpability, and overtures of systemic malpractices by the collective security apparatus.

Claiming that the sovereign rights of countries are threatened, and that without protection in this sphere, countries, and by extension their citizenry, are subject to bias and unequal treatment globally. In some respects, the Gambian delegation's remarks aim to apply the theories of Chicago School thinkers, Milton Friedman, Ludwig Van Mises, Frederic Hayek, and Karl Popper. The idea of "tyranny of the majority"; the notion that when individual's rights are inextricably linked to group rights that their freedoms will ultimately be jeopardized. The following are selected excerpts concerning the subject.

The Gambia firmly believes that socioeconomic development and respect for the sovereign rights of countries to control their own natural resources, especially minerals, should be the collective line of defense for a collective global security system that takes the sovereignty of each nation seriously. Combating poverty will not only save millions of lives but also strengthen states' capacities to combat terrorism, organized crime and intra-state conflict. We need renewed and genuine global partnerships and commitments that are binding and based on respect for the sovereign right of each individual State to choose a way of life that is based on its religious and cultural values, as no administrative system is better than the way prescribed by the almighty Allah. (Yahya Jammeh, 2013)

We also use this forum to call on the international financial institutions to open up and embrace overdue reforms. They should be transparent and inclusive and raise the profile of their smallest members, such as low-income countries or least developed countries (LDCs). We call on them to embrace the Istanbul Program of Action for LDCs. (Aja Isatou Saidy-Njie, 2012)

To put the Gambian and Senegalese speech remarks in perspective, and to apply a measure of comparability to pre-independence African political thought leaders, I have provided an excerpt from president Sekou Toure's 1960 speech delivered to the United Nations General

Assembly. In it he gives similar overtures of exploitative tendencies of the world order, but interestingly he also applies a level of African introspection to his analysis of the economic conditions of the continent, that unfortunately is missing in many of the 21<sup>st</sup> century speeches.

If Africa is to be liberated economically, it must cease to be considered as a reservoir of raw materials. It is worth emphasizing that the present underdeveloped state of practically the whole African continent is a direct consequence of the absence of any typically African economy. The new states emerging from servitude are confronted with the serious problem of the fragmentation of the African economy and its integration with the economies of metropolitan countries. The present economy of Africa has the characteristics of a colonial economy~ the essential purpose of which is to make the colony an economic appendage to the metropolitan country, Africa being considered as a market in which any competition likely to prejudice metropolitan interests is studiously eliminated. As a result of the accidents of colonization, neighboring African countries having identical economic features belong to completely different economic and commercial systems. In the majority of cases there is no capital accumulation which would enable our countries to make the investments needed for their economic and social development from their own resources. (Sekou Toure, 1960)

Interestingly, president Sekou Toure's 1960 comments on the UNGA floor still holds true some 50 years later. His focus on the African economy and the fragmented nature of the continental economy was of serious concern to him and his contemporaries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Incidentally, the matter of a fragmented and disjointed African economy continues to be a major macroeconomic problem for the continent's industrial and technological development. In which case, one would expect a sustained push on these points. However, introspective thought on African development was noticeably missing in many of the speeches.

## Global Inequality, Race, and Justice

This section addresses the analysis of the African political thought dimension on global inequality, race, and justice. This dimension covers the issue of racial inequalities and global injustices of grand order; matters concerning directed exploitative conditions of international law, border security, migration, and international policy. In the Gambian case, the notion of race and inequality as being a driving force in global geopolitics and economics was well presented. Throughout several UNGA speeches, The Gambian delegation repeatedly drew attention and conclusions to the idea that modern inequality was linked to both past and present-day exploitative political realities.

Beyond drawing general lines, President Yahya Jammeh of The Gambia often made very specific overtures with regards to who the subjugated peoples of the world were and who were the perpetrators of such injustices.




Figure 7: APTWI – Inequality, Race, and Justice Dimension

For instance, in his 2009 speech, he addressed the matter, imploring the international community to pay particular attention to racial inequality and poverty; and noted poignantly that inequality would inevitably affect global peace and security. Key excerpts from the speech are listed below:

There cannot be peace and security in the absence of justice for all. There cannot be justice in the face of abject poverty characterized by hunger and starvation, disease, and lack of basic social services as a result of exploitation. There cannot be justice if there is merciless exploitation, suppression and criminal invasions of sovereign states. There cannot be peace if there is no development as a result of marginalization, injustice and racism. (Yahya Jammeh, 2009)

As long as this status quo does not change, peace and security would continue to be an elusive dream as people; rich or poor, Muslim or non-Muslim, black or Asian are bound to defend their human dignity at any price. My delegation therefore calls for a united front against this dictatorship of a few over the rest of humanity. And in the interest of our collective security, the United Nations should see to the total elimination of racism and hate in all its forms whatever it takes, so that we can bequeath to generations of humanity yet unborn, a very peaceful and prosperous world devoid of destitution, exploitation and marginalization. (Yahya Jammeh, 2009)

We Africans have been suffering for too long at the hands of Westerners and we will put an end to this. It is African sweat, blood, tears and natural resources that have built the North throughout almost five centuries of merciless and racist exploitation that continues today. Enough is enough. (Yahya Jammeh, 2009)

In many respects the Gambia president took the moral high ground in his remarks, as these comments serve mankind and human dignity, whilst inspiring equality and justice at the highest level of international order and policy making. These are the inspirational quotes many African citizens look to hear from world leaders on the international stage. In fact, these words are similar to those touted by African pre-independence leaders of yesteryear in many respects. From Nkrumah, Lumumba, to Toure, the international world has heard similar condemnations of inequality during their respective eras. If we recall, it was on October 10<sup>th</sup>, 1960 that Sekou Toure stood in front of the United Nations General Assembly and condemned the international

world order for exploiting subjugated peoples who he claimed “were continual victims of injustice and despotism.” He demanded that that racial discrimination and cultural superiority be discarded outright, stating that “there are no inferior peoples, nor has any people the right to think or say that it brings the ideal of liberty to another people. We condemn exploitation and domination and are equally strongly opposed to the spirit of superiority which leads some to think that the fate of colonial peoples should depend on their charity.” In the same year, Kwame Nkrumah unequivocally condemned racially charged injustice, tyranny and what he called “inhumanity and barbarity” taking place in the Congo, Southwest Africa (Modern-day Namibia) and the apartheid regime of South Africa. Nkrumah charged that the government of South Africa “established a policy of racial discrimination and prosecution which in its essential inhumanity surpasses even the brutality of the Nazis against the Jews.”

The peoples of disenfranchised communities and countries look for strong leaders with whose words unequivocally condemn partial treatment of others at the expense of any privileged other. The Gambian president, notwithstanding all of his highly publicized flaws, effectively filled the void for African leaders in this instance. The Senegalese president on the other hand, although equipped with plenty of fodder on the subject, opted for a more diplomatic, jargon-laced speech that mostly fell on deaf ears. His remarks were not wrong or insensitive in anyway, they were simply lacking conviction, specificity and direction. In charging against inequality and poverty, Abdoulaye Wade stated:

The current challenges, both complex and global in nature, call strongly for innovative and concerted solutions if we are to succeed. That is especially true for problems of agriculture and food security. If we are to achieve on schedule Millennium Development Goal 1, to halve by 2015 the number of people suffering from hunger, we must put into practice a different approach to international cooperation, one based on support for agriculture instead of food assistance, which should be used only as an emergency response to exceptional circumstances. (Abdoulaye Wade, 2009)

In implementing the “Wade formula”, I proposed a fund to fight poverty funded by voluntary contributions from African oil-producing States and oil companies working in Africa, based on the principle of shared social responsibility. The fund could be managed collectively or entrusted to the World Bank. Similarly, I welcome the extension of the Exogenous Shocks Facility to countries benefiting from the Policy Support Instrument. (Abdoulaye Wade, 2009)

He fiercest point of advocacy in his 2009 speech, barely raised the flare higher than the previous notes of MDG aspirations above, as he goes on to seemingly and halfheartedly chastise industrialized nations for landgrabs in Africa during the first decade of the new millennium, stating:

Once the right conditions are in place, there is no reason why Africa should not be able to ensure its own food security. Better yet, its enormous land and water resources predispose the continent to become the world’s breadbasket. To that end, however, we must avoid the vicious trap of ceding land to foreigners bearing millions of dollars. The G-8 quite rightly expressed its concern on this subject at its most recent summit in Italy. According to recent estimates, between 15 and 20 million hectares have changed hands over the past three years, primarily in Africa. We Africans should make it our vocation to become farmers tilling our own land rather than being agricultural laborers working for capital-rich foreign planters. (Abdoulaye Wade, 2009)

The Senegalese president in this respect failed to ever draw attention to the clear inequities within the global system and their effects on his people, he also failed to link the issues of poverty and inequality to racial injustices around the world and their perpetrators in the same way that the Gambian president did. Instead, he focused much of his speech on foreign assistance, aid, and interventionist tools. Although president Abdoulaye Wade made the point of addressing some areas of contention within the global system, one could argue that his delivery implicitly diffused any torrents of condemnation on the international community.

The bottom line is that between the years 2009 and 2016 the Senegalese delegation mentioned the words (race, black people, or slavery) a total of eight times (barely one word per

number of years present), while the Gambian delegation mentioned those terms 35 times over the course of the same amount of years—mostly as means to draw attention to inequality in global poverty levels and the international response to said poverty.

However, the diplomatic response to inequality can be applied differently given the differences in how states perceive inequality, race, and justice. For example, when we talk about inequality in the sense of race, ethnicity, and gender there is an inherent disconnect to inequality on the basis of national heritage or country affiliation. This is likely because most nations have a heterogeneous racial and ethnic populations. So, one may argue that the matter of race, gender or religion are viewed differently than the matter of economic development, economic regionalization, or economic dependency of LDC nations, and are therefore regarded and planned for differently. In this sense, leaders may choose not to address inequality on the terms of race, ethnicity, gender, or religion and instead focus their rhetoric and/or policy on issues more directly related to issues of poverty, economics, etc. This study thus looked at other content areas of the speeches to examine differences in delivery and substance on other African political thought dimensions; particularly the area of economic and political freedoms. In this regard The Gambia again proved to be the modern champion in pointing out systemic equities, corruption and manipulative structures within the global system, specifically with regards to race.

### **Inequality and the International Criminal Court (ICC)**

Another point of qualitative analysis was on the elements concerning the International Criminal Court. Given that the court did not exist when Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure headed their respective delegations, a proper comparative analysis could not be carried out.

However, Africanist thinking on the subject has solidified in recent years around the notion that the court should prosecute cases on a broader spectrum to include war crimes perpetrated by countries in non-conflict zones; and should make changes to its decision-making structure to be more inclusive of African members. According to Mangu (2015), all the cases brought before the ICC and all the arrest warrants that have been issued have targeted Africans, and that all the persons in custody or those who were summoned and/or voluntarily appeared were African citizens (Mangu, 2015). This has drawn particularly scrutiny on the ICC, thus the issue of the legitimacy and reform of the International Criminal Court has been a matter championed by modern day Africanists near and far. African leaders have since called for noncompliance to the Rome Statute on the basis of article 98 of the statute. Opting instead for a more African centric approach to international criminal courts, by pursuing the implementation of the AU Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. To get a sense of modern public policy trends on the subject the study examined excerpts for the speeches where individual delegations expressed concern, contempt, or compliance with the international criminal court. The study found that with the exception of 2010 both The Gambian and Senegalese delegations did not address the matter of the ICC in their respective speeches. However, in 2010 both made efforts to address the growing concern on the subject.

Meanwhile, the same grievances that have been levelled against the Security Council have also been raised with regard to international criminal justice. Twelve years ago, the common need for international criminal justice that was universal, permanent and neutral led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to complement national jurisdictions in punishing and preventing the most serious crimes. (Abdoulaye Wade, 2010)

Because Senegal has faith in the ideals of peace and justice for all, it reiterates its commitment to the Court. It was the first country to ratify its Statute, on 2 February 1999. Nevertheless, the Court will never be credible if the President of the Sudan is the only one to be pursued, with suspect eagerness. (Abdoulaye Wade, 2010)



While the setting up of the ICC represents a significant advance in the fight against impunity, it is in its practice that the Court itself will be judged. And for that practice to be free of suspicion and questioning, we must ensure that it reflects the principles agreed by the United Nations with regard to human rights: universality, objectivity, non-selectivity and impartiality. On the basis of those principles, the Court should deal with all situations within its jurisdiction in the same way, whoever the perpetrators and whatever their nationality. (Dr. Mamadou Tangara, Gambia 2010)

As mentioned previously, the Rome Statute has been subject to increased scrutiny as many perceive the international criminal court as an international tool to further subjugate African people, and not as the intended principal instrument for policing, punishing, and preventing gross violations of human rights globally on an impartial basis. This in turn has resulted in debates amongst African countries on the merits of the institution and whether or not the ICC espouses African modes of thought and its adaptation of African justice, human rights, and other reconciliation institutions in Africa. For instance, not all African countries signed the Rome Statute, and many that had signed it, have ranging reasons and perceptions for doing so and about the court itself. Many in the African political world have grown to view the court as an institute strictly concerning conflict-affected and post-conflict countries and not principally concerned on the issue of gross violations of human rights in of itself. The perception is that the ICC promotes a kind of “privilege justice” and a “subversion of impunity” leaving African countries subject to a new order of dominion. Questions of whether the ICC only indicts African leaders, or whether ICC indictments are based on partisan and geopolitical conditions rather than key principles of juris prudence and equality before the law.

The Gambia and Senegal have again proven that Africanist sentiments continue to remain relevant in African geopolitics in 21<sup>st</sup> century for selected issues. In fact, Senegal had a bigger rhetorical presence in this particular analysis, demonstrating its willingness to speak out against

institutionalized processes that denigrate African people when and where appropriate. The Gambian delegation, was on the other hand uncharacteristically weak in this area given the opportunity to lament at western nations.

### **Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements**

With regards to bilateral and multilateral agreements the study found key differences in the way that The Gambia and Senegal entered into these agreements. Most notably this study found that although these two countries were very similar in terms of geographic location and demographic composition, their bilateral engagement were significantly different from one another. In particular the study found that bilateral engagement and aid provision from the United States differed in great magnitude. However, the study also found that despite major differences in Senegal and The Gambia's multilateral engagement strategies, the multilateral agreements that they entered into were relatively the same.

In the case of Senegal, the U.S. entered into 33 separate bilateral agreements, 14 of which were agreements regarding consolidation of debts and another six in defense and air transportation agreements (see table 2). These particular agreements were unique in that they did not mirror U.S. agreements with The Gambia. All of the defense and air transportation agreements were signed during the period when Jammeh was the sitting head of state of the Gambia. However, the consolidation of debt agreements were signed with Senegal starting in 1982 covering every year through 2005. During Jammeh's reign as president of the Gambia, U.S foreign assistance stalled dramatically, and diplomatic relations faltered quite a bit. In contrast, the Senegalese relationship with the U.S blossomed in the same timeframe. For instance, of the

\$1.52 billion in foreign assistance obligated by the U.S. for Senegal and The Gambia between 2009 and 2016 \$1.507 billion went to Senegal, leaving a mere \$1.3 million for The Gambia. That is 99.3% to Senegal and a little over 0.7% to The Gambia.

## 2017 U.S BILATERAL AGREEMENTS IN FORCE

Table 2: 2017 U.S Bilateral Agreements in Force

Country	Bilateral Agreement - Subject Area	PURPOSE - TREATIES IN FORCE 2017	Date Signed	Date Entered In Force	Location
Senegal	Cultural Exchanges, Property, and Cooperation	Establishment of Peace Corps Program	1/10/1963	1/17/1963	Dakar
Gambia	Cultural Exchanges, Property, and Cooperation	Establishment of Peace Corps Program	12/5/1966	12/5/1966	Bathurst
Gambia	Defense	Mutual Security Act 1951 (US/UK)	1/8/1952	1/8/1952	London
Senegal	Defense	Agreement Related to Furnishing Military Equipment	7/20/1962	7/20/1962	Dakar
Senegal	Defense	International Military Education/Training (IMET)	2/25/1983	7/15/1983	Dakar
Gambia	Defense	International Military Education/Training (IMET)	12/27/1983	1/5/1984	Banjul
Senegal	Defense	African Crisis Response, provision of goods/training	7/24/1997	8/29/1997	Dakar
Senegal	Defense	Grants for Defense Articles	11/22/2000	2/2/2001	Dakar
Senegal	Defense	Mutual Logistics Support	5/8/2001	5/14/2001	Dakar
Gambia	Defense	Grants for Defense Articles	8/13/2003	8/18/2003	Banjul
Senegal	Defense	USG Access, Use of Facilities and Areas in Senegal	5/2/2016	8/12/2016	Dakar

Gambia	Diplomatic and Consular Relations	Consular Convention between UK and US	6/6/1951	9/7/1952	Washington
Senegal	Employment	Employment of Dependents of US Govt employees	4/28/1998	4/28/1998	Dakar
Gambia	Employment	Employment of Dependents of US Govt employees	6/7/2002	8/13/2002	Banjul
Senegal	Environment and Conservation	GLOBE program - Global Learning to benefit Environment	3/17/1995	3/17/1995	Dakar
Gambia	Environment and Conservation	GLOBE program - Global Learning to benefit Environment	7/12/1996	7/12/1996	Banjul
Senegal	Finance	Investment Guarantees	6/12/1963	6/12/1963	Dakar
Gambia	Finance	Investment Guarantees	7/24/1967	11/4/1967	Banjul
Senegal	Finance	Agreement Regarding Consolidation of Debts	8/26/1982	10/25/1982	Dakar
Senegal	Finance	Agreement Regarding Consolidation of Debts	8/11/1983	9/13/1983	Washington
Senegal	Finance	Agreement Regarding Consolidation of Debts	8/22/1984	9/24/1984	Dakar
Senegal	Finance	Agreement Regarding Consolidation of Debts	6/5/1985	7/15/1985	Dakar
Senegal	Finance	Agreement Regarding Consolidation of Debts	4/10/1987	5/18/1987	Washington
Senegal	Finance	Agreement Regarding Consolidation of Debts	6/10/1988	7/28/1988	Washington
Senegal	Finance	Agreement Regarding	7/14/1989	8/24/1989	Dakar

		Consolidation of Debts			
Senegal	Finance	Agreement Regarding Consolidation of Debts	7/13/1990	9/5/1990	Dakar
Senegal	Finance	Agreement Regarding Consolidation of Debts	11/26/1991	2/10/1992	Dakar
Senegal	Finance	Agreement Regarding Consolidation of Debts	7/28/1994	8/29/1994	Dakar
Senegal	Finance	Agreement Regarding Consolidation of Debts	8/28/1995	11/1/1995	Dakar
Senegal	Finance	Agreement Regarding Consolidation of Debts	12/17/1998	3/17/1999	Dakar
Senegal	Finance	Agreement Regarding Consolidation of Debts	7/17/2001	9/6/2001	Dakar
Senegal	Finance	Agreement Regarding Consolidation of Debts	11/19/2004	1/18/2005	Dakar
Gambia	Foreign Assistance	Economic Cooperation between UK and US	7/6/1948	7/6/1948	London
Senegal	Foreign Assistance	Agreement to provide Economic, Financial, Technical Assistance	5/13/1961	5/13/1961	Washington
Gambia	Intellectual Property	Reciprocal protection of trademarks US and UK	10/24/1877	10/24/1877	London
Gambia	International Criminal Court	Agreement to surrender persons to the ICC	10/5/2002	7/27/2003	Banjul

Senegal	International Criminal Court	Agreement to surrender persons to the ICC	6/19/2003	6/27/2003	Dakar
Gambia	Law Enforcement	Extraditions Treaty between US and UK	12/22/1931	6/24/1935	London
Senegal	Law Enforcement	Mutual Assistance btw their Customs Administrators	4/27/2005	4/27/2005	Dakar
Senegal	Maritime Matters	Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Maritime Activity	4/29/2011	4/29/2011	Dakar
Gambia	Maritime Matters	cooperation to suppress illicit maritime activity	10/10/2011	10/10/2011	Banjul
Senegal	Postal Matters	International Express Mail Agreement	6/5/1986	9/1/1986	Dakar
Gambia	Property	Supplemental Tenure/Disposition of Property	5/27/1936	3/10/1941	Washington
Gambia	Property	Tenure/Disposition of real property US and UK	3/2/1899	2/9/1901	Washington
Gambia	Telecommunication	Radion Communications	3/17/1981	4/16/1981	Banjul
Senegal	Trade and Investment	Reciprocal protection of Investments	12/6/1983	10/25/1990	Washington
Gambia	Transportation	Pilot Licenses for Civilian Aircraft US/UK	4/5/1935	5/5/1935	Washington
Gambia	Transportation	Agreement between US and UK for Air Services	2/11/1946	2/11/1946	Bermuda
Gambia	Transportation	Air Transport Agreement	5/2/2000	1/18/2001	Washington
Senegal	Transportation	Agreement on provision of Civil Aviation Infrastructure Assistance	7/28/2000	7/28/2000	
Senegal	Transportation	Air Transport Agreement	1/11/2001	8/11/2003	Washington
Gambia	Transportation	Agreement on provision of Civil Aviation	5/20/2004	5/30/2004	

		Infrastructure Assistance			
Senegal	Transportation	Air Transport Agreement	5/29/2015	8/5/2015	Belgrade

This foreign assistance included key infrastructure projects such as a \$540 million compact designed to boost economic growth in the agricultural sector; the rehabilitation of transnational roads; the development of new irrigation and water resource management infrastructure; a modern international airport construction project; and other key security sector/military programs.

In this regard, the study found that there were immense differences in how the U.S. government engaged with African nations, and also how the U.S directed foreign assistance dollars to the two countries studied during the specified time frame. The U.S engagement with The Gambia was severely overshadowed in volume and quality of services; in terms of dollars, activities and political support provided to their Senegalese counterparts.

The multilateral engagement with Senegal and The Gambia however proved to be much more even handed, in effect demonstrating and perhaps emphasizing the impartial nature of these global institutions i.e. (IMF, World Bank, WTO, and UN) *vis a vis* bilateral relationships with superpowers such as the U.S., China, EU, Britain or France (see table 3 and 4).

## GAMBIA – MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS

Table 3: Gambia Multilateral Intergovernmental Agreements

1	Fifth Protocol to GATS	1997	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
2	Fourth Protocol to GATS	1997	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
3	TRIPS	1994	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
4	TRIMS	1994	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
5	GATS	1994	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
6	Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment Credit	1992	Regional/Plurilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
7	MIGA Convention	1985	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
8	ICSID Convention	1965	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
9	UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations	1983	Multilateral	Draft instruments
10	UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights	2011	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
11	ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises	2006	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
12	Doha Declaration	2001	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
13	ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises	2000	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
14	Singapore Ministerial Declaration	1996	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
15	World Bank Investment Guidelines	1992	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
16	ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises	1977	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
17	New International Economic Order UN Resolution	1974	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
18	Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States	1974	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
19	Permanent Sovereignty UN Resolution	1962	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar



## SENEGAL -- MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS

Table 4: Senegal Multilateral Intergovernmental Agreements

No.	Short title	Date of adoption	Level	Type
1	Senegal Model BIT		National	Model agreements
2	Fifth Protocol to GATS	1997	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
3	Fourth Protocol to GATS	1997	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
4	TRIPS	1994	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
5	TRIMS	1994	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
6	GATS	1994	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
7	Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment Credit	1992	Regional	Intergovernmental agreements
8	MIGA Convention	1985	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
9	ICSID Convention	1965	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
10	New York Convention	1958	Multilateral	Intergovernmental agreements
11	UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations	1983	Multilateral	Draft instruments
12	UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights	2011	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
13	ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises	2006	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
14	Doha Declaration	2001	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
15	ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises	2000	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
16	Singapore Ministerial Declaration	1996	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
17	World Bank Investment Guidelines	1992	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
18	ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises	1977	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar

19	New International Economic Order UN Resolution	1974	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
20	Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States	1974	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar
21	Permanent Sovereignty UN Resolution	1962	Multilateral	Guidelines, principles, resolutions and similar

In this regard, The Gambia and Senegal entered into mostly the same multilateral agreements without much discrimination. These agreements spanned the geographic and political spectrum, ranging from regional multilateral agreements such as the ECOWAS Treaty and the Cotonou Agreement; to continental agreements such as the AU Treaty; to the larger international multilateral agreements such as TRIPS, TRIMS, and UN treaties. Despite critical rhetoric from some delegations on the UN floor, the study highlighted the immense similarities between Senegal and The Gambia when it came to these types multilateral of agreements. In fact, this analysis helped provide further insight into the question of whether or not current multilateral institutions and IFI policies had adverse economic effects on third world countries. Because the study found that IFI policies were applied uniformly; that both nations in this sampling signed and committed to the policy stipulations therein despite vocal condemnations of other activities; and that there were no additional stipulations applied selectively to nations that were more politically aligned, served as an indicator of impartiality within the system. This does not mean that multilateral organizations do not have a negative effect on African development, because in some instances they certainly may. Instead, it suggests that negative development outcomes are not the underlying goal. Thus, it is this researcher's estimation that on the basic level, IFI policy only partially and in a very limited way affects international trade, aid, and/or monetary policy outcomes. However, these institutions do hold sway on local economies, but only through a sliding scale. Instead it is through bilateral mechanisms, and subsequent bilateral agreements

that matters of trade-dependence, trade-advantage, protectionism, foreign-aid, and monetary adjustments hold major sway. This largely has to do with three critical factors that are uniquely and consistently affecting both bilateral and multilateral relationships; (1) forces of impartiality; (2) enforceability and leverage; and (3) volume and control. This is to say that multilateral entities such as the World Bank, the IMF, or the WTO, only set broad parameters around ideas of trade, or monetary policies. In the case of the World Bank, it only has finite resources that do not amount to a significant portion of aid dollars available through other bilateral sources. In the first instance, these issues affect the volume and control over the available transactions to monitor, and on the second, affect their respective abilities to enforce multilateral rules governing them. For instance, the study found that the WTO amongst other PIOs had the most robust and regulated policies governing its jurisdiction. However, despite its robust regulatory framework, it had very few tools for monitoring and enforcing violations or infractions. The IMF has even less tools at its disposal, and is essentially limited to enforcement through leveraging debt-relief and other monetary resources. The World Bank in turn only has the ability to issue loans and grants for development projects, and thus uses this as its leverage and enforcement mechanism. The question this researcher faced was essentially, to what extent did these institutions have control over resources? What was the volume and total market share? What means of enforcement were available? What were the forces of impartiality at play? In this regard, the study found that bilateral processes for trade and aid far exceeded the volume and control multilateral agencies had over said resources. The answer to these questions of course leads us to the third area of focus of this research—trade, aid, and monetary indicators. However, to address the simple question of volume of aid between bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, including WTO, IMF, World Bank, and UN, the study found that bilateral flows far outweighed

the multilateral flows<sup>9</sup>. For instance, of the \$4.36 billion Senegal received in Official Development Assistance (ODA) between the years 2009 and 2016, only \$42 million of it came from the UN, IMF, or the World Bank with the remainder coming from the more substantial bilateral relationships. In the case of The Gambia, although they relied more heavily on multilateral flows than Senegal, the total multilateral aid received totaled \$31.1 million-- a mere 13.6% of total development assistance received by The Gambia between the years 2009 and 2016. The study thus revealed that there is a higher yield from bilateral aid flows than that of multilateral agencies. Moreover, there are key differences in the strategies of engagement employed by Senegal and The Gambia respectively, which resulted in stark variances in outcomes in terms of raw ODA dollar figures for their respective economies. The Gambian administration on one hand pleaded to the multilateral organizations for aid and political backing, refusing to capitulate to bilateral or hegemonic pressure. Whilst the Senegalese government opted for a seemingly even hand, walking a tight line between conformity, rigidity, and transactional diplomacy. In terms of raw dollars, seemingly the Senegalese strategy was a much more rewarding process.

### **Human Development in Senegal and The Gambia**

Finally, in terms of development, the study was definitive in its conclusion that both countries developed significantly between the years 2009 and 2016. Below are the Human Development Index trend lines for both Senegal and The Gambia for 1990 through 2015 (see

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<sup>9</sup> OECD data based on WTO, World Bank group, UN, and IMF. This did not include all multilateral and regional organizations such as the AFDB, AU, EU, IDB, etc.

figure 7). Both trend lines indicate a steady upward trajectory in development over the span of two and half decades. However, Senegal had a steeper growth rate than The Gambia over the study period of 2009 through 2016. Their respective Human Development Indexes(HDI) growing from .33 for The Gambia and .35 for Senegal in 1990 to .452 for The Gambia and .494 for Senegal in 2015 (the latest recording).




Figure 8: Human Development Index Source: UNDP 2017

Senegal ranked 162nd out of 188 countries, while The Gambia ranked 173rd in the overall group. Both Senegal and The Gambia placed in the “low human development” category, which is the lowest grouping of four distinct development groups. Within mainland West Africa, Gabon ranked highest at 109 falling just shy (by two countries) of being in the “high human development” category; outranking countries like India, South Africa, Egypt, and Indonesia to mention a few. The West African rankings of ECOWAS countries went as follows: Gabon

(109), Cabo Verde (122) Ghana (139), Senegal (162), Togo (166), Benin (167), The Gambia (173), Mali (175), Liberia (177), Guinea-Bissau (178), Sierra Leone (179), Guinea-Conakry (183), Burkina Faso (185); Niger (187). This put Senegal in 4th place and The Gambia in 7th place amongst the 15-member regional grouping; leaving both countries within the top half in terms of human development conditions in their respective countries.

Senegal outranked The Gambia on its basic HDI score and in most regards outpaced The Gambia on the individual human development areas of focus i.e. (Health, Education, GDP, and Income Composition) but also on the specific bottom layer indicators as well. Below is a chart of high-level indicators to summarize the top-level areas addressed above. In this chart, outlined is the HDI score for each respective country, their world ranking, and scores in key demographic areas tied to the human development (i.e. health, education, human security, income, poverty, inequality and general freedoms).

Table 5: Human Development Indicators by Category

<b>DEVELOPMENT IINDCATOR CATEGORIES</b>	<b>THE GAMBIA</b>	<b>SENEGAL</b>
HDI	0.452	0.494
World Rank	173 <sup>rd</sup>	162 <sup>nd</sup>
(Health) Life Expectancy	60.5 years	66.9 years
(Education) Expected Years of Schooling	8.9 years	9.5 years
GNI per Capita	\$1,541	\$2,250
Inequality Adjusted HDI	N/A	0.331
Gender Development Index	0.878	0.886
Multidimensional Poverty Index	0.289	0.278
Employment to Population Ratio	54%	51.70%
Homicide Rate (per 100,000)	9.4	7.9
% of GDP -Export and Imports	70.10%	73.60%
% of Population that are Internet Users	17.10%	21.70%
Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Capita	0.3	0.6
Population	2.0 million	15.1 million

Source: UNDP 2017

Based on the recorded data from the Human Development Index, this research was able to find that The Gambia and Senegal had a statistically significant difference in life expectancy, homicide rates, and GNI per capita income levels in favor of Senegal. The only advantage The Gambia displayed over Senegal was in the category of employment related vulnerabilities, where the Gambia had statistically significant positive difference to Senegal.

Another area of particular focus was on economic, trade, and financial flow data. In this regard, the study analyzed the sum of exports and imports of goods and services, expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) between Senegal and The Gambia. This analysis uses import/export percentage as a basic indicator of openness to foreign trade and economic integration-- essentially indicating the dependence of domestic producers on foreign demand (exports) and of domestic consumers and producers on foreign supply (imports), relative to the country economic size (GDP). In the case of The Gambia, the study found that 70.1% of its GDP was dependent on exports and 73.6% of the Senegalese GDP was depend on export trade relations. Whether one places importance on market openness and trade, or on domestic production and national market independence, one can begin to determine which country has the advantage. From a globalist viewpoint, one would give Senegal the advantage in this measure. However, from the Africanist point of view, The Gambia fared slightly better than Senegal in terms of its market and production independence. In any event, the two scores were comparatively similar once examined against other nations.

In relation to this, the study examined the external debt stock as a percentage of GNI between The Gambia and Senegal. This is the debt owed to nonresidents that are repayable in foreign currency, goods or services, expressed as a percentage of GNI. The study found that The Gambia had a far higher external debt rate at 63.9% than that of Senegal, whose external debt

rate of GNI was 36.9% comparatively. In the Gambian case, this amounts to nearly two thirds of gross national income that is owed to external non-Gambian creditors. Although the Senegalese figures are still high at about one-third its GNI, a rate of two thirds for such a small nation as the Gambia is all but crippling. Senegal outperformed The Gambia significantly in this data category.




Figure 9: HDI Trade and Financial Flows Indicators

The study also examined the export concentration index as a key data indicator. The export concentration index (also commonly referred to as Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index) measures the degree of product concentration in exports from a country. . In this measure, a value closer to 0 indicates that a country's exports are more homogeneously distributed amongst a series of products (reflecting a well-diversified economy); a value closer to 1 indicates that a



country's exports are concentrated highly among a few products. Under these metrics, Senegal fared better than the Gambia registering a value of .22 to The Gambia's .34. The table below displays these trade and financial flow indicators for The Gambia and Senegal side by side.

Table 6: Trade and Financial Flows Data

<b>TRADE AND FINANCIAL FLOWS</b>	<b>THE GAMBIA</b>	<b>SENEGAL</b>
Exports and imports (% of GDP)	70.10%	73.60%
Concentration index (exports)	0.34	0.22
External debt stock (% of GNI)	63.90%	36.60%
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	3.30%	2.50%
Net official development assistance received (% of GNI)	12.10%	7.20%
Private capital flows (% of GDP)	n.a.	-8.5
Remittances, inflows (% of GDP)	21.23%	11.71%

Source: UNDP

When it came to external debt stock-- that is the portion of a country's debt that was borrowed from foreign lenders including commercial banks, governments or international financial institutions-- Senegal again fared significantly better than The Gambia. The Gambia had external stock totaling up to 63.9% of GNI, while Senegal had an external stock percentage of 36.6% nearly half that of The Gambia. In both instances, the rate is high, however, in the case the Gambia the external debt stock percentage is staggering particularly when one considers that these loans, including their interest, are usually required to be paid in the currency in which the loan was made (i.e. Dollars, Euros, Yen, Riyals, etc.).

From the monetary perspective, the study examined remittances and foreign direct investment net inflows data to conclude the study of development, trade, and financial flow indicators. With regards to the foreign direct investment indicator-- that is the sum of equity

capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital and short-term capital, expressed as a percentage of GDP— the study found that The Gambia recorded a total of 3.3% of GDP, as net inflows of foreign direct investment, meanwhile Senegal recorded 2.5%. There was only a negligible difference between the two countries under this indicator. On the other hand, when it came to the examination of remittances. to the Gambia and Senegal, i.e. the inflows of earnings and material resources transferred by international migrants or refugees to recipients in their country of origin or countries in which the migrant formerly resided, the study found that The Gambia's economy relied heavily on these transfers making up some 21.2% of the economy as a whole. This was nearly twice the amount that of Senegal, whose remittance percentage of GDP was at 11.7%. Further, the study examined the net official development assistance received as a percentage of GNI. This is the total amount in disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories on the Development Assistance Committee list of aid recipients, expressed as a percentage of the recipient country GNI. The Gambia's economy was more dependent on development assistance (at 12.1% of GDP) for OECD countries than the Senegalese economy (at 7.2% of GDP).

Overall in terms of Human Development Index, Senegal has proven to have a slight advantage over The Gambia.

## Trade, Aid, and Monetary Policy Indicators


Lastly, the study also examined key trade, aid, and monetary indicators outside of the Human Development Index in order to display the relativity of multilateral and bilateral transactions at more precise levels relative to key multilateral policy prescriptions outlined in earlier chapters. As mentioned in previous sections, this researcher found that multilateral mechanisms, when compared to bilateral ones, had several key limiting factors related to their enforcement and applicability to individual or selected LDCs. In this regard, multilateral agencies were simply not ideal tools for underdevelopment objectives, as noted before (this does not relieve multilateral organizations wholesale, see chapter 10). Trade was no exception when it came to this conclusion. This is because when it comes to international trade, although the WTO is the chief multilateral agency charged with regulating the field, the WTO simply does not have the necessary punitive tools to truly be effective. To this point, all of its disputes are reported and adjudicated on a volunteer basis which weakens any sense of true regulation. Moreover, no country trades directly to or with the WTO, instead countries have state and regional trade partners with whom they trade. It is because of these individualized trade pacts globally that the WTO is effectively undermined in terms of its ability to regulate trade in any real sense. For instance, bilateral agreements commonly known as Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and other bilateral deals affect how trade actions are perceived and regulated around the world. This in turn severely distorts market trends and trade data. In the case of FTAs in particular, a common critique is that they simply undermine attempts to universally reduce trade barriers around the world (McMahon, 2006). This is evident as bilateral trade agreements naturally supersede multilateral ones. Free Trade Agreements, many of which are bilateral arrangements in which countries give each other preferential trade treatment (i.e. eliminating

tariffs and other barriers on goods), simply circumvent the multilateral process. Each country is thus free to continue its trade policies subjectively, such that tariffs with countries outside the FTA are under one set of rules, while those under the FTA operate under different conditions (McMahon, 2006).

In the case of The Gambia and Senegal, understanding their respective trade profile and key trade partners, tariff schedules, and FTAs are key to determining who can apply pressure to their respective trade industries and domestic economies (See Appendix H & I). Simply put, it is not the WTO. The Human Development Index discussed in the previous section gave key insights to the market share and areas of particularly vulnerability. However, to the larger questions of underdevelopment and external transactions to that end, the study examined adverse actions taken by both the WTO and the United States over the period of 2009 through 2016. During this timeframe, there were zero actions/disputes taken up against The Gambia. In fact, for The Gambia's entire WTO membership there haven't been any disputes or punitive actions taken. However, in the case of the United States bilateral actions, in 2015 the U.S. government effectively suspended the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) eligibility for The Gambia due to violations of human rights and the deterioration of rule of law. The U.S. later removed the eligibility restriction in 2017 once Yahya Jammeh was ousted. Other countries on the suspended list included Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Sudan—all with leaders that would likely score in the higher rankings on the African Political Thought Word Indicator scale. Again, a continent-wide study would be beneficial to produce conclusions that are more generalizable.

With regards to trade volume, Senegal simply trades with the external world in a far more significant manner than The Gambia. Although this study did not explore the causality of trade volume, it did make a few anecdotal observations in this regard. The key observations were that

Senegal's trade in key sectors of modern development grew in stark difference to that of The Gambia. Moreover, this particular trend was amplified during Yahya Jammeh's tenure as president. For instance, Senegal grew exponential faster than that The Gambia and matched the general global trajectory (See Figure, 10) in the realm of commercial service exports, while The Gambia saw a very flat trend line with only incremental gains over 20 years<sup>10</sup>.



Series : Commercial service exports (current US\$)  
 Source: World Development Indicators  
 Created on: 03/09/2018

Figure 10: Commercial Service Exports

<sup>10</sup> Commercial service exports are total service exports minus exports of government services not included elsewhere. International transactions in services are defined by the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual (1993) as the economic output of intangible commodities that may be produced, transferred, and consumed at the same time. Definitions may vary among reporting economies.

In the matter of trade in computer, communications and other services<sup>11</sup>, The Gambia and Senegal actually grew in opposing directions, whereas, the sector grew significantly in Senegal, and recessed considerably in The Gambia (See Figure, 10).




Figure 11; Computer, Communications, and other Services (% of Commercial Exports)

Again, regarding the notion of multilateralism versus bilateralism, I discussed the matter of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) extensively in chapter three of this study. These were two policy measures adopted by the WTO as a part of the Uruguay round of negotiations. After reviewing the data, these

<sup>11</sup> Computer, communications and other services (% of commercial service exports) include such activities as international telecommunications, and postal and courier services; computer data; news-related service transactions between residents and nonresidents; construction services; royalties and license fees; miscellaneous business, professional, and technical services; and personal, cultural, and recreational services.

measures again proved to have minimal impact on the respective economies of both Senegal and The Gambia. I will caution that this does not mean the TRIPS and TRIMS do not have inherent structural components that favor industrialized countries over LDCs, instead, the data for current trends showed that there had been only minimal impact in this sector to date. For example, the highest volume of payments for intellectual property rights for both Senegal and The Gambia only exceeded \$10 million in 2008 (See Figure 12). All of which, was earned by the Senegalese. That is less than 0.1% of their combined GDP in real terms. So again, these multilateral stipulations barely register on the meter for a systemic pressure campaign to under-develop African LDCs. For the case of TRIMS, there was not a single indicator that could measure this. The most reliable indicator was the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) net inflows indicator. Although it does not specifically depict how TRIMS are applied and what effects they have on the economy, it does give us a sense of how much of the local economy is affected by the TRIMS generally. In the case of The Gambia, FDI net inflows has stagnated and in fact recessed downward to under \$1 million in FDI in 2016 since the Uruguay round. Again, there is no clear causal connection to analyze, however, we can understand that there is a decreasing portion of the economy that has been subjected to TRIMS. On the Senegalese side, the FDI inflow grew from relatively low figures, numbers similar to The Gambia in early 1990s, to upwards of \$400 million in 2016. Again, the impacts of TRIMS on FDI in Senegal is not clear, however, what is clear is that despite its presence, FDI has spiked in Senegal over the past 20 years (See Figure 13). The question and any answers found essentially come down to one's preconceived opinion on the matter whether FDI is good or bad for the economy and the effectiveness of TRIMS as deterrent for development. Ultimately, the results are inconclusive in that there is no measure to show the impact of TRIMS on Senegalese or The Gambia's economy.




Figure 12: Charges for Use of Intellectual Property, Payments (BoP)




Figure 13: Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows

From the monetary perspective, the study evaluated the change in both the monetary base or broad money reserves of The Gambia and Senegal over time. The monetary base is the total amount of a currency that is either circulated in the hands of the public or in the commercial




bank deposits held in the central bank's reserves. This measure of the money supply typically only includes the most liquid currencies; it is also known as the "money base." On the other hand, broad money is the most inclusive method of calculating a given country's money supply. Broad money is the sum of currency outside banks; demand deposits other than those of the central government; the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government; bank and traveler's checks; and other securities such as certificates of deposit and commercial paper. The money supply is the totality of assets that households and businesses can use to make payments or to hold as short-term investments, such as currency, funds in bank accounts and anything of value resembling money. The study found that trend lines for both The Gambia and Senegal generally mirrored one another with The Gambia demonstrating higher broad money levels as a percentage of GDP than Senegal. For the most part, both broad money levels as well as broad money growth stayed stable between the two countries when measured as a percentage of GDP. However, the key difference observed in this metric was that the raw broad money level rose at striking rates in Senegal for the past decade, compared to The Gambia. At its highest point, the growth exceeded The Gambia by some 1,000% (See Figure 16).



Series : Broad money (% of GDP)  
 Source: World Development Indicators  
 Created on: 03/09/2018

Figure 14: Broad Money (% of GDP)



Series : Broad money growth (annual %)  
 Source: World Development Indicators  
 Created on: 03/09/2018

Figure 15: Broad Money Growth (Annual %)




Figure 16: Broad Money (Current Local Currency Unit)

However, the measure that determines the price of money is the most critical analysis examined on monetary factors as it relates to dependency. The study thus evaluated the official exchange rate of The Gambia and Senegal over time. The official exchange rate is a measure that refers to the exchange rate determined by national authorities or to the rate determined in the legally sanctioned exchange market. It is calculated as an annual average based on monthly averages (local currency units relative to the U.S. dollar). If examining this through a dependency lens, this indicator is perhaps most vulnerable to IMF and other multilateral disruptions or manipulations. The study found that again, Senegal fared out much better over the last few decades than The Gambia in the matter of foreign currency exchange rates. For instance, between 2000 and 2016 the Senegalese CFA exchange to the dollar stayed relatively

stable registering 472 XOF to the dollar in 2009 and 593 XOF to the dollar in 2016, compared the 26.6 The Gambian Dalasi to the dollar in 2000 and 43.9 to the dollar in 2016.

Another critical area that the IMF controls is the ability to provide debt relief, funding reserves and forbearances to individual countries in particular circumstances. For example, the IMF will occasionally provide debt relief to selected Least Developed Countries (LDCs) that meet certain governance standards and benchmarks. Accordingly, if a country runs into liquidity issues with regards to balance of payments, the IMF will provide temporary loans to cover those costs, essentially lending a security to the lender for cash with an agreement to buy it back in the future at a pre-determined price. These are often referred to as repurchase agreements, or a “repo.” The study examined both debt relief provided by the IMF and the issuance of such repurchase agreements.





Figure 17: Debt Forgiveness Grants



Series : IMF repurchases and charges (TDS, current US\$)  
 Source: World Development Indicators  
 Created on: 03/09/2018

Figure 18: IMF Repurchases and Charges

With regards to foreign assistance, Senegal fared far better than The Gambia over the past decade-- tallying figures above \$1 billion dollars annually while The Gambia barely registered 10% of that figure in total official development assistance received (See Figure 19). Again, this is mostly attributed to bilateral aid mechanisms that favored Senegal over The Gambia (See Figure 20). The bilateral aid far exceeds the multilateral ODA, thus further emphasizing the critical role of bilateral relationships in the broader geopolitical space.




Figure 19: Net Official Development Assistance




Figure 20: Net Bilateral Aid Flows from DAC Donor/U.S.

## Overall Data Assessment

The overall qualitative assessment was one that ultimately favored The Gambian delegation speeches as being more closely linked to speeches given by Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure than that of the Senegalese delegations. These conclusions were drawn on the basis of the sheer volume of targeted speech content concerning African Political Thought Dimensions as outlined in this research; the repetition of key concepts and Africanist policy positions within the selected speeches; the consistent delivery of Africanist policy positions year over year; and the tonal prescriptions and descriptive application of applied conviction within the delivery. The Senegalese delegation was certainly not far behind in their general coverage of topical Africanist issues, continually offering modalities of change and encouraging the adoption of reforms within the global mechanics of trade, aid, and international policy. The Abdoulaye Wade administration was particularly vocal regarding critical African Political Thought Dimensional concerns with the global structure. Macky Sall, (to a lesser degree) had similar convictions and presented his case openly to the UNGA congregation. However, whether it be stylistic differences or concerns regarding content, Macky Sall was ultimately far less descriptive and emphatic than his Senegalese and Gambia counterparts on Africanist terms. In most respects African Political Thought Components as espoused by Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure are very much prevalent in the minds, and words of current African leaders, particularly The Gambia and Senegal.

Overall the APTWI data also supported the hypothesis that The Gambia's political rhetoric more closely resembled those of pre-independent thought leaders like Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure, compared to the Senegalese political rhetoric. This held true for all political

thought dimensions as well as for each of the individual indicators. Moreover, the data provided further insight into the lexical and ideological relativities between speeches delivered in the independence era versus those delivered in the 21st century. The analysis of Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe and selected speeches given by Moummar Gaddafi and Nelson Mandela also gave further anecdotal information on the presence and prevalence of APTWIs in speeches given to the United Nations General Assembly.

The data demonstrated that leadership matters profusely in the international context, but more specifically that ideology in this arena matters and the veracity of the delivery in particular is critical to international policy setting. This study suggests that African political thought as espoused by African pre-independence leaders such as Nkrumah and Toure has evolved to have crucial effects on international policy and foreign aid determinants in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century. In this small comparative sampling, the study revealed that the countries that used the most African Political Thought Word-Indicators (APTWIs) in speeches to the United Nations General Assembly had generally poorer relationships with multilateral bodies and bilateral relations with the United States in particular. In this study we also found several key differences in perception between The Gambia and Senegal both in the rhetoric used on the international stage, and in the respective responses from donors and multilateral institutions. In particular, I found that the language used at the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) condemning acts of injustice, bias, and unequal treatment of Africans by Western/international policies and their implementing institutions differed significantly in both content and tone between The Gambia and Senegal respectively. The study found key differences in the quantity and veracity of pre-identified African Political Thought Word-Indicators in speeches given by The Gambian delegation compared to those made by their Senegalese counterparts. In UNGA speeches



spanning the years 2009 through 2016, this study found that The Gambian delegation delivered remarks that largely resembled those given by their African independence predecessors like Toure, Nkrumah, and the like. These speeches largely took aim at global hegemonic inequalities of the modern era; addressing issues of race, slavery, and sovereignty; and matters concerning African unity, solidarity, and political freedom; as well as other challenges in international affairs with regards to war, peace, justice, and the global economy. The Senegalese remarks on the other hand focused much less on the prevailing conditions of global inequality or pan-African equities and instead tailored its multilateral remarks presumably to its own critical bilateral relationships. In other words, the Senegalese delegation steered further away from pan-Africanist ideology touted in the 20<sup>th</sup> century by Africa's pioneering political class than the Gambia delegation did. In other instances, however, the Senegalese found more practical and inclusive solutions to problems, and generally used more diplomatic language and struck a softer tone on contentious topics.

Further, the study examined multilateral International Financial Institution (IFI) agreements and U.S bilateral relations with The Gambia and Senegal for the period between 2009 and 2016 and found that despite the difference in rhetoric at UNGA, by-and-large Senegal and The Gambia had a similar number and similar types of engagements with the multilateral agencies. However, the study revealed that The Gambia and Senegal vastly differed in the quantity and types of bilateral agreements for the time period in question. Broadly speaking The Gambia entered into 19 multilateral agreements, nine multilateral treaties with investment provisions, and 16 bilateral treaties; while Senegal entered into 21 multilateral agreements, 11 multilateral treaties with investment provisions, and almost double The Gambian bilateral treaties with a total of 28 bilateral treaties. Senegal also entered into 33 bilateral agreements

with the U.S in comparison to the 20 it entered into with The Gambia. More importantly, the types of agreements, i.e. investment, trade, and aid components) differed significantly between the two countries.

Finally, the study examined trade, aid, monetary indicators and the Human Development Index (HDI) more generally over the span of seven years in effort to equate a correlative value to the development dynamics of both Senegal and The Gambia. This included specific metrics on trade, aid, and monetary differences between the two nations.

In general terms, the study observed that both countries experienced a positive trend line towards development in those years. However, Senegal experienced a much steeper incline in most key trade, aid, monetary and human development metrics than The Gambia. The analysis both on the APTWI scale as well as from a development indicators perspective showed a pattern consistent with Senegal demonstrating low African political thought affiliation (across all spectrums), while also showing strong indicators of trade, aid, monetary, and human development. The Gambia on the other hand had strong African political thought affiliations to Nkrumah and Toure, but also consistently had lower development metrics across a majority of trade, aid, monetary sectors. Thus, demonstrating a correlative relationship between APTWI and development in this simple comparative analysis between Senegal and The Gambia.

## Other Findings

1. The Gambia's lowest overall APTWI scores came in 2011 and 2012, respectively; both were delivered by the sitting Vice President Aja Isatou Njie-Saidy and not the controversial head of state Yahya Jammeh.
2. Senegal's highest score came in 2009 in a speech delivered by President Abdoulaye Wade. Wade, an elder statesman who sat as president of Senegal for 12 years (from 2000 through 2012), was a long-time opposition leader known for strong Africanist principles.
3. The study found that President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, although the oldest of the speech givers, was the only sitting president to deliver every UNGA speech for his country.
4. The study found that the length of the speeches had an impact on the number of APTWIs recorded. The speeches given in the 1960s were comparatively much longer than those recorded in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. However, in keeping with the trend outlined, Yahya Jammeh and other Gambian speech givers outpaced their Senegalese counterparts by significant proportions.
5. Although known for his inflammatory and dogmatic nature, Robert Mugabe's speeches were surprisingly mild in temperament and mostly ranged in the mid-low range of APTWI usage. In fact, Zimbabwe did not have any scores that ranged high on the APTWI scale.
6. The general trendline of the data followed the following sequence from high to low: Guinea (Sekou Toure), Ghana (Kwame Nkrumah), Libya (Moummar Ghaddafi), The

Gambia (Yahya Jammeh), Zimbabwe (Robert Mugabe), Senegal (Abdoulaye Wade), Senegal (Macky Sall).

7. In January 2015, The U.S suspended The Gambia's eligibility for preferential trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
8. The Gambia and Senegal entered into several agreements with the U.S. that were similar in nature and in timing. For example, the establishment of the Peace Corps; and the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET).

### **Data Validity**

1. Some speech deliverers used substitutive terms such as “continent” in lieu of the term “Africa.” For the purpose of this study, those instances were not recorded as an African Political Thought Word-Indicator. Note, all speakers made this substitution upon occasion. In this regard, Robert Mugabe was the individual leader that used the term “continent” in substitution for “Africa” most frequently, thus it is my belief that the recording of the term would have likely skewed the results in favor of the recorded trend.
2. In the case of Sekou Toure, he recorded the highest use of the term “colonial,” this refers to all terms consisting of the prefix colonial. However, he also recorded the lowest score for referencing the “West.” After further analysis of the data, it was noted that Sekou Toure was unique in his use of the terms “colonial powers” and “colonist” in referencing sitting governments. Others, including Kwame Nkrumah, predominantly used the term to reference historical events.

3. With regards to term selection, the terms “colonial,” “Pan-African,” “imperialism” and “the West” are all somewhat dated terms and all carry some level of negative stigma. In some instances, the terms can be perceived as antagonistic and in bad taste. Thus, there is a possibility that leaders have moved away from these terms due to their links to historical references, but not in its principal meaning. However, the result did not suggest any major substitution of terms. The experiment accounted for words, phrases, synonyms and analogism that conveyed similar meaning. The negative stigma may have certainly prevented individuals overtly revealing plans or interests with respect to Pan-African policies.
4. Countries may be responding to pivotal and topical current events which may steer their speeches in directions that are not necessarily aligned with the African Political Thought dimensions being analyzed by this study.
5. Countries receiving massive aid packages from Western governments may have had reservations about directly mentioning these countries or allies on the international stage.
6. Countries who in turn are poor as a result of their own inaction, incompetence or mismanagement may be inclined to place blame on external sources.
7. Some leaders spoke longer than others, have different speech and linguistic patterns that could result the repetition of certain words or sentences. For instance, individuals may use a vocabulary that is more nuanced and less direct than what another leader may use.
8. Some countries may have progressed beyond certain developmental stages, thus shifting their geopolitical, regional and economic interests away from a certain type of rhetoric.

9. Although Senegal and The Gambia are located in a geographically similar area and both have similar demographic composition, the Senegalese population and landmass are both significantly bigger than those of The Gambia.
10. Although some of these leaders may exhibit positive correlative traits to that of pre-independence African thought leaders, it doesn't necessarily equate to the ability to govern or equal prestige within the African populace. That is because this study doesn't measure other critical components that necessitate the good governance of a nation state, i.e. rule of law, economic transparency, etc. It is merely testing for African political thought dimensions within their UN general assembly speeches.
11. In the modern era as Africa has evolved away from colonial subjection to economic and political liberation for all African nations, there may be less of a sense of a common African predisposition or solidarity, particular in a relational context between African countries and the West (or the rest of the world). Thus, African leaders may have steadily shied away from using the term "African" as to not collectively lump all Africans into one category, or claim ownership, or determine one position for an entire continent.
12. With regards to economic exploitation, individual states may find more lucrative deals for their countries by negotiating international monetary, trade, and aid deals bilaterally instead of in a collective manner. For instance, from a purely economic standpoint, the Djiboutian government would likely much rather secure funds for its citizenry than have those funds directed to some artificial African capital or negated altogether by relinquishing the decision making to a centralized body. Particularly when the lease for Camp Lemonier in Djibouti is leased today at \$63 million annually. From a singular state

policy perspective, the lease not only secures hard currency for the economy, but it also provides military security as a byproduct.

13. Further to that point, the balkanization of African states starting from the 1884 Berlin conference and the reinforcement of those borders by both internal and external factors well into the modern era may have contributed to the continued resistance against a systematic and organized social, political, and economic coordination of regional and continental resources from broader gain.

14. The speeches delivered by the Gambian delegation were delivered remarks on behalf of The Gambian president himself. These speeches often began with the reader, either vice president or minister of foreign affairs, stating, “I have the singular honor of reading the statement of His Excellency Dr. Al Hadji Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh, the President of the Republic of the Gambia.”

## CHAPTER 9:

### CONCLUSION

Pan-Africanists often blame the seemingly perpetual condition of economic and political instability in Africa on any of a host of external factors, whether it is based on the largest forced mass-migration occurrence in world history (i.e., the transatlantic slave trade); or the calculated subjugation of the African continent by way of colonialism; or by other evolving means of subversion, occupation and control in the modern era. Conversely, other scholars have placed blame on Africans themselves, citing endemic corruption, systemic financial mismanagement, poor leadership, and/or chronic prevalence of tribal conflict within the continent. Unfortunately, even though the reasons are plentiful, there has never been an easy answer to this question regarding the continued state of African underdevelopment. The answers to these questions are long lasting, far-reaching and inherently elusive; and certainly, something warranting sustained analysis. The question of culpability is certainly no exception, yet it is this question that is at the heart of this research; whether external forces are the key drivers of underdevelopment, or whether in fact it is African leadership and ideology that ultimately make the difference in African development outcomes. It is without a doubt that both these factors play critical roles in African economic development, and that they are inextricably connected to one another, particularly in the modern globalized economy. Thus, the attempt to extrapolate and delineate internal and external factors for localized market development in a globalized economy is a delicate process. In this study, the key mechanisms used to do this were to carefully craft definitions of key areas of observation, and also to make the distinct study assumptions and limitations clear. In this sense, to understand this study is to understand what it observes, and



what it does not. The idea of leadership in African public policy as it relates to this study, is one that poses leadership not as a management construct (albeit this is critical to governance) but, instead, leadership as a philosophical and ideological one. So, the idea of leadership as framed in this study is quite illusive inherently. However, leadership in the most fundamental sense is the ultimate determining mechanism discerning that which is permissible or punishable in a society. Therefore, when people discuss endemic corruption, financial mismanagement, and/or poor governance in Africa, they are essentially taking aim at African leadership in a wholesale fashion. This is because corruption, mismanagement, and bad governance are all symptoms of poor structures within the top-level order determining forces in a system. Measuring those determining forces is thus critical to the examination of leadership. Leadership though, in the matter of management in the business sense, is not what is examined in this study. Instead, it is leadership on the basis of ideology that is examine in this study.

The idea of leadership in the nation building context, versus leadership in the program management realm can be quite different in terms of measurement and output, rendering any assessment of leadership from a development perspective difficult. For instance, corruption or financial mismanagement themselves are not necessarily factors that will inherently affect a country's development on their own. There are many societies past and present that are highly corrupt and fraught with mismanagement but have managed to develop sufficiently. Conversely on a program by program basis, corruption or financial mismanagement will have more immediate, overt and detrimental effects on those programs, as opposed to on the national level. Thus, when I refer to African leadership, it is referring to the type of leadership that protects against this realm of corruption and disruption at the highest nation building levels and not at the

program/project management level; that is, leadership that has nationalistic and Africanist determinants at its core. This is what I have determined to be the ideological leadership realm.

The question then becomes—whether Africanist ideology based leadership has positive or negative effects on multilateral or bilateral policy adaptation, and more importantly does it have any effect on human development at the grassroots level. The study aimed to tackle these fundamental questions and was quite conclusive in demonstrating that ideological leadership had a major impact on governance when analyzed on those terms. The study also showed that on a comparative basis between The Gambia and Senegal, the country that had more ideologically-Africanist themes in its leadership’s rhetoric was significantly less likely to engage in advantageous and lucrative bilateral trade, aid, and monetary transactions, particularly when dealing with the United States. In this regard, the ideologically-Africanist nation was also less likely to develop as quickly as those with more neutral ideological leadership trends. This was in fact contrary to my original hypothesis and was quite a significant finding, given that the current Africanist mode of thinking is one that promotes the need for African governments to take more stringent, restrictive, and protective positions against the West. This finding puts those general notions into question and presents opportunities for hardliners to examine more diplomatic approaches to Western engagement. However, I should note that the finding does not imply that protectionism in and of itself is not an effective measure. Instead it presents evidence suggesting that within the current geopolitical environment where non-African nations can pick and choose with whom they engage, the ideologically neutral nations seem to benefit far more than those that are hardline Africanists. This was the trend observed between Yahya Jammeh’s Gambia, an Africanist hardliner, versus Macky Sall’s Senegal, a more ideologically neutral country. Certainly, a study examining all 54 African countries over a longer time span would be a

worthwhile undertaking, in order to draw more concrete conclusions about the role of Africanist ideology in Pan-African leadership and Pan-African development. This study opens up the space for such a comprehensive undertaking.

Beyond the areas of leadership, this study also helped draw attention to the critical roles that both multilateral and bilateral relationships play in the development arena. One particularly interesting revelation of the study was that multilateral relationships, although very important in setting international harmony, generally had very little effect on local development more broadly; and had an even smaller effect on trade and aid flows. This phenomenon is sometimes lost behind rhetoric, however when examined closely the logic proves to be quite intuitive. International multilateral bodies by their very mandate set out to be neutral, inclusive, and mechanisms for peace and impartiality, thus the multilateral agencies would rightfully work very hard to avoid having any implementing processes that can be viewed as overtly contrary to this basic mission. This intuitive and deductive reasoning held true in this case. Multilateral organizations therefore are much more inclined to act neutrally and develop programs and policies that are not very consequential at tipping the scale in one direction or the other. With this calculus in mind, it is perhaps then safe to say that much of the attention on Bretton Woods institutions is misplaced. These institutions (IMF, World Bank, or WTO) are mostly benign on the grand scale and are certainly dull tools for any targeted clandestine African underdevelopment motive. Thus, it is my contention that dependency theory from a Bretton Woods multilateral organization perspective doesn't hold much water. These organizations simply do not have precise enough tools to selectively discriminate in this fashion. .On the other hand, the bilateral tools available to any strong hegemonic entity are much more precise, calculated, and devastating than anything the respective multilateral entities can enact on their

own. The country participants can enact enough leverage to prevent illogical and arbitrary decision making in this regard. However, this does not mean that there aren't inherent inequities in the Bretton Woods make-up, because there are many obvious examples, for instance the voting structures of both IMF and World Bank are not democratic, and the leadership selection has not been equitably rotated amongst member countries since its inception. On the other hand, the funding equities are not democratic either, as OECD nations carry the heaviest financial burden in this regard. The reader should not assume that the multilateral agencies lack power, because they certainly do have mechanisms to exercise immense power in certain cases that are very clear and have broad international buy-in. Therefore, the power, although immense, is not very agile, precise or discrete, and thus does not make for a good tool for Western elites to enact arbitrary transgressions on African countries, regardless of what the dependency rhetoric is.

Bilateral tools conversely, are much more effective as a means to target adversarial third world countries than the multilateral platform can ever be. Again, this is due to three critical factors: 1) unilateral applicability, 2) inherent discretion, and 3) flexibility in deployment. The study demonstrated that in the case of Senegal and The Gambia, the United States employed trade, aid, and investment deals in very different ways, resulting in different outcomes over time. The three factors highlighted about are what allowed this observed trend to be possible. First, the fact that there is complete discretion, and at the same time complete lack of scrutiny on how countries engage on bilateral terms creates an environment where unilateral sanctions and unilateral rewards can be very effective at expanding and contracting local economies. Bilateral actions are an effective tool for industrialized nations to buy loyalty, leverage, and/or raw commodities. China has most recently entered this arena, and the influx of bilateral foreign assistance and foreign investment has soared in recent years, resulting in infrastructure and

private sector development on the African side of the equation, and increased access to minerals and strategic geopolitical position on the Chinese side. Many have criticized the Chinese involvement in Africa for these exact reasons, but from the Chinese perspective the bilateral arrangement is quite advantageous.

However, the effectiveness of bilateral actions is not universal, there are areas of weakness that control how and where it is applied, as well as how effective it will ultimately be. Typically, the bigger the world GDP contribution means the more power one can enact, and on the other hand, for smaller nations the less one is dependent on global trade the more insulated they are from bilateral actions. In a globalized world, insulation of this form has become an increasingly impossible effort to undertake. Most smaller nations seek to increase GDP and grow their middle class— two actions which inevitably pull their economies more tightly to the international interconnected global network. This in turn, progressively strengthens the influence of bilateral actors by hegemonic power-bearing states. Further, the ability to make adverse decisions without global oversight or international scrutiny on one hand; and on the other hand, engage in favoritism or “pay to play” without fallout, gives country operatives requisite cover to function on barter terms and not on egalitarian, humanitarian or altruistic ones. Finally, the ability to switch trade, aid, or investment policy very quickly gives bilateral actions the agility in imposing sanctions or rewarding diplomatic favors in real time. The notion that a particular reward or sanction can start or stop at any given time also gives nations a steady stream of political pressure points and levers to maneuver. African countries should therefore be much more concerned about bilateral actions than multilateral posturing and grandstanding. Catering to bilateral relationships are simply much more fruit-bearing than mastering multilateral group politics. This calculus is perhaps what was observed in the case of Senegal at the UNGA

conventions. The analyzed speech content may very well have been telling a completely different story than what could be concluded by the diminishing number of APTWIs. Thus, on one hand based on the APTWI analysis Senegal could be observed as being less Africanist in its policy agenda based on their speech content at UNGA, but on the other hand, one can also view their unwillingness to strike hardline Africanist themes at the UNGA convention as a well calculated move to not alienate key foreign donors and investors. In which case, Senegal could harbor similar Africanist ambitions as The Gambia, but only choose to display them in productive policy arenas and not in speeches unrelated to policy. This is to say, that ideology as a standalone is unproductive. Africanist ideology without an effective policy vehicle, simply serves to alienate potential partners and serves as a distraction away from the development agenda. Therefore, Africanist policy should be the driving force for African leaders, and not Africanist rhetoric as a standalone. Moreover, African countries with hardline positions around protectionism and exploitation would likely be better served by regional and multilateral joint statements and coordinated talking points, than by political grandstanding. This would effectively insulate individual smaller countries from any direct bilateral retribution.

Depending on how one interprets the results of this study, one could conclude that Pan-Africanist ideology is a diminishing pillar amongst current African leaders. This was certainly the case based on APTWI levels from 20<sup>th</sup> century African leaders (Nkrumah and Toure) versus the modern 21<sup>st</sup> century African leaders (Jammeh, Sall, and Wade). One can further conclude that hedging against the Western encroachment on African political freedoms is particularly unimportant. This particular observation was in fact quite surprising, as the idea of sovereignty and the advancement of an African super state is still well romanticized among many Africanists today. However, the data was quite revealing with regards to the very limited time spent

discussing such matters before the UNGA convention (leaving one to conclude that such matters are not of major relevance). Again, this may simply be written off as a measured approach to bilateralism, but the straight forward analysis suggests a decreasing interest or need for protection against Western political encroachment. However, to imagine the African political landscape as one uninterested in Pan-Africanism, political freedoms, or African intellectual freedoms is one that would be foreign to African political thought pioneers, namely, Nkrumah, Toure, Nassir, Lumumba, Mandela, Nyerere, Dubois, Garvey, Rodney, etc. Yet these are some of the trends this research revealed; that African intellectual and political freedoms, and Pan-Africanism as constructs of African empowerment were no longer items worthy of full pursuit; that notions of independent African thought on subjects of history, economics, human rights, and international affairs are to be relinquished; that protecting the rights and status of African citizens over those that have a history of exploiting Africans would be lost; that African solidarity and unity for the common good would no longer be a virtue, is unexpected.

With respect to foreign assistance, this research was helpful in highlighting key differences in multilateral, bilateral, philanthropic, and private sector mechanisms. In this regard, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) presented worthwhile advice that African nations must take advantage of the ever changing geopolitical and development assistance landscape, meaning that nations should maximize benefits such that foreign assistance can better serve as a catalyst and connector to other forces of good, such as private philanthropy, foreign direct investment, trade, and remittances. This in turn means catering to not only multilateral and bilateral mechanisms, but also private and nongovernmental bodies, like banks, new industries, and civil society groups. Though these forums are not substitutes for foreign assistance generally, these forces play an increasingly important role and developing

nations must work far more closely with them in order to advance. Thus, African ascendance will come from leveraging increasingly accessible knowledge, technical skills, and ingenuity (from the global private sector, universities, and people) and channeling the global capacity for innovation to solve seemingly intractable problems. Development will require leveraging existing tools with innovative thought, combined with strict determinacy from African governments. The tools are undoubtedly available, and the structures in place to create long-term systemic growth. Although there are existing mechanisms that may lean favorably towards one economy over another, there are enough other mechanisms that create the space for growth for all economies. Africans, like their Asian counterparts, will need to learn where those mechanisms are and exploit them to their own benefit.

As it relates to African development more generally, we should not simply discard the theories of yesteryear. We should instead reconsider the many ways that modernization, post-colonial, dependency, and governance theories relate to modern African development. All of these theories hold significance and relevance to current African economic and geopolitical condition. For instance, Rostow's six stages of growth certainly have some level of applicability to the modern African and global sociopolitical development. One can easily see many African countries as being somewhere along the modernization spectrum. On one hand, a country such as The Gambia, having undergone 22 years of dictatorship and only recently reestablished democratic systems, and economically viable relations with the rest of the world; with its dismantled agricultural sector, lack of industrial and skilled labor force, is still in the "Precondition for Takeoff" stage. On the other hand, a country like Senegal with a substantially bigger population, strong ties to key global markets, a burgeoning economy, and ever-growing skilled labor force has graduated from the preconditions phase onto "The Take-Off Stage."



The humanitarian concepts of kindness, benevolence, sympathy and morality are also critical areas of identified culture to maintain as African nations further develop their economies (The Gambia, in particular, is widely known as “the smiling coast”). However, it is certainly not feasible to implement such policies throughout all levels and arenas of African public policy as Dr. David has contended (David, 2004). This is perhaps why properly placing humanism and humanitarianism in the context of international development has proven tricky. The humanitarian paradigm and its key tenets of collectivism, social capital development, community development and social relationships are certainly paramount to human achievement in the humanitarian development schema; because human beings are social beings and therefore, their survival is based on group systems, and interactive conditions. Since the humanitarian paradigm advocates for incentivizing ‘social capital’ development over ‘monetary capital’ to harness development, African nations must develop modes of trust and reciprocity of services over simple financial transactions to harness its potential.

The mechanism outlined in the humanitarian paradigm may need some adjusting, however, the pillars on which it is rooted deserve increased attention in the modern era because the Humanitarian Paradigm is fundamentally linked to Human Development as defined by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). This is essentially the process of expanding people’s freedoms, opportunities and improving their holistic well-being. As mentioned earlier human development is about real freedoms (i.e., freedom to decide; who to be, what to do, and how to live).

Finally, although according to this study dependency theory in its direct multilateral form is likely only marginally relevant, other manifestations and adaptations of the concept on bilateral terms are areas that merit further exploration, particularly with new players steadily

increasing their economic and trade engagement with Africa. Also, bilateral trade agreements such as TPP affecting large swaths of global financial transactions is an area of concern, as well as elements of “information feudalism” where gaps and traps can adversely affect Africa’s position in the global supply chain and its overall development. The residual effects of slavery and colonization will also continue to haunt African leaders, and stunt African development. Those histories should not be forgotten, but it is important to focus on what can be done in practical terms.

The institutional capacity of African nations is also relevant to African independence, progression, and development. The better equipped African countries are at managing intricate governance matters, the better they will be at safeguarding from and mitigating internal or external economic disruptions and distortions. Just as collective bargaining serves to galvanize workers’ interests, so to must regional power structures be the unrelenting advocate for the African people’s best interests. The African Union, the African Development Bank, and other key regional multilateral organizations will ultimately have to play a more central role in organizing and advocating African regional and continental interests in order to compete in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## **Recommendations**

1. In order to meet Pan-African objectives and maximize their impact, African nations should coordinate speech content, talking points, and press statements for multilateral events generally, and more specifically for the annual UNGA meetings.

2. The African Union should lead the policy agenda of continental Africa and provide key multilateral and bilateral engagement strategies and technical assistance to individual African nations in preparation for international forums, presidential summits, and other policy fora.
3. African nations should systemically and consistently call for equality, justice, and transparency in world geopolitics. This should include the demand for permanent representation of both African and Asian blocs on the United Nations Peace and Security Council.
4. African nations should maximize the bullhorn and use the UNGA platform to deliver critical messaging for equality, African unity, African solidarity, geopolitical/military considerations, and macroeconomic conformities. This means increasing the length of speeches, increasing the APTWI usage, and increasing the qualitative grade of such speeches.
5. African nations should strengthen their regional and continental bodies i.e. (ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, IGAD, AFDB and the AU) by strengthening their powers to negotiate and intervene on regional and global matters. African nations should also utilize these bodies in lieu of other, more global multilateral bodies.
6. African nations should work with neighboring states and regional blocs to effectively negotiate and coordinate bilateral agreements and align mutual interests to more positive regional and continental outcomes.
7. African nations should be much more cautious and engaged on bilateral mechanisms than multilateral processes. Although counterintuitive, African nations should actually

negotiate and engage in bilateral agreements as a bloc to ensure some level of collective buy-in over key economic and geopolitical engagements on the continent.

8. African nations must negotiate on the multilateral platform as a regional/continental African bloc to maximize their effectiveness and to pool continental expertise/resources.
9. African countries should develop a common modern political thought paradigm consisting of intellectual and cultural freedoms within related policies that will protect against information feudalism and other culturally deteriorating factors of the globalized, 21<sup>st</sup> century world.
10. African nations should insist on receiving all of their non-humanitarian aid dollars in cash form or in budget support, instead of in-kind donations or third party grantees and/or contractors. This will allow for better accountability and control over assets, and will spur the economy through fractional reserve lending.
11. African nations must find innovative ways to both tax, as well as lower the transactional cost of the inflow of international remittances in order to increase their tax base, provide a steady stream of revenue, hard currency, and capital for important investment projects. Easing remittances in key as the cost are always transactional, of which a large government can absorb.
12. African nations must incentivize and prioritize key sector engagements for trade from Africa. Key country and regional partnerships are necessary for the industrialization of agricultural and other sector products.

13. Africa nations must open-up borders for finances, goods and people to seamlessly travel, interact, and transact with one another. Internal corridors will need to freely flow in order to spur intercontinental growth.
14. African nations must harmonize internal relations and promote, fund and incentivize increased unity, inclusivity, and intercommunal, interreligious unions and cooperative engagements through their respective countries, regions, and the continent as a whole.
15. The AU should amend the principle of inviolability of the colonial borders and negotiate new boundaries that have more coherent meaning for Africans. It must be borne in mind that the carving up of Africa in 1884 was not meant to unify, but rather to divide the continent. These are by no means easy political choices, but African leaders have to confront them before any real chance of optimizing Africa's power can be realized.

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: GAMBIA AND SENEGAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

Indicators	Senegal	Gambia
Life expectancy at birth (years)	66.9	60.5
Adult mortality rate, female (per 1,000 people)	160	237
Adult mortality rate, male (per 1,000 people)	227	291
Deaths due to malaria (per 100,000 people)	59.5	83.7
Deaths due to tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)	21	18
HIV prevalence, adult (% ages 15-49), total	0.5	1.8
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	41.7	47.9
Infants lacking immunization, DTP (% of one-year-olds)	6	2
Infants lacking immunization, measles (% of one-year-olds)	20	4
Public health expenditure (% of GDP)	2.4	5
Stunting (moderate or severe) (% under age 5)	19.4	24.5
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	47.2	68.9
Expected years of schooling (years)	9.5	8.9
Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and older)	55.7	55.5
Government expenditure on education (% of GDP)	5.6	2.8
Gross enrolment ratio: pre-primary (% of preschool-age children)	15	34
Gross enrolment ratio, primary (% of primary school-age population)	81	86
Gross enrolment ratio, secondary (% of secondary school-age population)	40	57
Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary (% of tertiary school-age population)	7	3
Mean years of schooling (years)	2.8	3.3
Population with at least some secondary education (% aged 25 and older)	13.9	31.9
Primary school dropout rate (% of primary school cohort)	38.6	22.7
Primary school teachers trained to teach (%)	70	84
Pupil-teacher ratio, primary school (number of pupils per teacher)	32	37
Gross national income (GNI) per capita (2011 PPP\$)	2,250	1,541
Adjusted net savings (% of GNI)	n.a.	n.a.
Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP)	36	53.7
Domestic food price level index	8.4	7.3
Domestic food price level volatility index	8.7	2.7
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (2011 PPP \$)	2,288	1,556
Gross domestic product (GDP), total (2011 PPP \$ billions)	34.6	3
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	27	21.2
Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI)	0.331	n.a.
Coefficient of human inequality	32.5	n.a.
Income inequality, Gini coefficient	40.3	n.a.
Income inequality, Palma ratio	1.9	n.a.
Income inequality, quintile ratio	7.7	n.a.
Inequality in education (%)	44.7	n.a.

Inequality in income (%)	27.7	26.9
Inequality in life expectancy (%)	25	31.3
Inequality-adjusted education index	0.196	n.a.
Inequality-adjusted income index	0.34	0.302
Inequality-adjusted life expectancy index	0.541	0.428
Overall loss in HDI due to inequality (%)	33.1	n.a.
Gender Development Index (GDI)	0.886	0.878
Adolescent birth rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19)	78.6	113
Estimated gross national income per capita, female (2011 PPP\$)	1,706	1,296
Estimated gross national income per capita, male (2011 PPP\$)	2,814	1,790
Expected years of schooling, female (years)	9.2	8.7
Expected years of schooling, male (years)	9.7	9.6
Gender Inequality Index (GII)	0.521	0.641
Human Development Index (HDI), female	0.464	0.425
Human Development Index (HDI), male	0.523	0.484
Labor force participation rate, female (% ages 15 and older)	45	72.2
Labor force participation rate, male (% ages 15 and older)	70.2	82.7
Legislators, senior officials and managers, female (% of total)	n.a.	n.a.
Life expectancy at birth, female (years)	68.8	61.9
Life expectancy at birth, male (years)	64.9	59.1
Maternal mortality ratio (deaths per 100,000 live births)	315	706
Mean years of schooling, female (years)	2.1	2.6
Mean years of schooling, male (years)	3.6	4.2
Population with at least some secondary education, female (% ages 25 and older)	10.2	25.3
Population with at least some secondary education, male (% ages 25 and older)	19.2	39.1
Share of seats in parliament (% held by women)	42.7	9.4
Unemployment rate (total), female to male ratio	1.7	1.8
Youth unemployment rate, female to male ratio	1.4	1.2
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), HDRO specifications	0.278	0.289
Population in multidimensional poverty, headcount (%)	51.9	57.2
Population in multidimensional poverty, headcount (thousands)	7,621	1,068
Population in multidimensional poverty, intensity of deprivation (%)	53.5	50.5
Population in severe multidimensional poverty (%)	30.8	31.7
Population living below income poverty line, PPP \$1.90 a day (%)	38	n.a.
Population near multidimensional poverty (%)	18.1	21.3
Working poor at PPP\$3.10 a day (% of total employment)	63.8	n.a.
Employment to population ratio (% ages 15 and older)	51.7	54
Child labour (% ages 5-14)	15	19
Employment in agriculture (% of total employment)	46.1	31.5
Employment in services (% of total employment)	22.4	54.6
Labour force participation rate (% ages 15 and older)	57.1	77.3
Mandatory paid maternity leave (days)	98	180
Old age pension recipients (% of statutory pension age population)	23.5	10.8

Total unemployment rate (% of labor force)	9.3	30.1
Vulnerable employment (% of total employment)	58	60.5
Youth not in school or employment (% ages 15-24)	n.a.	n.a.
Youth unemployment rate (% ages 15-24)	13.1	44.4
Homicide rate (per 100,000 people)	7.9	9.4
Birth registration (% under age five)	73	72
Homeless people due to natural disaster (average annual per million people)	0	21
Prison population (per 100,000 people)	62	58
Refugees by country of origin (thousands)	21.3	8.5
Suicide rate, female (per 100,000 people)	2.8	2.6
Suicide rate, male (per 100,000 people)	8.6	7.6
Violence against women ever experienced, intimate partner (%)	n.a.	n.a.
Violence against women ever experienced, nonintimate partner (%)	n.a.	n.a.
Exports and imports (% of GDP)	73.6	70.1
Concentration index (exports)	0.222	0.34
External debt stock (% of GNI)	36.6	63.9
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	2.5	3.3
Net official development assistance received (% of GNI)	7.2	12.1
Private capital flows (% of GDP)	-8.5	n.a.
Remittances, inflows (% of GDP)	11.71	21.23
Internet users (% of population)	21.7	17.1
International inbound tourists (thousands)	836	156
International student mobility (% of total tertiary enrolment)	n.a.	n.a.
Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people)	99.9	131.3
Net migration rate (per 1,000 people)	-1.4	-1.5
Carbon dioxide emissions per capita (tonnes)	0.6	0.3
Electrification rate, rural (% of rural population)	n.a.	n.a.
Forest area (% of total land area)	43	48.2
Forest area (total change %, 1990-2015)	-11.5	10.4
Fresh water withdrawals (% of total renewable water resources)	n.a.	n.a.
Natural resource depletion (% of GNI)	1.1	7
Renewable energy consumption (% of total final energy consumption)	51.4	48.8
Population, total (millions)	15.1	2
Dependency ratio, young age (0-14) (per 100 people ages 15-64)	82.1	89.7
Median age (years)	18	16.8
Dependency ratio, old age (65 and older) (per 100 people ages 15-64)	5.5	4.5
Population, ages 15-64 (millions)	8.1	1
Population, ages 65 and older (millions)	0.4	0
Population, under age 5 (millions)	2.6	0.4
Population, urban (%)	43.7	59.6
Sex ratio at birth (male to female births)	1.04	1.03



**APPENDIX B: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX**

HDI Rank (2015)	Country	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
169	Afghanistan	0.396	0.405	0.415	0.433	0.434	0.448	0.454	0.463	0.47	0.476	0.479	0.479
75	Albania	0.685	0.696	0.703	0.713	0.721	0.725	0.738	0.752	0.759	0.761	0.762	0.764
83	Algeria	0.68	0.686	0.69	0.697	0.705	0.714	0.724	0.732	0.737	0.741	0.743	0.745
32	Andorra							0.819	0.819	0.843	0.85	0.857	0.858
150	Angola	0.426	0.439	0.454	0.468	0.48	0.488	0.495	0.508	0.523	0.527	0.531	0.533
62	Antigua and Barbuda		0.773	0.781	0.786	0.788	0.783	0.782	0.778	0.781	0.782	0.784	0.786
45	Argentina	0.78	0.782	0.788	0.792	0.794	0.802	0.816	0.822	0.823	0.825	0.826	0.827
84	Armenia	0.679	0.692	0.707	0.721	0.725	0.72	0.729	0.732	0.736	0.739	0.741	0.743
2	Australia	0.91	0.915	0.918	0.921	0.925	0.927	0.927	0.93	0.933	0.936	0.937	0.939
24	Austria	0.848	0.854	0.86	0.864	0.87	0.872	0.88	0.884	0.887	0.892	0.892	0.893
78	Azerbaijan	0.675	0.682	0.708	0.719	0.728	0.737	0.741	0.742	0.745	0.752	0.758	0.759
58	Bahamas	0.786	0.788	0.79	0.791	0.791	0.788	0.788	0.789	0.79	0.789	0.79	0.792
47	Bahrain	0.806	0.81	0.813	0.815	0.814	0.81	0.812	0.812	0.815	0.82	0.823	0.824
139	Bangladesh	0.499	0.506	0.513	0.52	0.523	0.535	0.545	0.557	0.565	0.57	0.575	0.579
54	Barbados	0.761	0.766	0.771	0.775	0.779	0.781	0.78	0.785	0.792	0.793	0.794	0.795
52	Belarus	0.713	0.723	0.739	0.755	0.771	0.78	0.787	0.793	0.796	0.796	0.798	0.796
22	Belgium	0.861	0.865	0.871	0.874	0.876	0.878	0.884	0.886	0.889	0.89	0.895	0.896
103	Belize	0.695	0.692	0.7	0.699	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.702	0.706	0.705	0.706	0.706
167	Benin	0.43	0.434	0.438	0.444	0.448	0.451	0.454	0.458	0.466	0.475	0.481	0.485
132	Bhutan							0.572	0.581	0.589	0.596	0.604	0.607
118	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0.622	0.625	0.626	0.632	0.636	0.643	0.649	0.655	0.661	0.666	0.671	0.674
81	Bosnia and Herzegovina		0.697	0.703	0.71	0.716	0.717	0.711	0.728	0.735	0.742	0.747	0.75
108	Botswana	0.593	0.61	0.63	0.646	0.661	0.669	0.678	0.687	0.693	0.697	0.698	0.698
79	Brazil	0.694	0.698	0.7	0.704	0.714	0.716	0.724	0.73	0.734	0.747	0.754	0.754
30	Brunei Darussalam	0.834	0.837	0.84	0.84	0.841	0.845	0.846	0.852	0.86	0.863	0.864	0.865
56	Bulgaria	0.745	0.75	0.755	0.761	0.768	0.77	0.775	0.778	0.781	0.787	0.792	0.794

185	Burkina Faso		0.325	0.334	0.345	0.356	0.365	0.377	0.384	0.392	0.398	0.399	0.402
184	Burundi	0.286	0.29	0.309	0.319	0.336	0.361	0.385	0.393	0.398	0.404	0.406	0.404
122	Cabo Verde	0.582	0.596	0.602	0.615	0.621	0.627	0.632	0.636	0.643	0.643	0.646	0.648
143	Cambodia	0.47	0.483	0.495	0.511	0.52	0.519	0.533	0.54	0.546	0.553	0.558	0.563
153	Cameroon	0.456	0.456	0.456	0.466	0.473	0.48	0.486	0.496	0.501	0.507	0.514	0.518
10	Canada	0.886	0.891	0.894	0.897	0.898	0.898	0.903	0.907	0.909	0.912	0.919	0.92
188	Central African Republic	0.319	0.323	0.33	0.338	0.345	0.352	0.361	0.366	0.37	0.345	0.347	0.352
186	Chad	0.306	0.303	0.306	0.338	0.343	0.36	0.37	0.381	0.387	0.39	0.394	0.396
38	Chile	0.79	0.796	0.797	0.804	0.816	0.815	0.82	0.826	0.831	0.841	0.845	0.847
90	China	0.634	0.646	0.659	0.672	0.682	0.691	0.7	0.703	0.713	0.723	0.734	0.738
95	Colombia	0.658	0.669	0.675	0.683	0.691	0.695	0.7	0.707	0.712	0.72	0.724	0.727
160	Comoros	0.434	0.451	0.459	0.461	0.465	0.476	0.479	0.484	0.49	0.497	0.498	0.498
135	Congo	0.496	0.507	0.517	0.527	0.545	0.548	0.558	0.557	0.576	0.581	0.59	0.592
176	Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	0.355	0.364	0.37	0.377	0.389	0.395	0.398	0.407	0.412	0.419	0.425	0.435
66	Costa Rica	0.723	0.727	0.734	0.74	0.747	0.749	0.752	0.758	0.762	0.768	0.775	0.776
45	Croatia	0.777	0.783	0.793	0.8	0.803	0.803	0.808	0.815	0.817	0.82	0.823	0.827
68	Cuba	0.719	0.732	0.754	0.771	0.782	0.784	0.78	0.778	0.773	0.772	0.773	0.775
33	Cyprus	0.826	0.829	0.836	0.844	0.849	0.853	0.847	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.854	0.856
28	Czech Republic	0.84	0.847	0.851	0.856	0.858	0.859	0.861	0.864	0.865	0.871	0.875	0.878
171	Côte d'Ivoire	0.406	0.413	0.418	0.423	0.431	0.436	0.441	0.444	0.452	0.459	0.466	0.474
5	Denmark	0.897	0.902	0.904	0.906	0.906	0.906	0.91	0.922	0.924	0.926	0.923	0.925
172	Djibouti	0.396	0.405	0.416	0.427	0.436	0.441	0.451	0.46	0.464	0.467	0.47	0.473
96	Dominica	0.703	0.705	0.711	0.714	0.72	0.721	0.722	0.722	0.721	0.724	0.724	0.726
99	Dominican Republic	0.668	0.677	0.685	0.692	0.695	0.697	0.703	0.706	0.709	0.712	0.718	0.722
89	Ecuador	0.688	0.693	0.696	0.698	0.702	0.703	0.71	0.717	0.725	0.737	0.739	0.739
111	Egypt	0.629	0.636	0.644	0.651	0.659	0.665	0.671	0.673	0.681	0.686	0.688	0.691
117	El Salvador	0.644	0.651	0.657	0.659	0.662	0.662	0.666	0.67	0.675	0.676	0.678	0.68
135	Equatorial Guinea	0.563	0.569	0.587	0.592	0.59	0.589	0.58	0.583	0.586	0.582	0.582	0.592
179	Eritrea		0.405	0.405	0.406	0.402	0.404	0.405	0.41	0.414	0.416	0.418	0.42
30	Estonia	0.812	0.822	0.829	0.835	0.836	0.833	0.838	0.85	0.856	0.86	0.863	0.865

174	Ethiopia	0.325	0.346	0.362	0.378	0.393	0.401	0.411	0.422	0.427	0.435	0.441	0.448
91	Fiji	0.699	0.695	0.698	0.7	0.704	0.706	0.709	0.714	0.719	0.727	0.734	0.736
23	Finland	0.864	0.869	0.873	0.876	0.878	0.874	0.878	0.884	0.887	0.89	0.893	0.895
21	France	0.86	0.87	0.873	0.877	0.879	0.879	0.882	0.885	0.887	0.89	0.894	0.897
109	Gabon	0.64	0.646	0.645	0.651	0.652	0.66	0.664	0.669	0.678	0.687	0.694	0.697
173	Gambia	0.412	0.415	0.42	0.426	0.434	0.439	0.441	0.44	0.445	0.449	0.45	0.452
70	Georgia	0.703	0.714	0.722	0.735	0.734	0.738	0.742	0.749	0.755	0.759	0.768	0.769
4	Germany	0.884	0.892	0.898	0.903	0.906	0.907	0.912	0.916	0.919	0.92	0.924	0.926
139	Ghana	0.499	0.51	0.519	0.53	0.542	0.547	0.554	0.563	0.57	0.576	0.575	0.579
29	Greece	0.839	0.85	0.855	0.853	0.857	0.859	0.86	0.858	0.86	0.862	0.865	0.866
79	Grenada							0.741	0.744	0.746	0.749	0.751	0.754
125	Guatemala	0.567	0.57	0.578	0.589	0.596	0.602	0.609	0.616	0.611	0.614	0.637	0.64
183	Guinea	0.346	0.356	0.364	0.371	0.376	0.38	0.385	0.396	0.406	0.412	0.414	0.414
178	Guinea-Bissau		0.388	0.394	0.398	0.401	0.405	0.41	0.416	0.415	0.419	0.421	0.424
127	Guyana	0.619	0.622	0.62	0.618	0.618	0.618	0.624	0.63	0.633	0.636	0.638	0.638
163	Haiti	0.452	0.455	0.458	0.462	0.466	0.47	0.47	0.477	0.483	0.487	0.49	0.493
130	Honduras	0.577	0.583	0.59	0.597	0.603	0.606	0.611	0.614	0.614	0.618	0.623	0.625
12	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	0.861	0.87	0.881	0.887	0.892	0.894	0.898	0.905	0.907	0.913	0.916	0.917
43	Hungary	0.795	0.802	0.809	0.812	0.816	0.817	0.821	0.823	0.824	0.834	0.834	0.836
9	Iceland	0.879	0.884	0.887	0.892	0.894	0.894	0.894	0.901	0.907	0.915	0.919	0.921
131	India	0.526	0.536	0.546	0.556	0.563	0.569	0.58	0.59	0.599	0.607	0.615	0.624
113	Indonesia	0.629	0.632	0.638	0.641	0.645	0.656	0.662	0.669	0.677	0.682	0.686	0.689
69	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.687	0.692	0.704	0.716	0.728	0.735	0.745	0.755	0.769	0.77	0.774	0.774
121	Iraq	0.628	0.631	0.636	0.638	0.643	0.646	0.649	0.656	0.659	0.658	0.649	0.649
8	Ireland	0.889	0.896	0.902	0.908	0.909	0.907	0.909	0.895	0.902	0.91	0.92	0.923
19	Israel	0.866	0.87	0.872	0.877	0.876	0.878	0.883	0.889	0.891	0.895	0.898	0.899
26	Italy	0.851	0.856	0.862	0.866	0.868	0.869	0.872	0.877	0.876	0.877	0.881	0.887
94	Jamaica	0.706	0.709	0.714	0.718	0.721	0.721	0.722	0.725	0.727	0.727	0.729	0.73
17	Japan	0.87	0.873	0.877	0.88	0.881	0.879	0.884	0.889	0.894	0.899	0.902	0.903
86	Jordan	0.73	0.733	0.736	0.739	0.742	0.739	0.737	0.735	0.737	0.737	0.741	0.742
56	Kazakhstan	0.737	0.747	0.754	0.758	0.758	0.763	0.766	0.774	0.782	0.789	0.793	0.794

146	Kenya	0.474	0.483	0.494	0.506	0.514	0.523	0.53	0.536	0.541	0.546	0.55	0.555
137	Kiribati		0.576	0.574	0.572	0.576	0.584	0.585	0.581	0.589	0.597	0.586	0.588
18	Korea (Republic of)	0.852	0.86	0.867	0.873	0.876	0.87	0.884	0.889	0.891	0.896	0.899	0.901
51	Kuwait	0.789	0.787	0.787	0.787	0.788	0.79	0.792	0.794	0.796	0.787	0.799	0.8
120	Kyrgyzstan	0.612	0.613	0.618	0.624	0.629	0.631	0.632	0.638	0.647	0.656	0.662	0.664
138	Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.494	0.503	0.509	0.518	0.525	0.535	0.542	0.554	0.563	0.573	0.582	0.586
44	Latvia	0.791	0.807	0.814	0.819	0.821	0.815	0.81	0.812	0.814	0.822	0.828	0.83
76	Lebanon		0.733	0.731	0.74	0.746	0.752	0.758	0.763	0.766	0.763	0.763	0.763
160	Lesotho	0.437	0.437	0.44	0.447	0.453	0.464	0.469	0.479	0.484	0.491	0.495	0.497
177	Liberia	0.372	0.377	0.383	0.394	0.4	0.403	0.406	0.416	0.419	0.426	0.427	0.427
102	Libya	0.748	0.752	0.756	0.757	0.757	0.755	0.756	0.706	0.735	0.73	0.719	0.716
15	Liechtenstein	0.883	0.886	0.89	0.893	0.899	0.899	0.904	0.909	0.908	0.912	0.911	0.912
37	Lithuania	0.798	0.807	0.812	0.82	0.825	0.824	0.826	0.83	0.834	0.841	0.846	0.848
20	Luxembourg	0.874	0.88	0.877	0.887	0.888	0.884	0.894	0.892	0.892	0.892	0.896	0.898
158	Madagascar	0.473	0.478	0.483	0.491	0.5	0.503	0.504	0.506	0.508	0.509	0.511	0.512
170	Malawi	0.371	0.377	0.387	0.4	0.415	0.43	0.444	0.454	0.459	0.466	0.473	0.476
59	Malaysia	0.734	0.732	0.736	0.747	0.756	0.764	0.774	0.776	0.779	0.783	0.787	0.789
105	Maldives	0.625	0.622	0.632	0.641	0.651	0.653	0.663	0.675	0.683	0.693	0.701	0.701
175	Mali	0.338	0.35	0.363	0.36	0.385	0.396	0.404	0.411	0.421	0.43	0.438	0.442
33	Malta	0.805	0.809	0.808	0.813	0.815	0.819	0.826	0.821	0.828	0.847	0.853	0.856
157	Mauritania	0.461	0.466	0.475	0.475	0.476	0.484	0.487	0.491	0.501	0.509	0.513	0.513
64	Mauritius	0.704	0.713	0.72	0.728	0.734	0.74	0.748	0.756	0.765	0.769	0.779	0.781
77	Mexico	0.719	0.723	0.731	0.735	0.738	0.739	0.745	0.748	0.753	0.754	0.758	0.762
127	Micronesia (Federated States of)	0.617	0.622	0.625	0.628	0.629	0.633	0.638	0.64	0.641	0.639	0.637	0.638
107	Moldova (Republic of)	0.64	0.648	0.656	0.661	0.668	0.664	0.672	0.679	0.686	0.696	0.701	0.699
92	Mongolia	0.637	0.649	0.661	0.673	0.686	0.693	0.701	0.712	0.72	0.729	0.733	0.735
48	Montenegro	0.746	0.751	0.762	0.774	0.785	0.787	0.792	0.797	0.799	0.803	0.804	0.807
123	Morocco	0.569	0.575	0.581	0.589	0.596	0.603	0.612	0.623	0.634	0.64	0.645	0.647
181	Mozambique	0.341	0.353	0.36	0.372	0.382	0.39	0.397	0.4	0.405	0.409	0.414	0.418

145	Myanmar	0.465	0.474	0.484	0.493	0.504	0.515	0.526	0.533	0.54	0.547	0.552	0.556
125	Namibia	0.565	0.57	0.578	0.589	0.598	0.604	0.612	0.619	0.625	0.632	0.637	0.64
144	Nepal	0.469	0.476	0.486	0.492	0.502	0.515	0.529	0.538	0.545	0.551	0.555	0.558
7	Netherlands	0.888	0.893	0.899	0.905	0.906	0.906	0.911	0.921	0.922	0.923	0.923	0.924
13	New Zealand	0.886	0.888	0.891	0.894	0.895	0.899	0.901	0.904	0.908	0.91	0.913	0.915
124	Nicaragua	0.592	0.597	0.601	0.607	0.613	0.614	0.62	0.625	0.63	0.636	0.642	0.645
187	Niger	0.278	0.286	0.293	0.298	0.307	0.312	0.323	0.331	0.341	0.345	0.351	0.353
152	Nigeria	0.463	0.466	0.477	0.481	0.487	0.492	0.5	0.507	0.514	0.521	0.525	0.527
1	Norway	0.929	0.931	0.934	0.936	0.936	0.936	0.939	0.941	0.942	0.945	0.948	0.949
52	Oman	0.742	0.748	0.753	0.765	0.782	0.797	0.797	0.797	0.796	0.796	0.795	0.796
147	Pakistan	0.487	0.501	0.505	0.513	0.514	0.521	0.525	0.529	0.538	0.542	0.548	0.55
60	Palau	0.756	0.758	0.765	0.767	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.775	0.779	0.782	0.783	0.788
114	Palestine, State of	0.648	0.656	0.656	0.661	0.656	0.667	0.669	0.674	0.684	0.678	0.678	0.684
60	Panama	0.74	0.744	0.743	0.75	0.755	0.756	0.758	0.765	0.773	0.78	0.785	0.788
154	Papua New Guinea	0.446	0.454	0.461	0.469	0.477	0.485	0.494	0.501	0.506	0.511	0.515	0.516
110	Paraguay	0.646	0.648	0.649	0.654	0.663	0.664	0.675	0.679	0.679	0.688	0.692	0.693
87	Peru	0.692	0.693	0.696	0.7	0.706	0.708	0.721	0.725	0.731	0.735	0.737	0.74
116	Philippines	0.642	0.646	0.648	0.655	0.661	0.662	0.669	0.666	0.671	0.676	0.679	0.682
36	Poland	0.797	0.803	0.808	0.813	0.818	0.822	0.829	0.834	0.838	0.85	0.852	0.855
41	Portugal	0.79	0.793	0.797	0.804	0.809	0.812	0.818	0.824	0.827	0.837	0.841	0.843
33	Qatar	0.83	0.835	0.83	0.825	0.828	0.825	0.827	0.837	0.843	0.854	0.855	0.856
50	Romania	0.745	0.755	0.766	0.78	0.795	0.797	0.798	0.797	0.794	0.797	0.798	0.802
49	Russian Federation	0.748	0.754	0.761	0.769	0.776	0.773	0.785	0.792	0.799	0.803	0.805	0.804
159	Rwanda	0.388	0.404	0.424	0.438	0.447	0.454	0.464	0.475	0.485	0.488	0.493	0.498
74	Saint Kitts and Nevis							0.741	0.746	0.749	0.756	0.762	0.765
92	Saint Lucia	0.689	0.694	0.707	0.71	0.717	0.724	0.733	0.735	0.734	0.723	0.735	0.735
99	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.692	0.695	0.702	0.704	0.709	0.711	0.712	0.713	0.717	0.72	0.72	0.722
104	Samoa	0.671	0.677	0.682	0.688	0.691	0.69	0.693	0.698	0.7	0.701	0.702	0.704
142	Sao Tome and Principe	0.514	0.521	0.527	0.531	0.533	0.542	0.546	0.553	0.559	0.562	0.565	0.574
38	Saudi Arabia	0.761	0.767	0.773	0.779	0.787	0.792	0.804	0.818	0.83	0.841	0.845	0.847

162	Senegal	0.415	0.422	0.425	0.435	0.444	0.449	0.455	0.463	0.474	0.483	0.491	0.494
66	Serbia	0.73	0.739	0.743	0.749	0.754	0.755	0.757	0.767	0.766	0.771	0.775	0.776
63	Seychelles	0.712	0.728	0.733	0.739	0.739	0.74	0.744	0.755	0.762	0.766	0.781	0.782
179	Sierra Leone	0.341	0.348	0.357	0.367	0.375	0.384	0.392	0.401	0.413	0.426	0.431	0.42
5	Singapore	0.821	0.839	0.873	0.88	0.887	0.889	0.911	0.917	0.92	0.922	0.924	0.925
40	Slovakia	0.784	0.793	0.802	0.813	0.82	0.822	0.829	0.835	0.838	0.841	0.842	0.845
25	Slovenia	0.853	0.858	0.865	0.869	0.873	0.872	0.876	0.877	0.878	0.888	0.888	0.89
156	Solomon Islands	0.465	0.47	0.482	0.489	0.494	0.492	0.497	0.505	0.509	0.512	0.514	0.515
119	South Africa	0.609	0.609	0.612	0.616	0.622	0.63	0.638	0.644	0.652	0.66	0.665	0.666
181	South Sudan							0.429	0.419	0.417	0.421	0.421	0.418
27	Spain	0.837	0.844	0.849	0.854	0.858	0.86	0.867	0.871	0.874	0.877	0.882	0.884
73	Sri Lanka	0.712	0.718	0.725	0.731	0.735	0.739	0.746	0.752	0.757	0.76	0.764	0.766
165	Sudan	0.423	0.43	0.44	0.444	0.456	0.461	0.463	0.468	0.478	0.485	0.488	0.49
97	Suriname	0.672	0.678	0.684	0.691	0.696	0.7	0.704	0.708	0.719	0.722	0.723	0.725
148	Swaziland	0.495	0.502	0.508	0.514	0.519	0.523	0.526	0.534	0.539	0.541	0.541	0.541
14	Sweden	0.89	0.892	0.895	0.897	0.898	0.895	0.901	0.903	0.904	0.906	0.909	0.913
2	Switzerland	0.899	0.904	0.911	0.914	0.916	0.92	0.932	0.932	0.934	0.936	0.938	0.939
149	Syrian Arab Republic	0.624	0.636	0.644	0.651	0.648	0.65	0.646	0.645	0.635	0.575	0.553	0.536
129	Tajikistan	0.572	0.579	0.586	0.592	0.601	0.603	0.608	0.613	0.617	0.622	0.625	0.627
151	Tanzania (United Republic of)	0.432	0.446	0.457	0.468	0.478	0.488	0.498	0.504	0.513	0.512	0.519	0.531
87	Thailand	0.682	0.686	0.687	0.7	0.706	0.711	0.72	0.729	0.733	0.737	0.738	0.74
82	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia		0.703	0.709	0.714	0.73	0.732	0.735	0.739	0.741	0.743	0.746	0.748
133	Timor-Leste	0.492	0.511	0.541	0.566	0.599	0.599	0.607	0.618	0.62	0.612	0.603	0.606
166	Togo	0.435	0.436	0.443	0.441	0.442	0.449	0.457	0.464	0.47	0.475	0.484	0.487
101	Tonga	0.694	0.695	0.698	0.698	0.703	0.707	0.712	0.717	0.718	0.716	0.718	0.721
65	Trinidad and Tobago	0.745	0.751	0.76	0.767	0.773	0.772	0.774	0.772	0.773	0.778	0.779	0.78
97	Tunisia	0.683	0.689	0.695	0.701	0.706	0.71	0.714	0.717	0.72	0.722	0.723	0.725
71	Turkey	0.681	0.687	0.697	0.705	0.709	0.715	0.737	0.75	0.754	0.759	0.764	0.767
111	Turkmenistan							0.665	0.672	0.678	0.683	0.688	0.692

163	Uganda	0.429	0.434	0.442	0.453	0.464	0.473	0.477	0.477	0.478	0.483	0.488	0.493
84	Ukraine	0.707	0.716	0.723	0.73	0.734	0.728	0.734	0.739	0.744	0.746	0.748	0.743
42	United Arab Emirates	0.818	0.823	0.826	0.829	0.831	0.826	0.824	0.826	0.829	0.832	0.836	0.84
16	United Kingdom	0.886	0.89	0.889	0.892	0.895	0.895	0.902	0.898	0.899	0.904	0.908	0.91
10	United States	0.895	0.898	0.901	0.905	0.907	0.907	0.91	0.913	0.915	0.916	0.918	0.92
54	Uruguay	0.753	0.756	0.76	0.77	0.774	0.777	0.78	0.784	0.788	0.791	0.794	0.795
105	Uzbekistan	0.62	0.626	0.631	0.644	0.651	0.657	0.664	0.673	0.681	0.69	0.697	0.701
134	Vanuatu		0.572	0.579	0.582	0.589	0.59	0.591	0.592	0.591	0.596	0.598	0.597
71	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0.7	0.714	0.728	0.745	0.754	0.754	0.756	0.767	0.77	0.771	0.769	0.767
115	Viet Nam	0.609	0.618	0.625	0.633	0.641	0.647	0.655	0.662	0.668	0.675	0.678	0.683
168	Yemen	0.47	0.475	0.477	0.48	0.483	0.488	0.493	0.494	0.498	0.5	0.499	0.482
139	Zambia	0.467	0.479	0.492	0.504	0.518	0.533	0.543	0.554	0.565	0.57	0.576	0.579
154	Zimbabwe	0.406	0.408	0.414	0.421	0.419	0.436	0.452	0.464	0.488	0.498	0.507	0.516

APPENDIX C: GAMBIA – BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES

No.	Short title	Parties	Type of agreement	Status	Files	Date of signature
1	Gambia - Guinea BIT (2002)	Gambia; Guinea;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	Gambia-Guinea_2002_EN.pdf-en	21/10/2002
2	Gambia - Iran, Islamic Republic of BIT (2007)	Gambia; Iran, Islamic Republic of;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed		20/06/2007
3	Gambia - Kuwait BIT (2013)	Gambia; Kuwait;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed		01/04/2013
4	Gambia - Libya BIT (1995)	Gambia; Libya;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed		26/07/1995
5	Gambia - Mali BIT (2004)	Gambia; Mali;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed		14/05/2004
6	Gambia - Mauritania BIT (2001)	Gambia; Mauritania;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	Gambia-Mauritania_2001_EN.pdf-en	09/05/2001
7	Gambia - Mauritius BIT (2016)	Gambia; Mauritius;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed		10/11/2016
8	Gambia - Morocco BIT (2006)	Gambia; Morocco;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	Gambia-Morocco_2006_EN.pdf-en	20/02/2006
9	Gambia - Netherlands BIT (2002)	Gambia; Netherlands;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	Gambia-Netherlands_2002_EN.pdf-en	25/09/2002
10	Gambia - Qatar BIT (2002)	Gambia; Qatar;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	Gambia - Qatar BIT (2002)_en (OCR).pdf-en; Gambia-Qatar_2002_AR.pdf-ar	17/05/2002
11	Gambia - Spain BIT (2008)	Gambia; Spain;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	Gambia SPAIN BIT en 2008OCR.pdf-en; Gambia-Spain BIT_ES.pdf-es	17/12/2008
12	Gambia - Switzerland BIT (1993)	Gambia; Switzerland;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	Gambia - Switzerland (1993)_en (OCR).pdf-en;	22/11/1993



					Gambia-Switzerland_1993_FR.pdf-fr	
13	Gambia - Taiwan Province of China BIT (2010)	Gambia; Taiwan Province of China;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	Gambia Taiwan BIT en 2010 OCR.pdf-en	09/08/2005
14	Gambia - Turkey BIT (2013)	Gambia; Turkey;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	Gambia TURKEY BIT en 2013OCR.pdf-en	12/03/2013
15	Gambia - Ukraine BIT (2001)	Gambia; Ukraine;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	Gambia UKRAINE BIT en 2001OCR.pdf-en	14/07/2001
16	Gambia - United Kingdom BIT (2002)	Gambia; United Kingdom;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	Gambia-UK BIT (2002)_FULL TEXT_en.pdf-en	02/07/2002

APPENDIX D: GAMBIA – TREATIES WITH INVESTMENT PROVISIONS

No.	Title of agreement	Short title	Parties	Type of agreement	Status	Date of signature
1	Trade and Investment Framework Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Economic Community of West African States	ECOWAS - US TIFA (2014)	ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States); United States of America;	Treaties with Investment Provisions	Signed	05/08/2014
2	Supplementary Act A/SA.3/12/08 Adopting Community Rules on Investment and the Modalities for their Implementation with ECOWAS	ECOWAS Supplementary Act on Investments	ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	In force	19/12/2008
3	ECOWAS Energy Protocol	ECOWAS Energy Protocol	ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	Signed	31/01/2003
4	Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and Its Member States, of the Other Part	Cotonou Agreement (2000)	ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States); EU (European Union);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	In force	23/06/2000
5	Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	Revised ECOWAS Treaty	ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	In force	24/07/1993
6	Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community/African Union	AU Treaty	AU (African Union);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	In force	03/06/1991
7	Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments amongst the Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference	OIC Investment Agreement (1981)	OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	In force	05/06/1981

8	Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of West African States - Protocol A/P1/5/79 on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment	ECOWAS Protocol on Movement of Persons and Establishment	ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	In force	29/05/1979
9	Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of West African States	ECOWAS Treaty	ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	Terminated	28/05/1975

APPENDIX E: SENEGAL -BILATERAL INVESTMENTS TREATIES

No.	Short title	Parties	Type of agreement	Status	Date of signature
1	Argentina - Senegal BIT (1993)	Argentina; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	06/04/1993
2	Canada - Senegal BIT (2014)	Canada; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	27/11/2014
3	Egypt - Senegal BIT (1998)	Egypt; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	05/03/1998
4	France - Senegal BIT (2007)	France; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	26/07/2007
5	Germany - Senegal BIT (1964)	Germany; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	24/01/1964
6	India - Senegal BIT (2008)	India; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	03/07/2008
7	Italy - Senegal BIT (2000)	Italy; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	13/10/2000
8	Korea, Republic of - Senegal BIT (1984)	Korea, Republic of; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	12/07/1984
9	Kuwait - Senegal BIT (2009)	Kuwait; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	25/07/2009
10	Malaysia - Senegal BIT (1999)	Malaysia; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	11/02/1999
11	Mali - Senegal BIT (2005)	Mali; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	12/04/2005
12	Mauritius - Senegal BIT (2002)	Mauritius; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	14/03/2002
13	Morocco - Senegal BIT (2001)	Morocco; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	18/02/2001
14	Morocco - Senegal BIT (2006)	Morocco; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	15/11/2006
15	Netherlands - Senegal BIT (1979)	Netherlands; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	03/08/1979
16	Portugal - Senegal BIT (2011)	Portugal; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	25/01/2011
17	Qatar - Senegal BIT (1998)	Qatar; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	10/06/1998
18	Romania - Senegal BIT (1980)	Romania; Senegal;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	19/06/1980
19	Senegal - South Africa BIT (1998)	Senegal; South Africa;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	19/06/1998
20	Senegal - Spain BIT (2007)	Senegal; Spain;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	22/11/2007
21	Senegal - Sweden BIT (1967)	Senegal; Sweden;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	24/02/1967

22	Senegal - Switzerland BIT (1962)	Senegal; Switzerland;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	16/08/1962
23	Senegal - Syrian Arab Republic BIT (1975)	Senegal; Syrian Arab Republic;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	14/11/1975
24	Senegal - Taiwan Province of China BIT (1997)	Senegal; Taiwan Province of China;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	24/10/1997
25	Senegal - Tunisia BIT (1984)	Senegal; Tunisia;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	Signed	17/05/1984
26	Senegal - Turkey BIT (2010)	Senegal; Turkey;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	15/06/2010
27	Senegal - United Kingdom BIT (1980)	Senegal; United Kingdom;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	07/05/1980
28	Senegal - United States of America BIT (1983)	Senegal; United States of America;	Bilateral Investment Treaties	In force	06/12/1983

APPENDIX F: SENEGAL TREATIES WITH INVESTMENT PROVISIONS

No.	Title of agreement	Short title	Parties	Type of agreement	Date of signature
1	Trade and Investment Framework Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Economic Community of West African States	ECOWAS - US TIFA (2014)	ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States); United States of America;	Treaties with Investment Provisions	05/08/2014
2	Supplementary Act A/SA.3/12/08 Adopting Community Rules on Investment and the Modalities for their Implementation with ECOWAS	ECOWAS Supplementary Act on Investments	ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	19/12/2008
3	ECOWAS Energy Protocol	ECOWAS Energy Protocol	ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	31/01/2003
4	Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations	US-WAEMU TIFA	United States of America; WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	24/04/2002
5	Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and Its Member States, of the Other Part	Cotonou Agreement (2000)	ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States); EU (European Union);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	23/06/2000
6	Treaty Establishing the West African Economic and Monetary Union	WAEMU Treaty	WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	10/01/1994

7	Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	Revised ECOWAS Treaty	ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	24/07/1993
8	Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community/African Union	AU Treaty	AU (African Union);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	03/06/1991
9	Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments amongst the Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference	OIC Investment Agreement (1981)	OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	05/06/1981
10	Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of West African States - Protocol A/P1/5/79 on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment	ECOWAS Protocol on Movement of Persons and Establishment	ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	29/05/1979
11	Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of West African States	ECOWAS Treaty	ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States);	Treaties with Investment Provisions	28/05/1975

## APPENDIX B

## APPENDIX G: U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO GAMBIA AND SENEGAL

U.S FUNDING AREA	Country	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
Multi-Sector	Gambia	\$ -	\$ 0.02	\$ 0.06	\$ 0.04	\$ 0.03	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 0.14
Multi-Sector	Senegal	\$ 2.31	\$ (0.15)	\$ 2.11	\$ 2.46	\$ 2.85	\$ 2.16	\$ 1.95	\$ 0.02	\$ 13.71
Economic Development	Gambia	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 0.09	\$ 0.11	\$ 0.05	\$ 0.15	\$ 0.35	\$ 0.74
Economic Development	Senegal	\$ 8.15	\$ 497.57	\$ 3.16	\$ 2.34	\$ 11.44	\$ 34.02	\$ 124.08	\$ 329.98	\$ 1,010.74
Program Management	Gambia	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Program Management	Senegal	\$ 9.58	\$ 41.08	\$ (0.08)	\$ 0.68	\$ 18.85	\$ 25.95	\$ 25.68	\$ 25.50	\$ 147.24
Health	Gambia	\$ -	\$ 0.66	\$ 0.70	\$ 0.59	\$ 0.57	\$ 0.70	\$ -	\$ 0.68	\$ 3.89
Health	Senegal	\$ -	\$ 0.79	\$ 1.48	\$ 1.47	\$ 44.37	\$ 47.00	\$ 60.95	\$ 66.34	\$ 222.40
Environment	Gambia	\$ -	\$ 0.59	\$ 0.62	\$ 0.58	\$ 0.51	\$ 0.44	\$ 1.74	\$ 0.18	\$ 4.65
Environment	Senegal	\$ -	\$ 1.55	\$ 2.22	\$ 2.41	\$ 3.56	\$ 3.67	\$ 8.68	\$ 5.40	\$ 27.49
Democracy, Human Rights, Governance	Gambia	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 0.06	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 0.06
Democracy, Human Rights, Governance	Senegal	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 0.53	\$ 0.25	\$ 5.21	\$ 3.33	\$ 1.15	\$ 2.38	\$ 12.85
Education and Social Services	Gambia	\$ -	\$ 0.56	\$ 0.61	\$ 0.64	\$ 0.69	\$ 0.65	\$ -	\$ 0.70	\$ 3.85
Education and Social Services	Senegal	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 0.02	\$ 19.16	\$ 10.47	\$ 0.22	\$ 4.24	\$ 34.11



Peace and Security	Gambia	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 0.07	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 0.07
Peace and Security	Senegal	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 3.04	\$ 5.77	\$ 5.81	\$ 8.56	\$ 23.18
Humanitarian	Gambia	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 0.38	\$ -	\$ 0.38
Humanitarian	Senegal	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 4.49	\$ 9.35	\$ 1.48	\$ 15.32
		<b>\$ 20.04</b>	<b>\$ 542.67</b>	<b>\$ 11.40</b>	<b>\$ 11.57</b>	<b>\$ 110.52</b>	<b>\$ 138.70</b>	<b>\$ 240.14</b>	<b>\$ 445.80</b>	<b>\$ 1,520.83</b>

Source: Foreignassistance.gov

## APPENDIX H: THE GAMBIA TARIFFS AND IMPORTS SUMMARY

### Part A.1 Tariffs and imports: Summary and duty ranges

Summary	Total	Ag	Non-Ag	WTO member since	1996
Simple average final bound	103.5	105.2	59.7	Binding coverage:	Total 14.8
Simple average MFN applied					Non-Ag 0.7
Trade weighted average				Ag: Tariff quotas (in %)	0
Imports in billion US\$				Ag: Special safeguards (in %)	0

Frequency distribution	Duty-free	0 <= 5	5 <= 10	10 <= 15	15 <= 25	25 <= 50	50 <= 100	> 100	NAV
	Tariff lines and import values (in %)								
Agricultural products									
Final bound	0	0	0	0	2.4	3.3	1.1	93.1	0
MFN applied									
Imports									
Non-agricultural products									
Final bound	0	0	0	0	0	0.4	0.2	0.1	0
MFN applied									
Imports									

### Part A.2 Tariffs and imports by product groups

Product groups	Final bound duties				MFN applied duties			Imports	
	AVG	Duty-free in %	Max	Binding in %	AVG	Duty-free in %	Max	Share in %	Duty-free in %
Animal products	110.0	0	110	100					
Dairy products	110.0	0	110	100					
Fruit, vegetables, plants	110.0	0	110	100					
Coffee, tea	110.0	0	110	100					
Cereals & preparations	110.0	0	110	100					
Oilseeds, fats & oils	110.0	0	110	98.8					
Sugars and confectionery	110.0	0	110	100					
Beverages & tobacco	110.0	0	110	100					
Cotton	35.0	0	35	100					
Other agricultural products	86.5	0	110	100					
Fish & fish products	110.0	0	110	0.9					
Minerals & metals	42.3	0	50	1.4					
Petroleum	-	-	-	0					
Chemicals	60.0	0	110	0.4					
Wood, paper, etc.	-	-	-	0					
Textiles	-	-	-	0					
Clothing	-	-	-	0					

Leather, footwear, etc.	-	-	-	0		
Non-electrical machinery	-	-	-	0		
Electrical machinery	-	-	-	0		
Transport equipment	70.9	0	80	9.2		
Manufactures, n.e.s.	-	-	-	0		

## Part B Exports to major trading partners and duties faced

Major markets	Bilateral imports		Diversification		MFN AVG of		Pref.	Duty-free imports	
	in million		95% trade in no. of		traded TL		margin	TL	Value
	US\$		HS 2-digit	HS 6-digit	Simple	Weighted	Weighted	in %	in %
Agricultural products									
1. India	2015	28	1	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0
2. European Union	2015	13	4	6	8.9	4.3	4.3	100.0	100.0
3. Viet Nam	2015	12	1	1	10.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
4. Senegal	2015	0	4	4	16.0	23.0	23.0	100.0	100.0
5. Mauritania	2014	0	2	2	8.7	1.9	0.0	33.3	85.6
Non-agricultural products									
1. China	2015	56	1	1	1.7	0.0	0.0	71.7	99.9
2. European Union	2015	6	5	12	6.7	8.2	8.2	100.0	100.0
3. India	2015	4	3	3	6.7	5.5	0.0	16.7	13.8
4. United Arab Emirates	2015	2	2	3	2.0	0.2	0.0	60.0	96.0
5. Viet Nam	2015	2	2	2	2.5	0.0	0.0	75.0	99.9

Source: WTO.org

## APPENDIX I: SENEGAL TARIFFS AND IMPORTS SUMMARY

### Tariffs and imports: Summary and duty ranges

#### Part A.1

Summary		Total	Ag	Non-Ag	WTO member since	1995
Simple average final bound		30.0	29.8	30.0	Binding coverage:	Total 100
Simple average MFN applied	2016	12.2	15.8	11.5		Non-Ag 100
Trade weighted average	2015	9.2	12.6	8.2	Ag: Tariff quotas (in %)	0
Imports in billion US\$	2015	5.6	1.3	4.3	Ag: Special safeguards (in %)	0

Frequency distribution	Duty-free	0 <= 5	5 <= 10	10 <= 15	15 <= 25	25 <= 50	50 <= 100	> 100	NAV
	Tariff lines and import values (in %)								
Agricultural products									
Final bound	0	0	0	1.2	0	98.8	0	0	0
MFN applied	0	27.0	19.2	0	41.7	12.0	0	0	0
Imports	0	33.5	40.0	0	17.0	9.5	0	0	0
Non-agricultural products									
Final bound	0	0	0	0.1	0	99.9	0	0	0
MFN applied	1.8	39.8	21.9	0	36.1	0.4	0	0	0
Imports	18.1	34.0	30.5	0	17.0	0.3	0	0	0

### Tariffs and imports by product groups

#### Part A.2

Product groups	Final bound duties				MFN applied duties			Imports	
	AVG	Duty-free in %	Max	Binding in %	AVG	Duty-free in %	Max	Share in %	Duty-free in %
Animal products	30.0	0	30	100	24.5	0	35	0.2	0
Dairy products	27.5	0	30	100	17.0	0	35	1.3	0
Fruit, vegetables, plants	30.0	0	30	100	17.9	0	35	1.6	0
Coffee, tea	30.0	0	30	100	18.5	0	35	0.5	0
Cereals & preparations	29.3	0	30	100	13.6	0	35	13.6	0
Oilseeds, fats & oils	30.0	0	30	100	11.1	0	35	2.7	0
Sugars and confectionery	30.0	0	30	100	12.6	0	35	0.9	0
Beverages & tobacco	29.7	0	30	100	17.3	0	35	1.9	0
Cotton	30.0	0	30	100	5.0	0	5	0.0	0
Other agricultural products	30.0	0	30	100	9.6	0	20	0.4	0
Fish & fish products	30.0	0	30	100	15.6	0	20	0.4	0
Minerals & metals	30.0	0	30	100	11.6	1.9	20	12.4	15.2
Petroleum	30.0	0	30	100	7.7	19.0	10	20.7	38.8
Chemicals	30.0	0	30	100	7.4	3.8	35	10.1	32.8

Wood, paper, etc.	30.0	0	30	100	11.3	5.1	20	3.3	8.0
Textiles	30.0	0	30	100	16.1	0.3	35	2.5	12.6
Clothing	30.0	0	30	100	20.0	0	20	0.3	0
Leather, footwear, etc.	30.0	0	30	100	12.3	1.3	20	1.0	2.0
Non-electrical machinery	30.0	0	30	100	6.8	0	20	10.7	0
Electrical machinery	30.0	0	30	100	11.2	0.4	20	6.4	0.8
Transport equipment	30.0	0	30	100	8.1	2.5	20	7.1	0.0
Manufactures, n.e.s.	30.0	0	30	100	14.2	2.1	20	1.9	0.9

## Part B Exports to major trading partners and duties faced

Major markets	Bilateral imports		Diversification		MFN AVG of		Pref. margin	Duty-free imports		
	in million		95% trade in no. of		traded TL			Weighted	TL in %	Value in %
	US\$		HS 2-digit	HS 6-digit	Simple	Weighted				
Agricultural products										
1. European Union	2015	135	6	15	13.5	8.4	8.4	100.0	100.0	
2. China	2015	83	2	3	12.9	12.8	9.8	90.0	69.7	
3. India	2015	34	4	4	10.5	0.9	0.0	60.0	96.9	
4. Congo	2014	18	1	1	13.0	5.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	
5. Côte d'Ivoire	2015	15	3	5	20.8	20.0	20.0	100.0	100.0	
Non-agricultural products										
1. European Union	2015	322	19	51	5.0	8.0	8.0	100.0	100.0	
2. India	2015	230	4	4	7.1	5.0	0.0	8.0	1.9	
3. Switzerland	2015	220	1	1	1.6	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	
4. United Arab Emirates	2015	125	1	1	4.3	0.1	0.0	13.9	98.6	
5. Côte d'Ivoire	2015	107	10	19	15.3	10.2	10.2	100.0	100.0	

Source: WTO.org

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